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General Introduction

SInce Tiebout (1956), it is generally accepted that property taxes and local public ex-penditures, as well as a large number of structural and neighborhood characteristics
capitalize into house prices.
Tax capitalization is said to occur if, for constant quality of houses in terms of housing struc-
tural and neighborhood characteristics, an increase in the tax liability reduces house values.
Let us consider two houses which have the same structural characteristics and are located
in the same neighborhood. Suppose that there is a EUR 300 tax bill differential between
these two houses. If the relevant discount rate for households is 3%, perfect tax capitaliza-
tion implies that the house with the lower tax bill will be compensated by a 300/0.03= EUR
10,000 higher house value. Imperfect capitalization induces that the house values differences
will not be equal to the present value of the stream of future property taxes; for example, if
the difference of house values between two comparable houses is only EUR 5,000, the tax
capitalization rate is 50%.
Empirical capitalization studies are based on two approaches. The most popular, the he-
donic approach, establishes a relationship between house prices and the different amenities
that characterize houses. Hedonic prices are based on the pioneering theoretical works of
Lancaster (1966) and Rosen (1974), and have been used to develop index housing prices
and to estimate individuals’ willingness-to-pay for various attributes which are not traded on
explicit markets (for example, air quality and parks). The second technique is based on the
asset pricing approach and has been largely used in the literature on financial markets. House
value is defined as the present value of net-of-tax rental values generated to the owner.
As noted by Fischel (2001) and Oates (2006) there is an abundant literature on the capitaliza-
tion of local fiscal variables into house values. The major part of the literature is based on US
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data. Early contributions, like Oates (1969), King (1977) and Reinhard (1981) are based on
aggregate data and focus on the extent to which property taxes capitalize into property val-
ues. Subsequent empirical literature can be viewed as an attempt to improve the econometric
techniques employed to estimate the impact of local fiscal variables on housing prices. Pol-
lakowski (1973) points to a lack of control variables and the presence of omitted variables
bias in the original Oates’s estimation. These problems have been partially solved by cap-
italization studies that use micro data and include a greater number of control variables, as
in Wales and Wiens (1974), Chinloy (1978), Ihlanfeldt and Jackson (1982) and Yinger et al.
(1988).
While the literature provides a profusion of evidence on capitalization, there is still a con-
troversy on the extent to which local fiscal variables capitalize into house values (Palmon
and Smith, 1998a) and on the appropriate interpretation one must have with respect to the
Tiebout hypothesis. Oates (1973), Church (1974) and Reinhard (1981) report full or over-
capitalization. Rosen and Fullerton (1977), Richardson and Thalheimer (1981) and Palmon
and Smith (1998b) find intermediate rate of capitalization. Wales and Wiens (1974), Chinloy
(1978) and Gronberg (1979) do not find any significant tax capitalization effects.
In contrast to Oates (1969), another strand of literature considers capitalization as a short
term phenomenon that follows from a shortage of housing supply and that should disappear
over time. Capitalization does not describe a full Tiebout equilibrium. Henderson (1985)
and Henderson and Thisse (2001) stress the assumption of the role of active land developers
in a context of flexible jurisdictions’ boundaries. In such configuration, interjurisdictional
housing prices differentials are impossible because land developers reallocate strategically
land use in order to catch the profits that stem from capitalization. The communities with
desirable fiscal bundles expand over the communities with relatively high taxes and low
quality of public services. Moreover, Hamilton (1976a) argues that, in the long run, there
is no reason preventing land developers from creating new communities with the desired
fiscal bundle, which will eliminate the capitalization of tax and public expenditures into
property values. In contrast to the no-capitalization faction, Yinger (1981, 1982) argues that
capitalization is a feature of long-term equilibrium. He argues that as land developers create
new communities that are under-supplied or housing suppliers build new houses in scarce
communities, land becomes scarcer and prices rise. When the cost of converting land from
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non-residential to residential use is too high it becomes not profitable for land developers
to supply new houses or create new communities. All remaining variation in local fiscal
variables is thus capitalized into house values and capitalization occurs even in the long-run.
This debate on the existence of capitalization and its meaning has important practical im-
plications for the efficiency conditions of local public goods provision. Starting with the
contribution of Oates (1969), the outcome of a significant degree of tax and public expen-
ditures capitalization was interpreted as a test of the Tiebout hypothesis. Consequently,
capitalization of local fiscal variables was often interpreted as a Pareto efficient provision of
local public goods. The theoretical argument of Hamilton (1976a) and Henderson (1985)
implies in contrast that the Tiebout hypothesis is supported empirically by the absence of
any correlation between property taxes and house values.
Surprisingly, while it has been raised in the 70’s, the question of the persistence of capital-
ization has not received a definitive answer. Moreover, this debate has recently received new
attention by the literature. Brasington (2002) and Hilber and Mayer (2001, 2009) give some
support to the no-capitalization faction and show with US data that capitalization decreases
in response to housing supply. This thesis aims to contribute to the debate on the existence
of capitalization and investigates whether housing supply reaction effectively takes place
in practice and whether it affects the degree to which local fiscal variables capitalize into
property prices. Since housing supply may or may not react depending on various factors
such as the flexibility of jurisdictions’ boundaries, the presence of active land developers,
the question of the persistence of the tax capitalization is essentially an empirical one. The
objective is precisely to empirically determine whether capitalization actually persists across
space and over time. The extent to which tax and public expenditures capitalize into house
values is not only an academic issue but also has several important practical implications.
The degree of capitalization is important for fiscal equity. In the absence of capitalization,
an increase in property tax payment will not affect the market price of houses. This implies
that current homeowners can escape the burden of taxation and transfer tax increases on the
future buyers. In contrast, perfect capitalization ensures that current homeowners will pay,
in the form of lower house values, any increase of tax payment.
6 General Introduction
This thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter goes back to the theoretical base of the
capitalization hypothesis, namely the Tiebout (1956) model. We argue that while this model
is invoked by virtually every capitalization study, capitalization of local fiscal variables is not
a feature of the Tiebout model as it does not explicitly include property taxation and housing.
We present a survey of the Tiebout literature that fills this gap and examine whether efficiency
of public services provision holds with property taxes (Hamilton, 1975, 1976b; Hoyt, 1991;
Henderson, 1994). The Tiebout model is also relatively silent on what Oates (2006) calls
"the supply side of the Tiebout model". Chapter 1 shows that the response of the literature
is to introduce different forms of government in models that preserve the essential Tiebout
original assumptions. These models may include for example profit maximizing govern-
ments (Sonstelie and Portney, 1978; Henderson, 1985; Scotchmer, 1985a; Pines, 1991) or
property value maximizing governments (Wildasin, 1979; Yinger, 1981; Brueckner, 1983;
Scotchmer, 1986; Wildasin and Wilson, 1996).
Chapter 2 provides a review of the empirical literature on capitalization. Instead of present-
ing exhaustively capitalization studies, we focus on the improvements of the techniques and
data sets used in the literature. This includes the choice of an appropriate tax price (King,
1977; Reinhard, 1981), a better control for local public services like public school (Rosen
and Fullerton, 1977; Sonstelie and Portney, 1980a; Hayes and Taylor, 1996; Downes and
Zabel, 2002; Brasington and Haurin, 2005) or for neighborhood variables (Cushing, 1984;
Black, 1999). Some studies take advantage of natural experiments (for example school re-
forms, tax reforms, special jurisdictions) to obtain better measures of tax and public services
capitalization (Richardson and Thalheimer, 1981; Yinger et al., 1988; Palmon and Smith,
1998b; Dee, 2000; Reback, 2005).
Chapter 3 contributes to the empirical literature on capitalization by providing estimation
results of a unique data set from the Canton of Zurich. We show that Switzerland is a con-
venient "fiscal laboratory" to study capitalization of local fiscal variables into house prices.
We provide a description of our data set that includes, in addition to the local fiscal variables,
a large number of environmental, neighborhood and demographic variables. The originality
of our estimations relies on the nature of the house price variable, which is the price of a
standardized and comparable single family house in each community. Such a standardized
house price variable allows us to ignore the structural variables and all the biases they may
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entail. Our baseline results exhibit standard results with respect to the literature presented in
chapter 2.
Given the result of significant capitalization of income tax and public expenditures in the mu-
nicipalities of the Canton of Zurich, chapter 4 presents the debate on the existence and the
persistence of capitalization and rises two questions. Does capitalization rate significantly
decrease over space when housing supply reacts? In order to answer this question, we com-
pare capitalization in different places of the Canton of Zurich that differ in terms of housing
supply elasticity. The second question is whether capitalization tends to disappear over time,
as we move to long term equilibrium in which housing supply can react without restrictions.
General conclusion sums up the main results of this thesis and provides a discussion.

Chapter 1
Capitalization of Local Fiscal Variables and the
Tiebout Model: A Theoretical Review of the
Literature
THe Tiebout (1956) model is the theoretical basis of almost every theoretical studies oncapitalization of local fiscal variables into house values. The first section presents the
basic Tiebout mechanism, in which mobility plays an important role.
In this theoretical review, we focus only on the part of the Tiebout literature that simultane-
ously incorporates land, housing and taxation issues. It is worth noting that in the original
Tiebout model, these issues are rather neglected. Capitalization of fiscal variables is even no
treated at all. Another strand of the Tiebout literature has been developed on various topics
which are not directly related with capitalization, like sorting or stratification and redistribu-
tion (Westhoff, 1977; Epple and Platt, 1998; Kessler and Lulfesmann, 2005). This literature
goes beyond the scope of this thesis and is thus not addressed in this chapter.
10 Capitalization of Local Fiscal Variables and the Tiebout Model
While the Tiebout model is the theoretical basis of virtually every capitalization study, capi-
talization is not mentioned in the Tiebout’s original paper. It is not surprising when one con-
siders that Tiebout hardly mentions property taxes and even housing. In his model, Tiebout
ignores a lot of practical issues of the local public sector like the form of the taxation, the
type of governance and the existence of housing that affects the consumers’ location choice.
These shortcomings have thrown ambiguity on the proper interpretation that one must have
when considering the Tiebout model. While some authors consider the model as a descrip-
tive theory of local public finance, others only find in this model a simple algorithm for the
resolution of the preference-revelation problem of public goods.1
A number of authors (see for instance Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1989), Hamilton (1983)
and Oates (2006)) agree to say that Tiebout remains very evasive on the revenue side of the
local public budget constraint and especially on the type of taxation used by local govern-
ments. Tiebout simply assumes that local governments tax mobile consumers accordingly.
Oates (2006) even notes that the word "tax" appears only a few times in the Tiebout’s original
paper. It is not surprising to obtain an efficient pattern of public services when one restricts
the tax instruments to non-distortive tax like lump-sum tax, as it seems to be the case in
the Tiebout’s original paper. Part of the literature has thus attempted to introduce different
types of taxes in models that preserve the essential Tiebout features (free mobility, perfect
competition among jurisdictions) and to investigate the impact on efficiency.
Since the main source of local tax revenue is the property tax, these models also have to
include housing, which is the tax base of the property tax. The joint presence of property
tax and housing leads naturally to raise the issue of the capitalization of fiscal differentials
into property values (Oates, 1969; Hamilton, 1975, 1976b; Hoyt, 1991). As noted by Oates
(1981), the use of property taxation links the issues of efficiency in local public services and
in housing market. The main issue addressed is thus the one of efficiency with a distortive
tax. Does the Tiebout mechanism still preserve efficiency, despite the introduction of a
distortive tax such as property tax?
1For more considerations on the interpretation of the Tiebout model as a normative or a positive theory, see
Oates (2006).
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An other source of controversy of the Tiebout model is what Oates (2006) calls "the supply
side of the Tiebout model". In the same way that Tiebout neglects the system of prices that
face the mobile consumers, he does not characterize precisely the process by which taxes
and public expenditures are determined nor that he described the type of government he
considers. To stay close to his analogy between the private market and the local public sector,
Tiebout seems to consider "city managers" (Tiebout, 1956, p. 419) that act like private firms
and provide fiscal bundles if there is some profit to get. Section 1.2presents the theoretical
literature that fills this gap by introducing an explicit form of government or characterizing
explicitly the determination of local fiscal variables.
A first strand of literature, which is in spirit of the original Tiebout original paper, simply ig-
nores the "voice" option and the political process under which taxes and public expenditures
are chosen (Sonstelie and Portney, 1978; Henderson, 1985; Scotchmer, 1985a; Pines, 1991).
Rose-Ackerman argues that "doing two things at once is difficult. Models in which peo-
ple both vote and buy housing can easily become intractable and opaque" (Rose-Ackerman,
1983, p. 961). Thus, in the no-politics version of the Tiebout model, prospective (mobile
agents) and actual residents have no influence on the determination of the public budget.
The determination of the local fiscal variables are left to land developers or entrepreneurs
that create communities and set the levels of taxes and public spendings in order to maxi-
mize their profits.
In contrast to the "no politics" version of the Tiebout model, a second strand of literature
introduces an explicit modeling of the determination of taxes and public spendings. Since
this thesis is dedicated to capitalization, we do present the literature that simply combine
the median voter and Tiebout model (Rose-Ackerman, 1979; Epple et al., 1983, 1984). The
main objective of this literature is to expose the conditions of the existence of an equilib-
rium and capitalization plays a relatively minor role. Instead, we focus on the property value
maximization approach, which state that local governments will set taxes and public ex-
penditures in order to maximize the value of land or property of their residents (Brueckner,
1983; Scotchmer, 1986; Wildasin and Wilson, 1996). This objective is sometimes associ-
ated with majority voting (Edelson, 1976; Wildasin, 1979; Yinger, 1981, 1982). Of course,
this approach is closely related to the capitalization hypothesis of local fiscal variables into
land or property value. Whereas a large part of the literature includes majority voting in the
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Tiebout model, some papers consider bureaucratic behavior of local governments (Epple and
Zelenitz, 1981; Henderson, 1985; Hoyt, 1990; Caplan, 2001) and ask whether voting with
one’s feet and competition among are operative mechanisms to eliminate bad politics.
Finally, the club theoretical approach, which shares common features with the Tiebout model
(Cornes and Sandler, 1986; Oates, 2006), is presented in the third subsection. The link
between Tiebout and clubs theory is especially relevant for the spatial clubs literature, which
includes explicitly spatial issues such as land and housing.
1.1 The Tiebout Model
This section presents the original Tiebout model, its underlying assumptions and the main
implications for the provision of local public services. Whereas Tiebout is invoked as the
main theoretical basis of most of the capitalization studies, capitalization of local fiscal vari-
ables is not a feature of the original Tiebout paper. The second part of this section presents
the literature that introduce housing and property taxes in model that preserves the main as-
sumptions of the Tiebout model and investigate the implications for the efficiency of public
goods provision.
1.1.1 The Basic Model
As noted by Oates (2006), the primary objective of Tiebout is to solve the problem of the
revelation of preferences for public goods raised by Samuelson (1954). The Tiebout model
can be seen as a response to the Samuelson’s statement that no market type solution can
solve the free rider problem involved by the provision of public goods. Indeed, Samuelson
shows that a pure public good is efficiently provided if the sum of the willingness-to-pay
for that public good is equal to the marginal cost of the public good. Unfortunately, it is
unlikely that all agents will reveal their true preferences for the public good. Instead, they
will underestimate their preferences in order to freely benefit from its consumption, provided
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that one cannot exclude anyone from the consumption of a pure public good. Hence, public
good will not be produced, as all agents will follow the same free rider strategy.
Thus, the nature of the problem raised by Samuelson is essentially an informational one. If
one could extract the true willingness-to-pay from every agent in the economy, the public
goods could be optimally produced and consumed. Such information is not available and a
state government is necessary to "force" the economy to produce public goods. The Tiebout
model precisely deals with this question as its main objective is to determine an institutional
design which would allocate public expenditures optimally, without having recourse exclu-
sively to the intervention of a central government.
Tiebout first notes that the Musgrave-Samuelson failure of the market concerns national pub-
lic expenditures. He underlines that in practice, a substantial part of public expenditures is
raised at the local level, so that the argument of Samuelson is not necessarily valid for all
public expenditures. Taking into account this particularity, is it possible to find a process un-
der which a sort of market solution would be also optimal? The answer of Tiebout is that in
a federal setting, there is a large number of local jurisdictions that offer various fiscal pack-
ages. This characteristic of the local public sector gives the opportunity to yield solutions
that differ from the "Musgarve-Samuelson" one.
The Tiebout model is based on six main assumptions:
(1) There is free and perfect mobility. Agents’ moving decisions are based on fiscal con-
ditions (level of public expenditures, tax rates, definition of the tax base). In this simple
framework, no extra economic criteria can bend location choices. Agents are assumed to
choose the jurisdiction that best satisfies their preferences.
(2) There is a large number of agents and jurisdictions with various tastes and fiscal pack-
ages, such that each individual matches the appropriate community and each community
has a sufficient number of individual in order to form at the minimum average cost. As a
consequence, each community is inhabited by a homogeneous population with respect to
preferences and income. Moreover, new jurisdictions can form without cost.
(3) Agents have perfect information on the fiscal packages offered by the local jurisdictions.
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(4) Income is exogenously determined (for instance in the Central Business District).
(5) Local public goods are financed by lump-sum taxation. When a new entrant enters a
jurisdiction, he pays a congestion fee equal to the cost his presence implies. The average
cost of public good is assumed to be U-shaped. Public goods are provided at the minimum
average cost within each community.
(6) There are no spillovers between jurisdictions.
Starting from these assumptions, Tiebout describes a model where mobile agents differ with
respect to income and tastes and seek the jurisdiction that best satisfies their preferences.
On the supply side, there is a large number of local jurisdictions providing various types
of fiscal packages so that any agent can find the appropriate community. Tiebout is not
looking for a political process that would allow the local government to adapt to consumers’
preferences. Instead, local governments set a fiscal bundle to which the consumers must
adapt by moving in the suitable community (i.e. the one that offers the fiscal bundle that
maximizes utility). Thus, mobility is the process by which the revelation of true preferences
occurs. As agents have to move toward their preferred jurisdiction in order to enjoy the
consumption of the local public good, they implicitly reveal their true preferences for it.
Consumer mobility is the counterpart to the private market shopping trip and leads to Pareto-
efficiency. The foot-voting mechanism effectively converts taxes into a system of efficient
price and consumers receive the quantities of public services they would have demanded if
they were in a competitive market.
1.1.2 The Introduction of Housing and Property Taxes in the Tiebout
Model: The Capitalization Hypothesis
This section focuses on the Tiebout literature that incorporates explicitly housing and prop-
erty taxation. The main objective of this literature is to introduce housing and property
taxation in models that preserve the main characteristics of the Tiebout assumptions about
the mobility of individuals and the diversity offered by the local public sector in terms of
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fiscal bundles. The task is then to investigate whether the efficiency properties of the original
Tiebout model holds (Oates, 1969; Hamilton, 1975, 1976b).
Moreover, while the property tax is not the only source of taxation (Henderson, 1994), the-
oretical models shows in wide range of situations, property taxes will be prefer to any other
tax instruments (Hoyt, 1991; Krelove, 1993).
Property Tax Capitalization: Is The Property Tax a Benefit Tax?
A first step to take into account the effect of the property tax on a Tiebout model is included
in Oates (1969) who estimates the capitalization of the benefits and costs of local public
services in house values.2 Oates argues that if mobile households migrate to the suitable
community, they should reflect the level of property tax and local public expenditures in
their house value. He concludes that the property tax reduces to a fiscal price of the local
public good since he shows empirically that a decrease in the house value implied by an
increase in the tax rate is compensated by the increase in the house value due to the additional
expenditures on public school, resulting in a zero net change in the property value. As a
consequence, the Tiebout model with property tax still achieves an efficient pattern of local
public good.3
In a more formal framework, Hamilton (1975, 1976b) derives the conditions under which the
property tax reduces to a head tax, expanding the Tiebout model by an explicit consideration
of the housing market and the local use of a property tax. In the first version of the model,
each community is homogeneous with respect to house value. The critical assumption is
that local governments set zoning ordinances which can be specified as follow: no house-
hold can live in a particular community unless it consumes a minimum quantity of housing.
When households migrate to the community with the appropriate fiscal bundle, they choose
a community whose the minimum housing requirement is just equal to their actual housing
2The results derived by Oates (1969) are essentially empirical and they are described more extensively in
the second chapter.
3This view on the link between capitalization of local fiscal differentials and efficiency has been heavily
criticized by Edel and Sclar (1974) and Hamilton (1976a), among others. They argue that in a full Tiebout
equilibrium, housing supply adjusts and capitalization disappears. For more details on this issue, see chapter 4.
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consumption. Households would not build a house larger than the minimum requirement be-
cause it would imply redistribution toward households who buy the minimum requirement;
instead they build a larger house in a community with a more restrictive zoning ordinance in
order to benefit from lower taxes (because the tax base is higher) and to increase utility. Of
course, this result requires a large number of jurisdictions to ensure that an agent always find
the suitable community. Moreover, effective zoning ordinances prevent the construction of
houses with relatively low house value by poor households who would like to consume local
public services at subsidized prices. Zoning ordinances make implicitly enter the housing
consumption into the fiscal bundle. Thus zoning control allows preventing any intrajurisdic-
tional redistribution, converting the property tax into a lump-sum tax.4
Hamilton (1976a) introduces a second version of the model in which the communities are
assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to house values. The coexistence of high and low
income households gives rise to fiscal surplus, which are the difference between tax liability
of a household and the public service cost it implies. In a heterogeneous community, the
housing value of high income households will be less than the same kind of housing in a
homogeneous community, because of the presence of poor people with inexpensive houses
which alter the total tax base. At this point, Hamilton introduces a strong assumption of
perfect capitalization: total value (of housing structures and land) of a homogeneous com-
munity is equal to the total value of a homogeneous community if the land areas of the two
communities are the same. Since rich households experience a negative fiscal surplus, they
have to be compensated by a smaller price of land than in a homogeneous community to
reflect the real public service cost they induce. A Symmetrical mechanism arises for poor
households in mixed communities, so they undergo a greater price of land than in a homo-
geneous poor community. Without public intervention, such land value differential would
cause market responsiveness: land developers would increase the supply of land toward poor
households until the price differential disappears. Again, land regulation like fiscal zoning,
allowing preventing from too high levels of low income housing, is needed to achieve effi-
ciency. Hamilton (1976b) concludes that households choose the community with the optimal
4The Hamiltonian view, in which the property tax operates as benefit tax, is also called the benefit view.
In the alternative new view, the property tax is modeled as a tax on capital (see for example Mieszkowski
and Zodrow (1989) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1983)). We do not explore this view, as it does not imply
capitalization issues.
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level of local public services, where the quantity restriction of housing satisfies their desired
level and where, at the margin, the property tax incremented equals their valuation of those
services.5
Property Tax vs Other Sources of Revenue
The property tax is not the only tax instrument available at the local level. For example,
Henderson (1994) notes that property taxes account for only 38% of locally raised revenues
in United States in 1988-1989. He also stresses the great variation of property tax use across
localities and the rise of non-tax sources.
To understand what drives local choice of taxation, Henderson (1994) investigates communi-
ties’ choice of tax instruments, giving them the possibility to use not only property taxes but
also land taxes, housing revenues and head taxes to finance a publicly provided private good,
in an imperfect competition environment. Henderson introduces in the model the traditional
Arrow-Debreu separation of people’s decision as shareholders (land or homeowners) and as
consumers (voters and residents) in order to justify the difference between property taxes,
land taxes and user fees.6 Since the choice of revenue is likely to be influenced by local
political institutions, Henderson derives his results under two types of government objective:
the profit-maximization government and the voter control of communities. The results show
that the structure of local taxation will completely differ according to government objective
function. Profit-maximizing communities prefer user fees over property taxes (or land taxes)
and provide public expenditures efficiently. This result arises because user fees efficiently
price fiscal-migration externalities. The monopoly power of government only involves col-
lecting a fiscal surplus from residents through the use of fees. If user fees are prohibited,
profit-maximizing communities prefers property taxes over land taxes. In this case, the gov-
ernment corporation is forced to use property tax to price fiscal-migration externalities (this
5Fischel (1975) and White (1975) have extended the Tiebout-Hamilton perfect zoning to the case of non-
residential property tax on commercial and industrial capital.
6Assuming away the Arrow-Debreu separation means that residents incorporate the impact of their voting
choices on their income as shareholders and that, as property owner, they take into account wealth effect as
property values change. In this alternative scenario, Henderson (1995) shows that homeowners do not choose
to finance public expenditures with property taxes.
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cannot be done with land taxation, which do not affect the marginal inmigrants; recall the
separation assumption between renters and landowners) and to induce a distortion with un-
derconsumption of housing and public goods. In a voter model, land taxes are preferred to
property taxes because residents are no shareholders of lands (following from the Arrow-
Debreu separation). If land taxation is prohibited, the government is forced to use property
tax to expropriate land rents indirectly. It can also possibly use positive or negative fees to
balance the budget constraint, depending on the revenue raised by property taxes.
Persistence of Property Taxes
In contrast to Henderson (1994), Hoyt (1991) points out the importance of the property tax
as a source of local tax revenue. In particular, he asks why local governments do not move
from property to land taxation, despite the increase in welfare this change would imply. As
noted by Thisse and Duranton (1996), the use of land taxation is not a new idea: Henry
George proposed in Progress and Poverty, published in 1879, to fully tax land rents in order
to finance public services. This statement, which is known as the Henry Georges Theo-
rem (HGT thereafter) has then been formally proved by several authors like Flatters et al.
(1974) in a regional context and Arnott (1979), Arnott and Stiglitz (1979), Stiglitz (1977)
and Wildasin (1986) in a urban context with pure public goods.7 The essence of the HGT
is that at the optimal population size, the total differential rent is just equal to the amount of
public services.
Hoyt (1991) considers a metropolitan area in which local jurisdictions can finance public
services through both property tax, a uniform tax on land and capital expenditures, and a
separate per unit tax on land. Public services are assumed to be publicly-provided private
goods. Perfect mobility of households across the metropolis implies that, at the equilibrium,
the level of utility in each jurisdiction must be equal to the level of utility prevailing in the
rest of the economy. When the jurisdictions are utility-taking (i.e. they are small enough
to assume that their policies do not affect housing prices and policies in other jurisdictions),
perfect mobility implies perfect (property) tax capitalization; an increase in the property tax
7For a spatial version of the HGT, see Thisse and Duranton (1996) and Hochman et al. (1995).
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rate is exactly offset by a decrease in the net price of housing, leaving unchanged the gross
price of housing. Utility-taking jurisdictions also induce that maximizing rent in a commu-
nity is equivalent to maximize the utility of its residents (Sonstelie and Portney, 1978). Thus
the local jurisdiction maximizes net land rent subject to a balanced budget constraint. Hoyt
(1991) shows that the optimal jurisdiction’s response is to fully finance local public expendi-
tures by the property tax. The rational behind this result is that there is no gain to obtain from
a switching from property to land taxation, because the decrease in the property tax is fully
capitalized into property values. However, the property tax cut implies that new residents
will be attracted and subsidized by the initial landowners, through land taxation.8 Intuitively
the property tax, unlike land taxation, acts as a congestion price since immigrants pay for the
extra cost they induce through property tax payments (Henderson, 1994).
A generalization of the model shows that when jurisdictions have market power (i.e. juris-
dictions recognize that their policies have an impact on housing prices and policies in other
jurisdictions), the property tax and public service capitalization into housing prices is in-
complete and is negatively related to the relative size of the jurisdiction with respect to the
metropolis. Imperfect capitalization implies that a jurisdiction’s policy affects both net land
rents and housing prices; this breaks the link between land rent and utility maximization.9
Thus, Hoyt (1991) solves the Nash equilibrium by maximizing utility in the jurisdiction
subject to a balanced budget constraint and to imperfect capitalization of property tax and
government services. The results are a generalization of the utility-taking jurisdiction case
and show that whenever there is more than one jurisdiction in the metropolitan area, it is
optimal for jurisdictions to finance part of their public expenditures with property tax. The
fraction of expenditures financed by the property tax decreases with the market power of the
jurisdiction. If the jurisdiction’s market power tends to zero, one comes back to the utility-
taking jurisdiction case and the property tax is the unique optimal source of tax revenues.
However, the benefit of the property tax is decreasing in the market power of a jurisdic-
tion within the metropolitan area. The intuition behind this is that a property tax increase is
incompletely capitalized into housing prices (while with utility-taking jurisdictions the tax
8This reasoning implies that in the initial equilibrium all residents are land owners in the jurisdiction.
9See Starrett (1981), Pines (1985) and Hoyt (1992).
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change was perfectly offset by housing price). This makes the property tax more distorting
and less attractive than the separate land tax.10
Krelove (1993) shows that the persistence of property taxes can be explained by the fact that
local governments cannot impose direct taxes on residence, i.e. they cannot raise revenue
in a non-distortionary manner from residents. Krelove develops a model in which the tax
structure is not complete. The jurisdictions are assumed to maximize after-tax land rent and
finance congestable local public services with property tax on housing and a separate tax on
immobile land and mobile capital used in housing production, so that no costless transfers
between residents and government are possible. Krelove shows that the property tax emerges
endogenously (in contrast to Epple and Zelenitz, 1981 and Henderson, 1985 who assume that
property tax is the only revenue source) at equilibrium as the sole source of revenue for local
jurisdictions. As in Hoyt (1991) and Henderson (1994), the property tax appears to be a
second-best way to price the marginal resident that enters the community, instead of land
taxation.
1.2 Which Local Governance for the Tiebout Model?
Tiebout (1956) failed to describe how taxes and public expenditures are chosen in his model.
This section presents the three approaches that address this issue. The profit maximizing
developers approach, in line with the original Tiebout model, describes a minimalist inter-
vention of government which may simply be considered as developers or entrepreneurs that
maximize profit. In contrast, the property value maximizing approach may stem from politi-
cal pressure, i.e. local governments has strong incentives to adopt a policy that improve the
property value of their residents (Fischel, 2001). Finally, the club theoretical approach al-
lows to address formally some issues of the Tiebout model, like the formation of the optimal
number of communities.
10The same market share and capitalization argument is used by Hoyt (1992) to explain why large central
cities have higher tax rate than the surrounding suburbs.
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1.2.1 Profit Maximizing Developers
A first approach to introduce a supply side that models explicitly the objective of the local
governments in the Tiebout model is to consider the minimum level of intervention of the
local officials. Oates calls this approach the "entrepreneurial version of Tiebout" (Oates,
2006, p. 29). Actually, this view implies no politics in the model as the communities are
simply considered as developers or entrepreneurs that create and manage communities so as
to maximize their profits.
Sonstelie and Portney (1978) initiate this approach by considering a metropolitan area com-
posed of a large number of communities that provide local public services to their residents.
Households are perfectly mobile and consume housing, public services (provided equally
and free of charge in each jurisdiction) and a private good. For the sake of simplicity, each
house is described by a single physical characteristic, its size. The model does not imply
any form of taxes or user charges because the communities are assumed to derive revenues
from ownership of land which provides land rents. The rent earned by a house is determined
by demand and supply and depends on the house’s size and on the level of public services.
Perfect competition implies that communities and households are price takers and cannot in-
fluence independently the bid-rent function. The cost of providing public services that face
communities depends both on the quality of the public services and the number of residents
and is U-shaped with respect to the size of the community. As the communities own land,
they also bear the cost of constructing houses and maintaining the housing stock. Sonstelie
and Portney (1978) define the objective of the local governments as the maximization of
profits, which are the sum of rents earned in the community minus the cost of providing the
public services minus the total cost relative to the establishment and the maintenance of the
housing stock. In order to reach this objective, local governments may use the quality of
the public services and the size and the attributes of the housing stock. For instance, if the
community rises the level of the public service, the property value, rents, the community’s
revenue and the cost of providing public services increase. Changing the size of the hous-
ing stock also affects the community’s revenue through capitalization into property value and
rents and the housing cost on the costs side. Of course, the timing of the two control variables
is different; while changes in the quality of public services rapidly affect community’s cost
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and revenues, changes in the housing stock condition have long run effects owing to the long
time horizon of houses. As a consequence, Sonstelie and Portney (1978) define two types
of equilibrium: a short-run equilibrium, in which the only instrument of local governments
is the public services quality and a long-run equilibrium in which local governments can
alter both the public services quality and the housing stock. In the short-run, the migration
of households and community profit maximization results in an efficient allocation of local
public services and the distribution of residents across the fixed housing stock is optimal. In
the long-run, the allocation of public services is still efficient but contrary to the previous
situation, the housing stock may vary. However, Sonstelie and Portney (1978) argue that the
housing stock and the community size are adjusted to maximize profit so that the size and the
composition of the housing stock are also optimal. Their model has normative implications
as it does not explain how communities effectively choose the level of public services but
rather exposes the efficiency properties of community profit maximization.
Henderson (1985) also uses the profit maximizing approach in order to stress the important
role the local land developers have on land use, local public policies and the determination
of an efficient allocation of resources in a Tiebout type model.11 In his model, individuals
within a community have the same preferences to reflect the Tiebout sorting effect that en-
courages stratification. The number of communities is very large such that they are price or
utility-taking.
In the no politics version of the model,12 the community is modeled as a club which is
assumed to be owned by a group of land developers.13 The community chooses per capita
public service level and the property tax rate in order to maximize total profits that consist of
land rents and property taxes on housing minus public services expenditures.
The maximization of profits produces a second-best equilibrium (because of the presence
of distorsive property taxation) with two characteristics: (1) the land management company
11This approach can also be found in Hoyt (1990).
12In a subsequent section, Henderson (1985) incorporates "good" and "bad" politics in the Tiebout model.
13While Henderson (1985) denotes the local government as a club, his formal approach differs from club
theory in several ways. For instance, the local public good is not submitted to congestion cost and the revenue
side of the club is not based on a simple price membership as in the club theory but rather on property tax and
land rents. See sub-section 1.2.3 for issues on the link between the club theoretical approach and the Tiebout
model.
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does not exploit residents fiscally as all property taxes are spent on public services and (2) a
second best version of the condition for the provision of public goods is satisfied. In conclu-
sion, in the intracommunity equilibrium, the Tiebout model yields efficient solutions.14
Contrary to Henderson (1985) and Wildasin (1986), Pines (1991) investigates the existence
of a Tiebout equilibrium in a profit maximizing developer setting, with the idea that it is
useless to study the efficiency properties of the Tiebout equilibrium if one does not know
whether it exists. The model is based on Stiglitz (1977). A large number of mobile house-
holds choose a community where they work, consume a private good and a public good. On
the local public sector side, governments act as price-taking (or, equivalently, utility-taking)
profit maximizing developers. Their objective is to set the level of public good and house-
holds that maximizes the net profit from the production of the private and public goods, with
a given wage schedule.
Considering the optimal community size and the issues of existence, uniqueness, and effi-
ciency of equilibrium in his model, Pines (1991) takes into account two hypothesis regarding
land scarcity: (1) first, the land is free. It means that the communities ("Islands") are per-
fectly replicable. In this case, Pines (1991) shows that there exists a unique and efficient
equilibrium. (2) In a second step, communities are assumed to be non-replicable or imper-
fectly replicable so that land is scarce. In such configuration, no equilibrium exists. Pines
(1991) argues that in the case of club theory, perfect replicability of clubs is a natural as-
sumption. However, when applied to an urban setting, the spatial dimension and the spatial
discontinuities it implies make this assumption more disturbing. As a consequence, a more
appropriate assumption, according to Pines, is the one of non-replicability when consider-
ing the Tiebout model. It follows from the model that no equilibrium exists in the case of
profit maximizing developers and that the existence of an efficient equilibrium requires the
presence of politics.
Scotchmer (1985a) deals with similar issues, but in a different framework, namely the club
theoretical approach. In particular, the author investigates a Nash equilibrium among profit-
14The model also includes solutions with politics and intercommunity equilibrium but these points go beyond
the scope of the current section. The latter issue, which gives an active role to land developers, is considered in
the fourth chapter.
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maximizing clubs.15 Clubs are groups of individuals that share club goods. Club goods
are defined by two dimensions, the facility size and the price of membership, and subject
to congestion cost. Contrary to the previous literature, Scotchmer (1985a) assumes that the
profit-maximizing clubs are not utility-takers so that they exploit a market power and make
positive profit. She studies a two-stage symmetric Nash equilibrium. In a first stage, firms
(clubs) decide whether they enter or not. The entry occurs only if it does not lead the new
entrant as well as all other firms to negative profit. In a second stage, firms play a standard
symmetric Nash equilibrium, where the strategic variables are the facility size and the entry
fee. The game is solved by backward induction. In the second stage, the symmetric Nash
equilibrium is characterized by the familiar Samuelson condition. However, the equilibrium
price condition differs from the utility-taking firms as the price of membership is greater
than the marginal congestion cost. This entails positive profit for firms, reflecting the firms’
market power. In the first stage, the equilibrium number of firms is met when the marginal
firm is deterred since it would imply negative profit for itself and all the other firms. The
entry issue plays an important role in the model. The entry mechanism ensures that there
will be a response (i.e. the entry of new firms) to positive profits in order to ensure that the
number of clubs will be close to the efficient one. However, Scotchmer (1985a) suggests that
one expects generally more than the efficient number of clubs in the equilibrium, especially
in the case where there are few clubs that have large market power.
1.2.2 Tiebout and Politics
An alternative view of the intervention of local governments in the Tiebout model introduces
explicitly collective choice institutions and the political process that stems from the demo-
cratic process. Oates calls this approach the "collective choice version of Tiebout" (Oates,
2006, p. 31).
15Previous literature on club theory and the link with the Tiebout model is discussed more extensively in
section 1.2.3.
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Maximization of Property Values: A Simple Model
The essence of the property value maximization approach can be described in the following
basic model, based on Wildasin (1979), Brueckner (1979) and Helsley (2004). Let’s consider
a metropolitan area composed of a large numbers of communities in which each community
has an exogenous stock of N houses indexed by i = 1, . . . ,N.16 Residents have identical
preferences but differ with respect to income; their utility function is U(x,h,g), where x
is the consumption of a composite numéraire commodity, h represents the consumption of
housing and g the provision of public services.
In this approach, perfect mobility plays a crucial as it implies the capitalization of housing
and public services into house rents. The bid rent function for house i denoted Ri(hi,g,y),
which is the maximum amount a resident is willing to pay for the services offered by the
house, is implicitly defined by the following utility constraint:
U(y−Ri,hi,g) =U∗(y), (1.1)
where U∗(y) is the utility level that a community must offer in equilibrium, depending on
the level of income y. Equation (1.1) states that a change in public services or in the housing
services entails a migration flow from or toward the community and must be compensated
by a change of the rent to satisfy the utility constraint. Applying the implicit theorem to
equation (1.1) yields:
∂Ri
∂g
=
∂U/∂g
∂U/∂x
> 0, (1.2)
∂Ri
∂hi
=
∂U/∂hi
∂U/∂x
> 0. (1.3)
The slope of the bide rent function with respect to the level of public services (housing ser-
vices) is equal to resident’s marginal rate of substitution between the public services (housing
services) and the numéraire good. Equations (1.2) and (1.3) reflects that an increase in g or
hi must be compensated by an increase in Ri, causing a reduction in xi, to hold the utility
constant. This means that the benefit of public services are reflected (or capitalized) into
house rents. It explains why aggregate property value maximization leads to efficiency.
16Brueckner (1983) extends this approach by introducing housing production in the model.
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The provision of public services g is assumed to be financed by a uniform tax t on house
values. Denoting C(g) the provision cost function and Vi the value of the ith house, the
public budget constraint can be written t∑Ni=1Vi =C(g). The value of a house is the present
value of the stream of net-of-tax rents provided by housing services. Assuming a infinite
lifetime horizon and constant house rent over time, the house value is:
Vi =
(Ri(hi,g,y)− tVi)
θ
, (1.4)
where tVi is the property tax payment and theta the discount rate. Summing (1.4) over the
N houses of the jurisdiction and substituting the public budget constraint, we obtain the
aggregate property value:
N
∑
i=1
Vi =
(Ri(hi,g,y)−C(g))
θ
. (1.5)
The point of the property value maximization literature is precisely to assume that local
governments will choose the level of public services by maximizing the aggregate property
value in the community described in (1.5). The cost of one another unit of public service
will be balanced against the benefit it will implies on residents through increased aggregate
property value. Using (1.2), the first-order condition for maximization of (1.5) is
N
∑
i=1
∂U/∂g
∂U/∂x
=
∂C
∂g
. (1.6)
The level of public services that maximizes aggregate property value satisfy the Samuel-
son condition. This means that the aggregate property value maximization behavior leads
jurisdictions to efficiency.
Property Value Maximizing Communities
Some models use property value maximization as an alternative objective to profit maximiza-
tion for local governments. At first glance, this objective seems less natural than decision-
making through political process like majority voting. However, the American experience
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suggests that land developers play an important role in the creation and management of sev-
eral cities
Some authors suggest that this objective could emerge as an unspecified political process
(Wildasin and Wilson, 1996; Helsley, 2004). Alternatively, property value maximization
could be considered as an institutional objective in its own right, to the extent that a signifi-
cant number of households own their own property.17
For Brueckner (1983), the property value maximization objective is associated with a type
of entrepreneurial government behavior. In his setting, local governments are part of a large
community system, so that they act in a competitive environment; they take consumer util-
ities as parametric. Communities’ area and households’ lot size are fixed. Residents have
identical endowments and consume a numéraire commodity, housing and a congestable pub-
lic good. Housing is produced with land and the numéraire; public good is produced only
with the numéraire. The house price function, which relates housing and public good con-
sumption to the house value, is obtained by consumer bid-rent function under assumption of
parametric utilities.18 Housing producers supply housing in order to maximize their profit,
and subject to the housing price function constraint (or equivalently to the parametric utility
constraint).19 The local government chooses the level of public good in order to maximize
aggregate property value in the community, which is defined as the total rent value minus the
total cost for the public good.
In a first case, Brueckner (1983) considers that public good is financed by a house tax (a
head tax on each house owner) borne by producers (and not residents). The results show
that aggregate property value maximization implies that the resulting internal equilibrium
is Pareto-efficient, as the optimization government problem yields the familiar Samuelson
condition. In a second case, a property tax is introduced instead of a house tax to finance the
local public good. The Samuelson rule for the provision of the public good is preserved but
17Wildasin and Wilson (1996) argue that even if landowners are in political minority, their interests may still
be reflected in the local political process if they could use mechanisms other than voting.
18This assumption reflects perfect mobility across jurisdictions. Note that this housing price function is used
in Sonstelie and Portney (1978) and Wildasin (1979) but without any discussion on its determination.
19An alternative version of this model without housing production can be found in Brueckner (1979).
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internal efficiency is conditional on the inefficient equilibrium housing stock induced by the
distortionary property tax.
Internal efficiency does not mean that the system-wide equilibrium is efficient as well. An
appropriate distribution of consumers across communities is required for the community
system to be globally efficient. Brueckner (1983) shows that property value maximization
does not naturally lead to such situations and that, starting from internal efficient equilibrium
with two types of consumers, some reallocation of consumers across jurisdictions could lead
to Pareto-superior outcome.
In contrast to Brueckner (1983), Scotchmer (1986) considers an imperfect competition frame-
work by assuming a finite number of jurisdictions. She argues that the utility-taking assump-
tion implies that a jurisdiction’s policy will not affect land prices in the rest of the economy.
Local jurisdictions provide a pure public good which is financed by land taxes. Households
receive an initial endowment of private good plus an equal share of rental income raised
in the economy. The capitalization of the local public good into land values emerges from
the bid-rent approach, i.e. land is allocated through a perfectly competitive decentralized
market. A local jurisdiction chooses the level of public goods so as to maximize property
value, which is defined by land value minus the total cost of public goods. Scotchmer (1986)
shows that under separability assumption on the utility function, the local public goods will
be underprovided. The intuition behind this result is that a marginal unit of public good in
one jurisdiction decreases land prices in other jurisdictions, in contrast to the perfect com-
petition case. The jurisdiction’s policy has a externality on land prices elsewhere and makes
the public good less lucrative to the landowners as the positive effect of the public good on
the demand for land and land price in that jurisdiction is reduced. Thus local public goods
are underprovided.
In an alternative Nash equilibrium, Scotchmer (1986) adds head taxes in addition to land
taxes in order to balance the public budget constraint. The choice variables of the jurisdiction
are the public good and the head tax. In this case, the use of a new instrument allows the
jurisdictions to provide public goods efficiently. The head tax can be viewed as an instrument
to manipulate the population size through incentive effects and eliminate the price externality
outside the jurisdiction (which was not possible with only one instrument like the level of
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public goods). Note that imperfectly competitive jurisdictions use the head tax for a different
reason than jurisdictions in a competitive framework. The latter use the head tax only if the
public good is congestable.
Wildasin and Wilson (1996) contribute to the tradition of property value maximizing objec-
tive in an overlapping-generation model with imperfect mobility. The economy consists of
a large and fixed number of identical towns, each with the same amount of land. There are
two types of workers, young and old, who live over two periods and supply labor to compet-
itive firms. Costly mobility is represented by a moving cost which is randomly assigned to
workers and that occurs if they change residence in the second period. Local governments
are assumed to maximize the present value of after-tax land rents, which accrue to absentee
landowners. Public goods are assumed to be fixed and identically provided in all towns. A
key assumption is that governments have the possibility to differentiate the fiscal treatment
of their residents. The first-order condition for the land value maximization program shows
that governments exploit their monopsony power over the stayer wage, as high moving costs
lead some old workers to stay in their towns. The attachment to place developed by less
mobile workers allows governments to capture rents by overtaxing this type of workers.
Property value maximization objective can be viewed as a response to voting and democratic
pressures. For example, Edelson (1976) and Wildasin (1979) consider models where res-
idents of a community vote for the public good level which maximizes the value of their
own property. Pauly (1976) describes a model which is in line with the Tiebout assumption:
households with heterogeneous tastes and income consume a composite private good and
a public good, they have location-independent income and are perfectly mobile within the
metropolitan area. However, one assumption departs from the traditional Tiebout literature;
while the Tiebout literature often assumes that households face a perfectly elastic number of
communities (Edel and Sclar, 1974; Hamilton, 1976b), Pauly (1976) considers that there is
a fixed supply of the taxed good in each jurisdiction. Given the fixed metropolitan popula-
tion, it means that capitalization will occur, because of an imperfect matching of individual
preferences and public good consumption opportunities. The determination of the level of
public goods is investigated under two types of process. Under the majority voting rule,
Pauly (1976) shows that net benefit capitalization is likely to occur in equilibrium. Under
property value maximizing behavior, voters take into account the feedback effect of their
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political choice on rents in their community or in the other. For the sake of simplicity, it is
assumed that only property owners vote and that their property is homogeneous so that prop-
erty value maximization and majority voting rule are equivalent. Pauly (1976) finds that in
this case equilibrium generally fails to exist, as the jurisdictions have the incentive to change
the level of public goods in order to create excess demand and increase rents.
Yinger (1981, 1982) brings voting issue in a model with capitalization of local fiscal variables
into house values. For him, the Tiebout literature is incomplete because it does not fully
integrate both actual voting and voting with one’s feet. On the one hand, the capitalization
of local fiscal variables into house values stems from the mobility of households across
jurisdictions in a metropolitan area and influences political choices made within jurisdictions.
On the other hand, the pattern of local public services that emerges from voting process also
influences the allocation of mobile households to communities. In order to overcome these
shortcomings, Yinger (1981, 1982) constructs a model which integrates explicitly housing
decisions, household’s mobility, location decisions and residential voting. Each jurisdiction
provides a local public service financed by property taxes levied on house value. Individuals
have an exogenous income that they spend on a composite good, on housing services and
on property taxes. Two types of individuals are examined separately, namely movers and
residents.20
Movers are households that decide to choose a new residential location. They bid for housing
in various locations and thereby determine how local public services and taxes are capitalized
into house values. More precisely, movers choose a location by maximizing utility subject to
their budget constraint. Since movers are not yet residents of a community, their optimiza-
tion problem does not include a community budget constraint (they have no voting power).
Moreover, they take tax rates and public services in different communities as given but local
fiscal variables effectively vary through their choice of a community. This optimization prob-
lem generates the pattern of housing prices, i.e. the way local fiscal variables are capitalized
into house values. However, households’ mobility is not sufficient to cause capitalization,
20The duality between movers and residents is also found in Sonstelie and Portney (1980b) who argue that
with perfect mobility and no restriction on the number of communities, resident property owners have the
incentive to separate consumption activities and investment decisions by voting for the fiscal package that
maximizes property value and then moving (if necessary) to the community that offers the highest level of
utility.
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which also requires variation of service-tax packages across communities. And this variation
is allowed by the choice of residents in the political process within each jurisdiction.
Residents are assumed to be property owners. In contrast to movers, they have the power
to determine the level of public services and taxes through voting and they treat their con-
sumption of housing services as given (this means that the building of additions is ruled out
of the model). Assuming that the decisions made by elected officials reflect the preferences
of residents, the democratic process that determines the local fiscal variables can be reduced
to the maximization of residents’ utility. In contrast to movers, the residents’ optimization
programs include the public budget constraint, in addition to the private budget constraint.
Yinger (1981, 1982) shows that this optimization program is equivalent for residents to max-
imize their property value subject to the public budget constraint. Intuitively, it reflects the
incentive residents have to vote for the fiscal package they would bid the most, although they
do not directly bid for it.
In an homogeneous community where the median voter is simply a representative voter,
Yinger (1981, 1982) shows that the property value maximization yields the level of public
services for which the marginal benefit from services (the increase in the rental value from
another unit of public services) equals the marginal cost. In the heterogeneous community
case, the median voter picks the level of public services for which his marginal benefit before
taxes, adjusted by his position in the distribution of preferences equals his cost. In the special
case where the marginal benefit from public services is the same for all residents, the median
voter sets the community’s mean marginal benefit equal to the mean marginal cost.21
Yinger (1981, 1982) argues that capitalization yields inefficient provision of public services,
as it breaks the link between property tax and public services. The property tax implies that
communities set the marginal cost of public services below the marginal rate of transforma-
tion, which leads to underconsumption of housing relative to public services.
In Brueckner and Joo (1991), the interaction between voting with one’s feet and actual voting
is explicitly considered, in contrast to Yinger (1981, 1982). They develop a dynamic two-
21This result is similar to Edelson (1976), who shows that the efficiency condition (relative to a non-taxed
composite good) is met in a heterogeneous community with constant tax shares.
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period model in which residents vote for the level of a durable public good which is financed
by a property tax levied on house values. Since houses are assumed to be identical, each
resident bears an equal share of the cost per period of the public good. The voter lives in the
community over two periods after the vote has occurred and eventually leaves in the end of
period one, selling his house and moving away. The rental value and the resale value of the
house are determined by the arbitrage condition of the buyer who can buy the voter’s house or
occupy rental housing in other communities with an associated reservation utility. Brueckner
and Joo (1991) show that the rule of provision of the level of public good that maximizes
voter’s utility is given by a weighted average of the net marginal benefit to the resident and the
net marginal benefit of the future buyer. In other words, the preference of the future resident
is already reflected in the voter’s ideal level of public good. It also implies that the difference
of outcomes between property value maximization and utility maximization will depend on
the closeness of the marginal valuation of the current owner and the prospective buyer. If the
voter has a stronger (weaker) preference for the public good than the future buyer, the voter’s
choice of public good will lie above (below) the property value maximizing level. Property
value maximization and utility maximization will be equivalent if the voter and the future
buyer have the same preferences for the public good.
Bureaucratic and Rent-Seeking Behavior
Gyourko and Tracy (1989b,a) suggest that not only local public sector rent-seeking, through
public sector unions, produces a wage premium for local government employees but is also
capitalized in local land markets in the form of lower house values.22
The Tiebout model suggests that competition among jurisdiction results in efficient provision
of public services. Epple and Zelenitz (1981) investigate whether the mobility of individuals,
and the capitalization of local fiscal variables into housing prices it implies, can serve as a
22Gyourko and Tracy (1989b) show, for instance, that a dummy indicating the presence of highly organized
union (that is, at least two-thirds of the workforce is organized by unions) significantly decreases the log of
median house prices in a sample of 90 U.S cities.
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constraint on governments that act in their own interests.23 They suggest that when consider-
ing land explicitly, governments have the possibility to set inefficient high tax by extracting
land rent from residents. They consider a metropolis with a fixed land area, equally divided
among jurisdictions which have fixed boundary. Households are perfectly mobile among
jurisdictions; they consume numéraire goods, housing and public services. Mobility among
jurisdictions implies that the property tax capitalizes positively and public expenditures cap-
italize negatively into housing prices, following a flow of population and the change implied
in the housing market. In addition, the tax capitalization impact increases with the number
of jurisdictions and the property tax is perfectly capitalized in the perfect competition case
(i. e, with an infinite number of jurisdictions). Each government is assumed to maximize
profit, which is the excess of tax revenue over government expenditure, without any elec-
toral constraint. Epple and Zelenitz (1981) shows that in perfect competition equilibrium,
tax revenue exceeds government spending, and this rent is positively related to housing value
and housing supply elasticity. They conclude that competition by itself does not completely
eliminate inefficiency. Indeed, while an increase in the number of jurisdiction decreases the
equilibrium tax rate, the rent extracted by the government is still positive because they can
exploit the housing supply elasticity. This result is easily explained by the assumptions of
jurisdiction’s fixed land area and inflexible boundaries: while residents can move to escape
excessive taxation, land is immobile and landowners cannot move land for instance for a
redefinition jurisdictions’ boundaries.
Like Epple and Zelenitz (1981), Caplan (2001) considers rent-seeking local governments
which are constrained by economic competition in a Tiebout world, but adds a political
constraint. There are several types of households that differ in terms of preference for public
goods. In each jurisdiction, there are two competing political parties and the winner is chosen
trough simple majority voting. However, note that the political competition is imperfect as
one party is assumed to be advantaged. The local government objective is a mix of the
size of the government, the public expenditures funded by (property tax) revenues, and the
taxation in excess of that necessary to finance public expenditures, the bureaucratic rent. The
environment is favorable to the capitalization of property taxes: each community has a fixed
supply of land and boundaries are fixed. Housing is produced by combining land and capital
23This approach is also found in Hoyt (1990) in order to test whether residents and capital mobility effectively
constraints governments inefficiency.
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under a Leontief production function, implying the capitalization of property taxes into real
estate values.
Caplan (2001) shows that in equilibrium, local governments use the property tax as a tool to
extract positive rents from households. Mobility does not prevent households from excessive
taxation. The rationale behind this result is that capitalization of property tax implies that
landowners bear the full burden of local taxation and cannot escape from excessive taxation
by moving to another jurisdiction. This result contrasts with Epple and Zelenitz (1981), who
find that competition eliminates at least partially the monopoly power of local governments
and that rent extraction essentially depends on housing demand and supply elasticity. In
contrast, Caplan (2001) suggests that the only source of efficiency in this case is not the
mobility (the exit option) but the strength of the electoral competition (the voice option).
Thus Caplan (2001) reverses the Tiebout’s result: it is the political constraint rather than
the economic pressure that leads the local public sector to an efficient provision of public
services.
In contrast to Epple and Zelenitz (1981) and Caplan (2001), Henderson (1985) argues that
in the proper defined long run equilibrium of a Tiebout model, "bad politics" are simply
impossible. Contrary to Epple and Zelenitz (1981) or Yinger (1982), Henderson (1985)
suggests that in a full Tiebout equilibrium one must assume a flexible number of jurisdictions
as well as flexibility of jurisdictions’ boundaries, in which land developers have an active
role over the land use through annexation an d detachment. As a consequence, the price of
land of uniform quality is equalized in the long run. There is no place in such model for
capitalization of taxes and public goods and no possibility for bureaucrats to exploit housing
supply elasticity and extract land rent from landowners.
Hoyt (1999) shows that the size of jurisdictions is related to governments’ inefficiency. He
argues that Leviathans in large cities are less constrained than in small cities, because prop-
erty taxes capitalize to a lower extent there. Large cities have a large share of the population
of the metropolis. A change of their policy implies a large flow of population and change of
utility in the rest of the metropolis. Thus the degree of property tax and public expenditure
capitalization in large cities is lower because they can pass the cost of the policy change on
the rest of the metropolis. In contrast, policy changes in small cities have almost no impact
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on the rest of the metropolis and are fully capitalized in housing prices. Hoyt (1999) argues
that voters have less incentive to limit government inefficiency in large cities because they
do not bear the entire burden of such inefficient policy.
1.2.3 The Club Theoretical Approach
As described for instance in Scotchmer (1985a), the theory of clubs is primarily concerned
with the sharing of the cost of a club good which is subject to congestion (the typical example
being the swimming pool). Agents have the incentive to form groups in order to create
externalities for each other (Scotchmer, 2002). The seminal paper on the theory of clubs is
due to Buchanan (1965), in which agents band together to share the cost of an impure public
good. A number of authors (Rubinfeld, 1987; Cornes and Sandler, 1986; Scotchmer, 2002)
note that the club theoretical approach is particularly suitable for the formalization of the
Tiebout model. Oates (2006, p. 38) argues that the club theory and the Tiebout model are
"close cousins" and that "the Tiebout model and the theory of clubs are often addressed in the
same breath as if they are virtually interchangeable". Sandler and Tschirhart (1997) argue
that Tiebout (1956) contributes to the club literature by developing a theory of jurisdiction
size.
A Simple Model
The main results of the theory of clubs can be described in the following simple model,
based on Cornes and Sandler (1986). To keep the analysis simple, we focus on a case in
which segregation is impossible, i.e. the case of a homogeneous population with identical
tastes and incomes (McGuire, 1974). Let the preferences of a representative agent be defined
by the utility function U(x,g) with usual properties, where x is a numéraire private good and
g is the level of (impure) public good supplied to each member of the club.24 Each member
of the club is endowed with an equal amount of income y. The private good is used to
24Alternative utility functions may directly include the number of sharers in the club in order to describe a
pure distaste for association but it does not qualitatively change the results.
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produce the club good at cost C =C(g,n) with ∂C/∂g > 0 and ∂C/∂n > 0, where C is the
total cost of public good measured in units of the numéraire and n is the size of the sharing
group. Writting the total cost function in this way shows explicitly the difference between a
club good and a pure public good. The club good is subject to crowding costs; in the case
of a pure public good we have ∂C/∂n = 0, i.e. the total cost is not affected by the marginal
resident.
Assuming that the club good is equally financed by all the members of the club, the private
budget constraint is y = x+C(g,n)/n. Substituting the private budget constraint into the
utility function, an efficient allocation can be characterized by a vector (g∗,n∗) which solves:
Maxg,n U(y−C(g,n)/n,g). (1.7)
This program reveals the trade-off at work in the model. A new member will reduce the
average contribution paid by all the members of the club and will allow an increase in the
consumption of the private good and the utility level. In the same time, its entry also de-
creases the quality of the club good enjoyed by club members, because of higher congestion
costs.25 Necessary conditions for a maximum are given by:
n
∂U/∂g
∂U/∂x
=
∂C
∂g
, (1.8)
∂C
∂n
=
C
n
. (1.9)
Equation (1.8) is the familiar Samuelson condition for the Pareto-optimal allocation of pub-
lic good. In contrast to pure public goods in which the relevant size of the jurisdiction is the
entire community, club goods require an entry or a membership condition, which is given by
25Formally, externalities that people create simultaneously for each other can be illustrated by differentiating
the utility function specified in the optimization program with respect to n:
∂U
∂n
=−∂U
∂x
∂C
∂n
1
n
+
∂U
∂x
C
n2
.
The first term represents the external diseconomy, for which an increase in n lowers U , since ∂C/∂n > 0. The
second term refers to the external economy, for which an increase in n rises U , since it reduces the average
contribution and increases the consumption of private good.
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equation (1.9).26 This condition shows that when a new household enters the community, it
increases the marginal congestion cost; at the same time, it decreases the average contribu-
tion. Thus, equation (1.9) states that the club welcomes new entrants up to the point where
the marginal congestion cost is equal to the average contribution. The intuition behind this
result is that for large groups, crowding costs dominate the benefits of sharing the cost of
the club good. It means that reallocations of individuals in larger groups will not lead to
Pareto-superior outcome.27
Denoting N the size of the total population in the economy, equation (1.9) implies that there
should be N/n identical clubs, a condition that is not certain to occur (this problem, on
which we come back later, is known as the integer problem). The entry condition also
requires that each of the N/n groups be sized such that the average cost per person C/n
be at a minimum. This sheds light on the Tiebout assumption under which voting with one’s
feet leads each jurisdiction to provide local public services at the minimum average cost.
If ∂C/∂n < C/n, the jurisdiction has to attract new residents to benefit from lower sharing
costs. If ∂C/∂n > C/n, the jurisdiction has to reduce its population size in order to lower
the crowding costs.
Alternatively, the solution to (1.7) can be seen as a two-step optimization program (Scotch-
mer, 1985a). In a first step, the program (1.7) has to be solved with respect to g; it yields
g(n) the efficient allocation of public good for any group of size n. In a second step, g(n) is
substituted in (1.7) to give the utility envelope:
u(n)≡U(y−C(g(n),n)/n,g(n)), (1.10)
which is maximized with respect to n to yield the efficient size of the club.
26With a pure distaste for association, the utility function is U(x,n,g) and equation (1.9) rewrites:
−n∂U/∂n
∂U/∂x
=
C
n
.
27According to Scotchmer (2002) this point explains why club models have been interpreted as models of
local public goods.
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Non-Spatial Clubs
The main focus of the early literature on clubs was on the characterization of the efficient
sharing groups, as in the previous simple model, and on the existence of solutions. The main
issue related to the existence of equilibrium in the theory of clubs is the integer problem.
Using the equilibrium notion of the core, Pauly (1967, 1970a,b) shows that allocations in
the core are efficient but that the core is generally empty. Indeed, a stable group formation
requires that the total population N is an integer multiple of n∗ (in addition, the efficient club
size n∗ must be lower than total population). If its not the case, a group of agents can act
cooperatively and form a jurisdiction to raise the utility of at least one member. Thus the
club formation is unstable - the core is empty.
As argued by Scotchmer (2002), the equilibrium concept used in the club literature and in
the Tiebout model are different. Besides the notion of the core, Scotchmer and Wooders
(1987a,b) introduce the competitive equilibrium in club economies. In this approach, the
competitive conjecture is applied to clubs to see whether a complete price system defined by
the memberships in groups leads to an efficient allocation of agents. Scotchmer and Wooders
(1987a) show that when there is only one private good every allocation in the core is a
competitive equilibrium. The equivalence between the core and the competitive equilibrium
implies that the integer problem also applies to the competitive equilibrium.
A third equilibrium concept used in the theory of clubs is the Nash equilibrium. For instance,
Scotchmer (1985a,b) studies a Nash equilibrium in which the clubs’ strategies are the facility
size or both the facility size and the membership price. The nature of the Nash equilibrium
will depend on the type of clubs’ strategies.
In contrast to the three previous equilibria discussed above, the Tiebout model uses the notion
of the free mobility equilibrium. In this setting, the group formation is stable if no agent
wants to move to increase utility. Scotchmer (2002) argues that this type of equilibrium is
more limited than the core or the competitive equilibrium since it gives the opportunity for a
group of agents to make coordinated decisions to reassemble in an efficient size group.
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The simple model that we have presented has been extended in many ways. For exam-
ple, some models allow for a variable visitation or utilization rate (Berglas, 1976b; Ber-
glas and Pines, 1981; Scotchmer and Wooders, 1987a). Moreover, we implicitly assume
anonymous crowding in the provision of the public good, i.e. the congestion depends on
the number of club members but not on the members’ characteristics. In contrast, with
non-anonymous crowding, such as peer group effect in schooling, club members generate
different types of externalities depending on their individual characteristics. Club litera-
ture with non-anonymous crowding includes Berglas (1976a,b), Scotchmer and Wooders
(1987b), Brueckner (1989, 1994), Wooders (1989), McGuire (1991), Scotchmer (1997),
Gilles and Scotchmer (1997) and Epple and Romano (1998). Scotchmer (2002) shows that
non-anonymous crowding confers another dimension to the existence problem discussed
above: even if there is no integer problem, it may be impossible for agents to form groups
with appropriate combinations of characteristics.
Another issue raised by the Tiebout model is the club’s formation with heterogeneous popu-
lation. Should optimal group formation with heterogeneous population lead to segregated or
mixed clubs? This question has important implications on social stratification, the desirabil-
ity of segregated neighborhoods and exclusionary zoning ordinances. Answer is mixed but
the different points of view are inherent to the model used (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1980).28
For example, Berglas and Pines (1981) show that, in a club model with two types of agents
and variable utilization of the facility, it is suboptimal to have two or more identical mixed
groups. However, Sandler and Tschirhart (1984) demonstrate that this result depends cru-
cially on a full financing constraint implied by the way the congestion enters the utility
function: the toll reduces to an average pricing rule. Consequently, mixed clubs, where het-
erogeneous agents use different amounts of the club good but pay the same total fees, is
always less desirable than homogeneous clubs.
28McGuire (1974), Berglas (1976b) and Berglas and Pines (1981) argue against segregated clubs. In contrast,
De Serpa (1977), Sandler and Tschirhart (1980) and Sandler and Tschirhart (1984) argue in favor of mixed
clubs.
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Spatial Clubs
Spatial considerations have been relatively little explored in the theory of local public goods
whereas it allows understanding the difference between club goods and local public goods.
Scotchmer (2002) notes that the main difference of clubs is that the population can be par-
titioned in different ways for different club goods - for instance one club for a museum and
another club for a swimming pool - while it can be only once for a jurisdiction. Oates (2006)
argues that the problems addressed in the basic theory of clubs is much simpler than those
addressed in the Tiebout model. The latter deals with space; households are restricted in a
geographically defined jurisdiction, where they consume a given bundle of public services.
In contrast, the theory of clubs allows individuals to consume different public goods in dif-
ferent clubs, whose geographical boundaries could well overlap.
Recent literature on clubs includes explicitly spatial issue such as housing and land markets
in order to approach the Tiebout features. Hochman (2005) suggests that besides the pri-
mary agglomeration of club goods into facilities caused by scale economies in the provision
of these goods, space brings two other types of agglomeration. A secondary agglomeration
leads households to concentrate around facilities in order to save commuting costs. This sec-
ondary agglomeration of population in turns generates a tertiary agglomeration of facilities
in the midst of population concentrations. Hochman (2005) argues that the previous liter-
ature on urban agglomeration (e.g., Fujita and Thisse (1986), Thisse and Wildasin (1992))
ignores the tertiary agglomeration by assuming a uniform population density (and thus ruling
out the secondary agglomeration of population).29
Space is not only a new source of agglomeration but it also affects the rule for optimal allo-
cation of public goods and population. Hochman (1982a) studies congestable concentrated
local public goods in an urban setting, with endogenous clubs’ boundaries. These types of
public goods are provided in specific locations to which residents must travel to enjoy their
consumption. Hochman (1982a) shows that efficient provision of public goods implies that
congestions tolls, equal to the marginal damages to club members by the marginal unit of
utilization, are imposed on each unit of utilization. Total congestion tolls paid by club mem-
29Hochman (2009) derives the optimal allocation with the three types of agglomeration pattern and shows
that contrary to non-spatial clubs, these optimal solutions may be difficult to decentralize.
Which Local Governance for the Tiebout Model? 41
bers should be set in proportion to the degree of congestability. In contrast to non-spatial
clubs where user charges cover the entire cost of the club goods, efficiency requires that the
rest of public expenditures are covered by land rents taxation.30
With pure concentrated local public goods, i.e. when the degree of congestability is equal
to zero, local expenditures are fully financed by land rents (we come back to the HGT).
In contrast, when the degree of congestability is equal to zero local expenditures are fully
financed by congestion tolls, that effectively become prices.
Hochman (1982a) notes that compared to the non-spatial theory of clubs, the existence of
clubs formation is not only due to the congestion of local public goods but also to the limited
accessible land. Limited geographic space constitutes a natural source of congestion. Thus,
even in the case of a pure concentrated local public good, i.e. with no direct crowding
from the public facility, the formation of club occurs because limited accessible land around
facilities still generates a second type of congestion.
Besides the conditions for an efficient allocation of public goods, the introduction of space
implies a set of spatial conditions for an efficient location of public goods and fixation of
club boundaries. Hochman (1982a) shows that local public goods should be located in such
a manner that total travel costs to it by club members are minimized. This occurs when
the total travel costs resulting from a shifting of the public facility from the CBD or toward
the CBD are equal. Optimal border fixation implies that the marginal rate of substitution
between housing and a composite private good of two households on the border of two clubs
must be equal.
Contrary to Hochman (1982a) who restricts clubs from providing only one public good with
independent boundaries, Hochman et al. (1995) study an institutional structure of local gov-
ernments that allows for overlapping of clubs’ market areas, due to the consumption of multi-
ple local public goods. They show, like Hochman (1982a,b) that the formation of an optimal
complex (which is a system of clubs providing the whole range of local public goods to the
population) satisfies an extended version of the HGT. However, the decentralization of this
30This result is also derived by Hochman (1982b) in the case of dispersed congestable local public goods
and by Hochman et al. (1995) in an overlapping clubs framework.
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optimum is problematic because of the overlapping structure of the clubs. With only one
local public good, the taxation of land rents accrues only to the club where land is located.
With overlapping clubs, the aggregate land rent has to be distributed among different sup-
pliers of the local public goods with common market area. The aggregate land rent must be
distributed in such a way that each supplier of the local public goods behaves efficiently.
Hochman et al. (1995) argue that the only way to achieve efficiency is thus to decentralize
fiscal responsibilities to land value maximizing local governments that control the clubs’ at-
tributes within the boundaries of an optimal complex. Since these local governments should
encompass the whole range of local public goods, each serving an optimal area, their bound-
aries might be relatively large. That’s why Hochman et al. (1995) denote these local govern-
ment as "metropolitan governments". Thus, this model suggests that fiscal responsibilities
should be decentralized to only one layer of local governments with larger territorial bases,
rather than to multiple layers of governments to provide several types of local public goods.
In contrast to Fujita (1986) and Sakashita (1987) who consider endogenous locations of
public facilities but exogenous numbers of public facilities, Berliant et al. (2006) provide
a model in which both the locations and the numbers of congestable public facilities are
determined endogenously. They derive the Pareto-optimal allocation and show that dispersed
public facility configuration occurs for high degree of congestability and unit transportation
cost and low household valuation of the public good.
Conclusion
This chapter goes back to the theoretical source of the capitalization of local fiscal variables
into house values. Tiebout (1956) argues, in response to Samuelson (1954), that in a local
context agents have to move to their preferred jurisdiction and are forced to reveal their
preferences for local public goods. This mechanism, which is analogous to the functioning
of the private market leads to the efficient provision of local public services.
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Wile the Tiebout model is constantly invoked in both theoretical and empirical capitalization
studies, there is no mention of capitalization in his original paper. This can be explained by
the absence of a complete description of complete system of prices for local public goods
and practically no consideration of housing. Once we introduce these two ingredients in a
model that preserve the Tiebout features, Hamilton (1975, 1976b) shows that capitalization
plays an important role for the efficiency of the provision of local public goods.
The efficiency of local public services in the Tiebout model may seem somewhat trivial when
one considers that Tiebout does not fully describe the process under which taxes and public
expenditures are chosen. There is three approaches to fill this gap. The profit maximizing
communities view is in line with the original Tiebout model. Alternatively, local govern-
ments may set fiscal packages in order to maximize the property values of their residents.
The Tiebout model also shares common features with the club theoretical approach.
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Chapter 2
The Empirical Review of the Capitalization
Literature
EVery capitalization study is based either on the hedonic approach or the asset pricingapproach, which are presented in first section. The former establishes a relationship
between the price of a marketable good and the amenities this good contains. It has been used
in order to estimate the impact of a large number of non-market goods (like environmental
amenities, air pollution, flood hazard) on house prices and to infer their implicit prices. The
latter approach is not only used to determine the price of a house but is also used to set the
price of other asset like stocks or bonds (Yinger et al., 1988).
As noted by Oates (2006) and Fischel (2001), there is a large literature on capitalization.
Of course the objective of this chapter is not to present this literature exhaustively.1 This
chapter surveys the capitalization literature by focusing on the econometric innovations and
improvements that occurred over time. The first significant empirical contribution to the
capitalization of local fiscal differentials into house values, Oates (1969), is subject to var-
1See the surveys of Bloom et al. (1983), Yinger et al. (1988), Chaudry-Shah (1988) for a review of a part of
this literature.
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ious biases of different natures. Subsequent literature can be viewed as a continuous effort
to reduce these biases and obtain better measures of the degree of tax and public services
capitalization.
Some authors (King, 1977; Reinhard, 1981) point to a misspecification of the tax variable in
Oates (1969). Pollakowski (1973) argues that Oates (1969), by considering only the annual
current expenditure per pupil in dollars as a proxy for the public service quality, does not
correctly control for public expenditures in his capitalization regression. A large part of the
literature is dedicated to the search of an appropriate control of the public service quality.
Section 2.4 shows that most of the articles (McDougall, 1976; Rosen and Fullerton, 1977)
introduce for example test scores as a proxy for public school quality. An alternative is to
compute the school’s value added as a proxy for public school quality (Sonstelie and Portney,
1980a; Reinhard, 1981; Downes and Zabel, 2002).
A difficulty induced by the estimation of capitalization is to isolate the tax rate effect from the
public service effect on house prices (Linneman, 1978). Richardson and Thalheimer (1981)
and Palmon and Smith (1998b) overcome this difficulty by estimating capitalization in ju-
risdictions which provide the same level of services but where, for some reasons, there are
substantial variations in the property tax rates. This allows to avoid the potential downward
bias in the tax capitalization coefficient, induced by error measurement of public services
and the positive correlation between public services and tax rates.
A standard capitalization regression requires a lot of information on neighborhood char-
acteristics to avoid omitted variable bias on public services coefficient estimates. To reduce
the omitted neighborhood variables bias on public service capitalization, Cushing (1984) and
Black (1999) estimate capitalization at the border of two jurisdictions in order to benefit from
public services differentials but with relatively little variation in neighborhood attributes.
Due to a lack of informations on individual transactions, the first capitalization studies focus
on interjuridictional tax capitalization, that is municipalities with relatively high tax rate have
a relatively low median house value. Section 2.6 shows that intrajurisdictional capitalization
may occur because of assessment differences that stems from the absence reevaluation of
property values at market prices (Yinger et al., 1988), because of systematic and random
The Two Approaches for Testing Tax Capitalization 47
assessment (Ihlanfeldt and Jackson, 1982), or because of tax reduction (Chinloy, 1978).
Moreover, in contrast to aggregate studies, studies based on micro data allows to estimate
either intrajurisdictional capitalization (Church, 1974; Edelstein, 1974; Wales and Wiens,
1974; Chinloy, 1978) or both within and across capitalization (Case, 1978; Hamilton, 1979;
Goodman, 1983).
2.1 The Two Approaches for Testing Tax Capitalization
Most of the studies on capitalization are founded on two approaches, namely the house price
hedonic approach and the capitalization approach. Each of these approaches is subject to
several econometric problems such as measurement errors in the variables, potential left-out
variables, simultaneity bias, and potential misspecification of the empirical equation.
2.1.1 The Hedonic Prices Approach
The hedonic prices approach is used both for aggregate studies (Oates, 1969, 1973; Gustely,
1976) and micro-data studies (Palmon and Smith, 1998b; Black, 1999; Brasington, 2001)
on tax capitalization and is based on the pioneering theoretical works of Lancaster (1966)
and Rosen (1974). Following this procedure, the hedonic prices of differentiated products
(which are implicit prices) can be defined as a function of their attributes.
Formally, a house bundle is represented by a vector of n characteristics Z = (Z1, . . . ,Zn).
Each element of the vector Z is a quantity of an objectively measured attribute, like the
number of rooms, the size of the lot or the location. Since land is non-reproducible, each
house is unique. However, the price structure is assumed to be identical for the embodied
characteristics. The perception of these quantities is homogeneous among consumers, even
if their preferences relative to alternative packages may vary. It is assumed that there is
a sufficient number of houses with different characteristics so that the choice of various
combinations of attributes is continuous. The market price of a house is given by P(Z), the
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hedonic price function, which depends on the vector of characteristics. We assume that this
price is parametric for households, i.e. they compete with each other for housing and land
and they have no market power. Households’ preferences are given by the following utility
function U =U(X ,Z), where X represents a composite non-housing good. If the price of X
is equal to one and Y is the income, the budget constraint is Y = X +P(Z). The households
choose a house with (Z1, . . . ,Zn) characteristics and the quantity of the composite good so as
to maximize its utility function subject to the budget constraint. This leads to the following
first-order conditions:
UZi
UX
=
∂P
∂Zi
= Pi, i = 1, . . . ,n. (2.1)
As in the classical urban economic theory (Alonso, 1964; Muth, 1969), we can derive from
the utility function a bid rent function θ(Z,u,Y ) using a condition of minimum utility level
attainment:
U(Y −θ(Z,u,Y ),Z) = u. (2.2)
The bid rent function gives the maximum amount of expenditures a household is willing to
pay for an alternative bundle of characteristics of a house and for a given level of utility.
Differentiating (2.2) yields:
θZi =
UZi
UX
> 0, θu =− 1UX , θY = 1. (2.3)
Equation (2.3) shows that the derivative of the bid rent function with respect to a particular
characteristic is equal to the willingness to pay (in terms of X forgone) for an additional unit
of this characteristic, holding the utility level constant. Moreover, the bid rent is decreasing
in the level of utility index and increasing in the income.2
Optimality is reached when the minimum price P(Z) the buyer has to pay is equal to his
maximum willingness to pay, that is when θ(Z∗;u∗,Y ) =P(Z∗) and then when at the margin:
θZi(Z
∗,u∗,Y ) = Pi(Z∗), i = 1, . . . ,n. (2.4)
2For more details on the form and properties of P and θ , see Rosen (1974).
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Combining (2.3) and (2.4), we obtain:
θZi =
UZi
UX
= Pi, i = 1, . . . ,n. (2.5)
This equation offers the theoretical foundation to the interpretation of the parameters of an
econometric equation regressing housing price on housing characteristics. It insures that,
under optimizing behavior and equilibrium in the housing market, the choice made by the
consumers provides information on the marginal willingness to pay for housing characteris-
tics.
To close the model, we have to explain the hedonic price function determination and thus the
producers’ behavior. Each firm is restricted to produce competitively only one combination
of characteristics and has a cost function C(M,Z), with M the number of houses supplied.
Again, the assumption of perfect competition insures that the producers take the hedonic
price as a parameter. Let the marginal cost of producing more characteristics and houses
be positive and increasing. Each firm chooses a combination of attributes and a level of
production to maximize its profit pi = MP(Z)−C(M,Z), which yields the following first-
order conditions:
Pi(Z) =
CZi(M,Z)
M
, i = 1, . . . ,n (2.6)
P(Z) =CM(M,Z). (2.7)
Optimum combination of attributes is reached when the marginal cost of an additional unit
of characteristics equals its marginal cost of production for all attributes. Moreover, houses
are produced until the per unit revenue equals the marginal cost of production.
We can define an offer function for the producers as we made for the consumers and the bid
rent function by using the following condition:
pi = Mφ −C(M,Z). (2.8)
The offer function indicates the minimum supply price the producer is willing to accept for a
given bundle of attributes and profit level. Basic properties can be derived by differentiating
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equation (2.8) with respect to Zi and pi:
φZi =
CZi
M
> 0, φpi =
1
M
> 0. (2.9)
The offer function is increasing in characteristics and in the profit level.3 Optimum bundle
of characteristics and maximum profit requires that the offer price the producer is willing to
accept equals the maximum price given by the market condition, so that φ(Z∗;pi∗) = P(Z∗)
and that
φZi(Z
∗;pi∗) = Pi(Z∗), i = 1, . . . ,n. (2.10)
Combining (2.6) and (2.10) yields
φZi =
CZi(M,Z)
M
= Pi, i = 1, . . . ,n. (2.11)
Market equilibrium requires that the amount of supplied houses is equal to the amount de-
manded by consumers for every set of characteristics.
This model provides a theoretical foundation for the link between the price of a house and its
characteristics. If we consider that the bundle of attributes enters linearly in the econometric
equation,4 we obtain
Pj = α0+
n
∑
i=1
αiZi j +βt jt j, (2.12)
with Pj the sale price of the jth property, Zi j is a vector of structural and locational charac-
teristics and t j is the annual rate of property taxation. All elements that may influence the
house value enter in the vector Zi j. In this regard, this type of equation has not only been
used to study the impact of taxes and public services on house prices but also to estimate the
economic value of other phenomenona that are not always traded in an explicit market, like
flood hazards (Donnelly, 1989; Harrison et al., 2001) and air pollution (Smith and Huang,
1995; Chay and Greenstone, 2005).
The main disadvantage of this approach is that it has nothing to say about the way the prop-
erty tax rate enters in the econometric equation (2.12).
3For more details on the second order properties of the offer function, see Rosen (1974).
4Conditions for linearity of P(Z) are given in Rosen (1974) and Freeman (1979).
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2.1.2 The Capitalization Approach
Another way to derive an econometric equation that estimates the capitalization of fiscal
variables is to use a simple asset-pricing principle introduced by the literature on financial
markets and that relies house value to property taxes and measures of public services.5 The
house value is defined as being equal to the present value of net-of-tax rental values generated
to the owner. Algebraically,
P =
N
∑
i=1
S−T
(1+ r)i
, (2.13)
where P is the house’s market value, S is the value of housing services, T the annual property
tax payment on the house and r is the real discount rate. Assuming an infinite lifetime
horizon, equation (2.13) can be simplified to :6
P =
S−T
r
, (2.14)
where r can be interpreted as an infinite-horizon discount rate. Yinger et al. (1988) show
that the greater the house lifetime horizon and the discount rate, the better the closeness of
this approximation. Introducing β as an indicator of the degree of capitalization in equation
(2.14) gives:
P =
S−βT
r
. (2.15)
If S is assumed to be a linear function of the structural and locational characteristics, we can
directly estimate equation (2.15) and calculate the degree of capitalization by multiplying
the estimated coefficient of the property tax payment by an assumed real discount rate.
By definition, the annual property tax payment is equal to the effective property tax rate, t,
times the house’s market value P:
T = tP. (2.16)
5A comprehensive overview of this approach is given in Yinger et al. (1988).
6For details on the derivation of this simplification, see Yinger et al. (1988).
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Substituting (2.16) into (2.15) allows us to obtain a version of the capitalization equation
with the effective property tax rate rather than the property tax payment:
P =
S−β tP
r
. (2.17)
Substituting the hedonic function for housing services S(Zi) in (2.17) and solving for P
yields:
P =
S(Zi)
r+β t
. (2.18)
Note that since (2.18) and (2.15) are equivalent, the meaning of β is the same in both equa-
tions: it indicates the effect of a one dollar increase in the present value of property tax
payment on the house price. Assume this time that S is a multiplicative function of housing
and neighborhood characteristics of the form S(Zi) =∏ni=1 Zi and take the natural logarithm
of (2.18) to obtain:
lnP =
n
∑
i=1
αiZi− ln(r)− ln(1+ βr t). (2.19)
Contrary to the hedonic prices approach, the capitalization model gives a theoretical guid-
ance not only for explaining the relationship between taxes and public services but also for
the functional form that takes the tax price term in the econometric equation. However, it
also involves econometric difficulties since equation (2.19) is nonlinear in the property tax
rate and the coefficient β and the real discount rate are non separable. As a consequence,
equation (2.19) cannot be estimated using a simple OLS regression. In the literature, three
solutions are used to solve the problem of the nonlinearity. The first possibility generally
used in the literature is simply to ignore or simplify the nonlinearity associated to the prop-
erty tax rate and to enter t or ln(t) as the tax variable. According to Yinger et al. (1988), this
is clearly the less convincing solution because it introduces a bias with unknown magnitude
and direction. Moreover, using this kind of approximations is disturbing especially when it
is possible to derive an econometric specification from the theory. Another possibility is to
use the approximation ln(1+a) = a when a is small. Contrary to the previous case, we can
estimate the impact of this approximation which quality depends on the value of a = β t/r.
For large β and t the approximation may be imprecise. The best solution is to use nonlinear
methods to estimate equation (2.19), as in Yinger et al. (1988) who use a nonlinear two-stage
least square estimating procedure.
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2.2 Interjurisdictional Capitalization and the Tiebout Model:
The Oates’ Equation
2.2.1 The Oates’s Equation
The first major contribution to the capitalization literature is Oates (1969). Even if there are
some previous papers dealing with tax capitalization (Wicks et al., 1968), Oates is the first
to test both tax and public service capitalization in a unified framework. His main objective
is to offer a testable implication for the Tiebout hypothesis which states that the mobility
of individuals leads to an efficient allocation of public goods at the local level. As we have
seen in the first chapter, the Tiebout model describes a world in which a metropolitan area is
composed of a central business district and many suburban communities that provide various
types of tax and public services packages. Consumers are mobile and choose the community
that offers the fiscal package that maximizes their utility.
Bearing in mind this result, Oates (1969) argues that the relevant variable that determines the
location choice is the present value of future streams of benefits resulting from the provision
of public services relative to the present value of future tax payments. As a consequence, an
increase in the property tax may still rise the net rental income and the property value if tax
revenues are used to finance public services that positively affect housing prices.
Oates (1969) extracts an empirical implication from these considerations. As the consumers
take into account the effect of local public budgets for their choice of residence’s locality,
they bid up for houses located in communities with attractive fiscal packages, i.e. with
relatively high quality of public services and low level of taxes. On the contrary, local public
spending that does not affect location decisions should not affect the demand for housing
and the property values.
The aim of Oates (1969) is thus to support empirically this practical implication of the
Tiebout model, by testing the effects of local fiscal variables on property values in different
communities. According to Oates, finding a positive effect of public services and a negative
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effect of property taxes on property values would be consistent with the Tiebout hypothesis.
These results would imply that households "vote with their feet" and would be an evidence
for efficient allocation of public goods.
Oates (1969) uses a sample of fifty-three municipalities in the northeastern New-Jersey lo-
cated within the New-York metropolitan region in 1960. Due to the use aggregate data, the
author estimates interjurisdictional tax capitalization, which is consistent with the Tiebout
model that focuses on interjurisdictional mobility. Moreover, the sample is restricted to res-
idential communities where a large number of residents go outside the community (to the
CBD, for example) to their place of employment, i.e. to communities with an employment-
residence ratio less than one. The empirical equation takes the following form:
V = f (t,E,R,N,Y,M,P), (2.20)
where V is the median home value by community, t is the effective tax rate in percent (the
median property tax bill per household divided by the median home value), E the annual
current expenditure per pupil in dollars. Since the value of a house does not only depend on
local fiscal variables, other variables like the house style and location-specific variables that
characterize the neighborhood of the house are also introduced in the equation. R, the median
number of rooms per owner-occupied house is an indication of the size and N, the percentage
of houses built since 1950, is a proxy for the age of the housing stock in the community. Y
is the median family income in thousands of dollars in 1959. M, the linear distance in miles
of the community from midtown Manhattan, stems from the classical urban theory. P, the
percentage of families in the community with an annual income of less than $3000, captures
the effects of the neighborhood characteristics or "the intangible characteristics of a house"
(Oates, 1969, p. 961). Indeed, wealthier families are more likely to live in high quality
residences. P is used to adjust the median family income variable, because a large number of
low-income families will understate the actual median income of homeowners relative to the
median family income. Therefore the median income of homeowners and the median value
of owner-occupied houses will tend to be higher in the communities with a relatively large
number of low-income families.
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Regarding the choice of fiscal variables, Oates (1969) uses the effective property tax rate
as the tax price term rather than the nominal property tax rate to take into account the dif-
ference in assessment ratios between the different communities of the sample (for example,
assessment practices may differ from one community to another). The effective property tax
rate is included in a log form to approximate for non linearity described in equation (2.19).
As a measure of the public services output, the (log of) per pupil school public spending is
introduced with the assumption that expenditures vary positively with the level of output of
educational services. Oates (1969) is aware that using an input as a proxy for an output is un-
satisfactory because the variation of expenditures in two communities could be explained for
example by the difference in the size of the school population, without any effect on the qual-
ity of education. In order to take into account the differences in the structure of the school
population between communities, Oates (1969) determines a "weight pupil enrollment" to
adjust the per capita school expenditures.7
In a first step, Oates (1969) estimates equation (2.20) with OLS. The results confirm, as
expected from the Tiebout model, a positive effect of public services and a negative effect
of taxes on the property value. However, the coefficients may be biased by simultaneity
between the property tax rate and the property value. It might happen that the tax rate is
influenced by the level of the property value because a higher property value in a community
allows a given level of public services to be provided at a lower property tax rate, leading to
a downward bias of the coefficient estimate of effective property taxes and thus to an upward
bias of tax capitalization. The same logic applies for public expenditures with the exception
that it may lead to an upward bias of the public service coefficient.
Oates (1969) uses a Two-Stage Least Squares (TSLQ) approach to solve the simultaneity
problem in equation (2.20). In the first step, predetermined variables such as education
attainment, population density or school’s population structure are used to estimate predicted
values of tax and spending that are purged of their correlation with the error term. The results
are similar to the OLS regression except for the coefficient of the public expenditure variable
which is larger. The control variables are all significant and with expected signs. Younger
housing stock with higher size increases the property value. Houses are also more expensive
7The following weight is applied for each school district: kindergarten pupils = .5, elementary school pupils
= 1, secondary school pupils = 1.25, special pupils = 2.
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in wealthier communities with nice neighborhood amenities. The closeness to the CBD
positively affects the median house value.
Regarding the fiscal variables which are of primary interest, Oates (1969) finds that an in-
crease in the local property tax from 2% to 3% reduces the market value of a house by
about $1,500. The magnitude of tax capitalization is thus about two-third of the theoretical
capitalization that would be induced by an equivalent tax rate variation for a typical house
with a market value of $20,000 and a time horizon of 40 years, and using a discount rate of
5%.8 For the expenditure side, Oates shows that for a hypothetical community composed of
identical houses with a market value of $20,000 and one public school pupil per family, the
increase in the public budget for education implied by 1% rise in the tax rate raises house
values by roughly $1,200, assuming that one half of the additional tax revenues is used to
finance education. Therefore, not only public education has a positive influence on property
value but it also almost offsets the negative effect of an increase in the tax rate on house
values. Oates (1969) suggests that this mihgt indicate that the sample’s communities have
approximately reached a Tiebout equilibrium in the sense that education is provided up to the
point where the benefit from an additional unit of output equals the marginal cost. Moreover,
the results support the Tiebout hypothesis that consumers shop for public services because
communities with high property tax rate have lower house values than communities with low
tax rate, holding constant the quality of public services. Thus consumers effectively choose
the tax-service package that best satisfies their preference and bid up houses in the commu-
nities with relatively low tax rates and high education quality. Another important conclusion
in terms of tax incidence is that the property tax is equivalent to a benefit tax. As the negative
effect on property value of a tax increase is roughly offset by the public spending allowed by
the additional tax revenues, property tax can be seen as a kind of user charges for services
provided (Mieszkowski and Zodrow, 1989). This means that efficiency holds in the Tiebout
model even with property taxes, if the urban area reaches a Tiebout equilibrium.
While the Oates’s equation stimulated a number of papers in the field of tax capitalization,
it raised several critics regarding both economic and econometric issues. First, as Oates
recognizes himself, the negative relationship between house values and taxes could be a
8For details on the calculus, see Oates (1969), p. 965, footnote 13.
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short-run phenomenon and disappear in the long run, because of housing supply adjustment.
Moreover, Hamilton (1976b) and Edel and Sclar (1974) argue that estimating significant tax
and expenditures capitalization does not necessarily imply efficiency. On the contrary, in
a fully adjusted Tiebout equilibrium, supply response to tax differentials should cancel tax
capitalization. Thus, efficiency would require no capitalization at equilibrium.9
Second, the Oates’ study is also subject to several econometric problems. For example, a
too little number of control variables for structural and location characteristics of houses is
included in the estimation. This could lead to potential left-out variables bias, especially if
these variables enter in the characteristics of houses that determine the assessment value. In
this case, the property tax payment is correlated with the structural and neighborhoods char-
acteristics. Since houses’ structural characteristics generally have a positive effect on the
assessed value, left-out variables are likely to under-estimate the extent of tax capitalization
(Yinger et al., 1988). Pollakowski (1973) suggests that the estimation of the public service
capitalization could also be biased by left-out variables. Oates uses educational expenditure
per pupil as a measure of local public services. He argues that primary and secondary ed-
ucation is an important item in local public budget. However, as Oates does not provide a
consistent interpretation on his public service variable, it may introduce biases in the estima-
tion of the public good capitalization. Assume that E is a proxy for educational services and
that another public service variable which significantly affects the property value is omit-
ted. If the left-out variable is positively related to E, the capitalization of the public service
variable will be biased upward. If the left-out variable is negatively related to E, the capi-
talization of the public service variable will be biased downward. In this case, an accurate
estimation of public service capitalization will require that only public school expenditures
significantly affect the property value or that other types of public service are uncorrelated
with E. Therefore the direction of the bias depends on the sense of the relationship between
public education expenditures and other types of local public spending that affect the prop-
erty value. By contrast, if we consider E as being an index for the general level of public
services in the community, the estimation of the public services capitalization will be more
accurate if E is highly correlated with the left-out variable. To the extent that the left-out
public spending variable is related to the property tax variable and that more public expendi-
9The debate on the persistence of capitalization is detailed in chapter 4.
58 The Empirical Review of the Capitalization Literature
tures may imply more taxes, the tax capitalization is likely to be underestimated. However,
if the community finances public services by debts, the property tax and the left-out pub-
lic spending variable may be negatively correlated and yield a downward bias on the tax
coefficient.
Regarding the potential endogeneity problem, Pollakowski (1973) casts some doubts on the
two-stage estimation procedure used by Oates (1969). More precisely, he argues that several
of the Oates’s instruments are also correlated with the error term, whereas the interest of a
TSLQ is to find additional variables that are correlated with the tax and the public expenditure
variables but not with the error term. Pollakowski gives evidences about the consequences
of an inappropriate use of the TSLQ by estimating an empirical equation similar to the one
of Oates and using the same data but without illegitimate predetermined variables, such
as education attainment, population density and percentage of dwellings owner occupied.
The results are no longer satisfactory: tax rate and public education coefficients become
imprecise and insignificant at the 5% level.
These critics are only part of those made to the original Oates’s equation. Other econometric
problems regarding the use of public spending as a measure of public services quality, the
proper choice of a tax variable, the use of macro data and the functional form of the capi-
talization equation have been the object of several critics to the Oates’s original estimation.
As we said in the introduction of this chapter, the empirical capitalization literature can be
seen as a constant improvement of econometric models and procedures, using the particu-
lar properties of unique data set. Thus, in the next sections we review with more details
these econometric issues and the different approaches that have been adopted to deal with all
problems encountered in the original Oates’ capitalization equation.
2.2.2 Capitalization and Tax Incidence
Before turning to the various improvements over time of the literature on fiscal capitalization,
let us consider the somewhat neglected issue of capitalization of property taxes into rents.
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The fiscal capitalization is closely related to the incidence of local property taxes and the
fiscal equity. As argued by Orr (1968) and Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1989), the classical
view of tax incidence emphasizes that as land is supplied in a fixed quantity, land taxes are
borne by the landowners in the form of lower land values. Moreover, taxes on improvements,
such as housing taxes, fall upon tenants in the form of higher rents. For instance, an increase
in the property tax drops the level of the net return to capital and investment is discouraged.
The decrease in the capital stock boosts the price of the housing stock and occurs until the
market price of capital compensates the higher tax, resulting in a complete forward shifting.
This has an important implication for fiscal equity because it implies that in the case of
rental property, taxes are borne by the renters who tend to belong to lower income groups,
strengthening the tax regressivity of the taxation structure.
However, following Oates (1969), almost all contributions on tax capitalization focus on the
effects of property taxes on house values and evidences that rents capitalize taxes, confirming
that forward shifting have been relatively neglected, except Orr (1968), Hyman and Pasour
(1973a) and Black (1974) who study the impact of property tax on rental housing. Orr (1968)
argues that the conventional theory of the incidence of property taxes is based on a particular
assumption regarding the supply elasticity of improvements. More precisely, in the long run,
the supply of capital adjusts so that there is no capitalization of taxes in the value of the
structure but rather an increase in the rents.
Following alternative assumptions, there are some reasons to think that incomplete forward
shifting may occur. Based on Boston metropolitan area data, Orr highlights that only a
small portion of housing structures was recently built and thus suggests that the change in
the housing stock relative to rent differentials is a very slow process. With an imperfect
elastic housing supply curve, a lower part of the tax burden will be borne by tenants. In the
extreme case of a perfectly inelastic housing supply,10 the tax burden will be entirely borne
by property owners.
Another implicit assumption of the traditional tax incidence theory is that the property tax
is uniformly set in the urban area as a whole. However, in a system of independent local
10This is the basic assumption made in studies on tax capitalization with property owners, on the ground that
the quantity of land is given. For a discussion on the validity of this assumption, see chapter 3.
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jurisdictions with tax autonomy, there are wide cross-section discrepancies in the level of
tax rates. In the Tiebout tradition of residential mobility, these tax differentials should lead
households to move toward low taxing jurisdictions.11 A higher degree of interjurisdictional
mobility should lead to a more elastic demand for housing and tend to reduce the forward
shifting. In the limit, perfect residential mobility would completely vanish forward shifting
and make owners bear all tax differentials. Of course, these arguments on supply and de-
mand elasticity are no longer valid for that portion of the property tax that is common to all
jurisdictions.
In conclusion, Orr expects that property taxes in a local context should be at least only par-
tially shifted forward, if not shifted at all. To test this hypothesis, the median monthly gross
rent per room (R) is regressed on housing demand and supply characteristics, since the equi-
librium rent is found by equalizing the demand and supply for housing in each jurisdiction:
R = f (t,X1, . . . ,Xn,Y1, . . . ,Ym), (2.21)
where t is the equalized property tax rate, X variables stand for the housing supply character-
istics and Y for the demand characteristics. Concerning the housing supply characteristics,
Orr includes the average price of land per acre in the jurisdiction to control the effect of
tax differentials on land values and a dummy variable that indicate the presence of publicly
provided sewage disposal facilities and water. Demand characteristics comprise an index
of accessibility to employment opportunities in surrounding communities, an index of the
housing stock quality and the annual amount of educational expenditure per pupil in public
school expressed as a deviation from the state average. The variable of primary interest is t,
the equalized property tax rate on single-family homes. A significant positive coefficient of
the tax variable would indicate the extent of the tax shifting to tenants. Equation (2.21) is
estimated by linear least squares regression.
t does not enter significantly in (2.21), hence estimation results clearly support the non-
shifting hypothesis: for the sample of Boston SMSA, tax differentials are borne by property
owners rather than occupants. Orr (1968) finds that even if t was statistically significant,
11In this case, we assume a constant level of public services among jurisdictions.
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a 1% increase in tax rate would be shifted forward by only about 20%.12 This result has
important implications for fiscal equity. In contrast to the traditional theory on property tax
incidence, Orr (1968) shows that local conditions on housing demand and supply elasticity
effectively make property owners bear the tax burden. Since renters tend to belong to lower
income groups than property owners, this outcome would leave the local property tax less
progressive than expected.
Black (1974) realizes a similar estimation but uses a different sample. Restricting the analy-
sis to the city of Boston, he finds that taxes are more shifted than in the metropolitan area, as
an unit increase in the effective property tax rate rises the monthly rent by about 60%. In a
city, housing supply is expected to be less elastic because of the lack of land available. This
should lead to lower tax shifting estimates. As a consequence, higher tax shifting is likely to
be driven by a relative inelastic housing demand. Depending on the appropriate assumption
on housing demand elasticity, this result may well be coherent with Orr’s findings.13
Hyman and Pasour (1973a) also find on a southern state sample of North Carolina a greater
degree of tax shifting than Orr (1968). Their empirical results suggest that 60% of a $0.10
differential is shifted to the tenant through an increase in rents. While this seems to be in
contrast with Orr’s finding, Hyman and Pasour argue that North Carolina SMSAs have a
more elastic housing supply relative to the Boston SMSA. This may be explained by several
factors such as more land available surrounding municipalities in the state, less restraints on
housing construction. Moreover, this result is consistent with another paper of Hyman and
Pasour (1973b) that finds no capitalization of owner occupied housing property taxes into
property values.
12Heinberg and Oates (1970) cast doubts on Orr’s results. They state that the equalized tax rate on single-
family homes is an incorrect independent variable because rental housing is likely to be related to multi-family
structures. Estimation of tax shifting will thus be biased if there are differences in assessment ratios in single-
family and multi-family housing. Orr (1972) argues in response that there are reasons to think that equalized
tax rates on singe-family and on rental housing are correlated since assessment ratios are highly correlated.
Moreover, they are both calculated with a common nominal tax rate.
13Theoretical considerations on demand elasticity in cities argue in favor of either more or less elasticity. On
the one hand, housing demand elasticity may be larger because housing units are more homogeneous and better
substitutes than those in a metropolitan area, encouraging intrajurisdictional mobility. On the other hand, the
standard urban land use model shows that low income population, which may be less mobile, tends to locate in
cities. Moreover, low income families may not have the possibility to find appropriate type of housing (such as
multiple-family structures) in the rest of the metropolitan area.
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Thus these studies give evidence that the effects of property taxation vary over regions and
may fall either on renters or on property owners, according to the conditions on housing
demand and supply. An important policy implication is that the incidence of local property
taxes will also differ across regions and may be more or less fair. As a consequence, the
knowledge of these tax capitalization effects is of primary interest for policymakers when
they set taxes or transfers.
2.3 The Choice of the Tax Price Term
A large part of tax capitalization studies focus on the property tax because it is, at least in the
United-States, the primary source of tax revenue for local governments. In its original equa-
tion, Oates (1969) uses the effective property tax rate (which is the nominal tax rate times
the assessment ratio) in order to take into account assessment variations across communi-
ties. Tax bills are defined as the product of the nominal tax rate and the assessment value
of houses. As a consequence, nominal tax rate may not reflect the true tax burden borne
by homeowners if the market value differs from the assessment value of houses. Several
factors lead to differences in the assessment ratio. In an intrajurisdictional setting there may
be systematic and random assessment errors which are related to assessment behaviors (for
instance Ihlanfeldt and Jackson (1982) underscore that in U.S cities more expensive prop-
erties tend to be under assessed relative to less expensive properties, leading to a decrease
in the effective property tax rate as values increase). Assessment discrepancies could also
result from the adoption of various assessment practices across municipalities. Moreover,
even if property values are correctly assessed at a given time, reassessment or revaluation do
not occur everywhere at the same moment.14 Property values with a high rate of growth are
thus under assessed relative to property values with a low rate of growth.
Almost every tax capitalization study uses the effective property tax as the tax price term,
except for King (1977) who suggests that in Oates’s equation the tax effect is misspecified
and introduces a bias on the tax capitalization estimate. He argues that it is the tax burden
14A detailed description of revaluation histories in two of their seven Massachusetts communities sample is
given in Yinger et al. (1988).
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rather than the tax rate which is capitalized into property values. Using the effective property
tax rate amounts to make the dependent variable P come up in the right-hand side of the
econometric equation.15 This tautological link between effective tax rate and property value
implies a spurious correlation that has not been discussed by Oates.16 The Oates’ equation
can thus be rewritten as:
V = α+btV +∑
i
βiXi, (2.22)
where V is the median home value, tV the annual property tax payment (the effective tax rate
applied to the median home value) and Xi the structural, site and public service attributes in
the municipality.
However the introduction of a tax payment variable instead of an effective tax rate is not
exempt of critics. Wales and Wiens (1974) argue that structural omitted variables, which are
positively correlated with both the median home value and the tax payment variable, entail
an upward bias for the tax coefficient and drive the estimated extent of the capitalization
toward zero. Yinger et al. (1988) stress that it is more difficult to eliminate left-out variable
bias in a tax payment specification than in an effective tax rate specification because tax rates
are not directly correlated with housing and neighborhood attributes. This is especially the
case for the Oates’ sample which only includes the median number of rooms and the age
of the housing stock as structural control variables.17 King (1977) replicates the Oates’s
estimation (one with only public school expenditures as public service variable and one with
public school expenditures and municipal spending) and uses a TSLQ procedure to deal with
this simultaneity bias. In each case (with and without municipal expenditures), Kings finds
a lower extent of tax capitalization than Oates.18 To overcome the simultaneity problem and
make sure that the low capitalization rate result does not come from the use of incorrect
instruments for the tax variable,19 he suggests an alternative form to the equation (2.22) in
15This results from the definition of the effective tax rate which is the ratio of the annual property tax payment
over the market value of the house.
16Oates only considers the case where the simultaneity bias stems from the fact that higher property values
allow a given level of local public services to be provided at a lower property tax rate.
17King (1977) notes however that this argument does not hold if a sufficient large set of control variables is
included in the estimation equation.
18Like Oates, King (1977) assumes a 5% discount rate and 40 years house time horizon to compute the
degree of tax capitalization.
19As King (1977) does not give the list of instruments we can only infer that he uses the same instruments
as Oates. Thus the critics formulated by Pollakowski (1973) to Oates also apply.
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which the tax variable is included as part of the dependent variable:
V −btV = α+∑
i
βiXi, (2.23)
where b, measuring the extent of tax capitalization, takes the value selected from the interval
(0.1-1.0). This equation is then estimated by a maximum likelihood procedure. Equation
(2.23) is estimated for various values of b over the interval until R2 is maximized. For the
model including public school and municipal expenditures, the latter procedure generates
robust results relative to the TSLQ regression.
Reinhard (1981) takes back King’s claim that it is the tax burden which is capitalized into
property values but brings two corrections to the equation (2.23). First, he argues that the
right-hand side of equation (2.23) should be interpreted as the actual total user cost of the
residence, that is the tax price plus the tax costs. However, with the tax coefficient b re-
strained to be positive, the actual user cost would be lower than the house price obtained
without any taxation, but leaving the level of public services unchanged. The tax variable
should therefore be added to rather than subtracted from the house price, as made by King
(1977). Second, while the tax coefficient should reflect the present discounted value of the
stream of future tax bills, equation (2.23) is designed to indicate the capitalization of only
one year’s tax payment. These considerations lead to the following equation:
V +
btV
r
= α+∑
i
βiXi, (2.24)
where r is the discount rate and time horizon of houses is assumed to be infinite. Regarding
the estimation technique, Reinhard (1981) suggests that King’s approach is not appropriate
for equation (2.24) because the variance of the dependent variable is increasing as b rises.
Thus an iterative procedure that maximizes R2 will tend to select a low level of b. Reinhard
overcomes this problem by passing the tax variable, in the form of tax rate, in the right-hand
side of equation (2.24):
V =
α+∑iβiXi
(1+bt/r)
. (2.25)
As in King (1977), the extent of capitalization is obtained by reestimating equation (2.25)
with various values of b/r, and observing associated changes in the F-statistic.
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With this econometric procedure, Reinhard finds complete capitalization and even over cap-
italization of the tax burden in property values, depending on the inclusion of the per capita
municipal expenditures on all functions other than local public schools and debt service.
Moreover, Reinhard (1981) points out that this result is not likely to be biased by omitted
variables like Oates (1969) and King (1977) because his sample is based on a large sample of
micro data (actual sales of individual houses) that carefully specifies structural and amenity
characteristics of houses. In contrast to King (1977) who finds that the use of the effective
tax rate instead of the tax bill as a tax variable leads to an upward bias of the capitalization,
these findings of complete and over capitalization imply the opposite. In conclusion, the
specification is important when one wants to characterize the extent of tax capitalization.
2.4 The Control for Public Goods and Other Variables
The taxation side is not the only weakness of the original Oates’ contribution. Several critics
concerning the control for public services are treated in subsequent capitalization literature.
Critics are essentially related to the inappropriate choice of the public services variable and
the control for neighborhood characteristics. Different approaches, which are presented in
this subsection, are used to overcome this problem.
2.4.1 The Control for Public Services
Tax capitalization in property values reflects the differences in the present value of the future
stream of taxes for constant quality houses. As a consequence, an accurate estimate of the
extent of tax capitalization requires an appropriate control for all other characteristics of
houses, and especially the benefits accruing from the provision of public services at the local
level. Given the large number of studies that measure the school premium in house prices, it
is probably impossible to describe these contributions exhaustively.
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Following Oates (1969), most of tax capitalization studies focus on public schools because
it is an important item of local government spending in the United-States. As we have seen
above with Pollakowski (1973),20 the use of only one public services variable may include
biases on the tax and public services coefficients in case of omitted variables. This is all the
more true for models that use aggregate data with few structural and neighborhood variables
that poorly characterize the housing stock. According to Oates (1973), the easiest way to deal
with this problem is to reestimate the equation (2.20) containing other spending variables
that are also relevant for municipal governments. Oates is able to add a new variable, Z, the
municipal spending per capita in 1960 (in dollars) in all functions other than local public
schools and debt service. This variable is significant and has the expected sign. In addition,
the absolute value of the tax coefficient is higher than when only public school expenditures
are included in the hedonic regression, and implies roughly full capitalization of property tax
differential into property values.
Gustely (1976) suggests that various outcomes on the extent of tax capitalization may result
from aggregation bias over the public output measure. In particular, he notices that the
most often used proxy in previous studies, the per pupil education expenditures, is not only
composed of locally-raised funds but also of expenditures from state and federal sources. The
positive influence of public expenditures on housing prices may then not be due to differences
in school quality. While intergovernmental aid may well be capitalized into property values,
it is important to distinguish between the effect of having a better school on house prices
which is consistent to a Tiebout process and the effect of a higher level of grants that does
not reveal any intrinsic public output advantages. To show the impact of the aggregation
bias, two models are estimated for a rural, an urban and a combined sample each time.21
In the first model, property values and rents are regressed on aggregate expenditures for
school and nonschool purposes and a set of structural and accessibility variables. The results
are unsatisfactory and counterintuitive: whatever the sample, expenditures coefficients are
not significant and for most cases they have an unexpected negative sign. In the second
model, public expenditures are disaggregated and only local expenditures are considered in
the regression. This time, expenditures coefficients have generally a consistent positive sign
and significance is substantially increased. These results confirm that external source of
20See subsection 2.2.1.
21The sample consists in cities and towns in the Syracuse, New-York area for 1970.
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finance implies confusion on the estimation of the effects of municipal spending differential
on house prices.22
Appropriate Control for Public Education
There is a more disturbing problem with the use of public expenditures as a proxy for the
quality of local public services. Rosen and Fullerton (1977) underscore that it is incorrect
to control output public schools by expenditures on input variables. Public spending on
education may be not perfectly correlated with public school quality differential because
educational factor prices, educational production function and many environmental factors
may differ among communities, so that some municipalities need more spending than others
to reach the same education attainment. As argued by McDougall (1976), a proper use of
expenditures as a measure of public services would require communities to have the same
resource endowment, the same cost structure, the same technology. To his defense, Oates
(1969, 1973) argues that within a metropolitan area such differences may be quite limited so
that the level of expenditures is a reasonable measure of education output. In addition, Oates
takes into account school specificities that are at least partially reflected in the public services
variable as the per pupil school expenditures are weighted by the enrollment scheme.
Brasington and Haurin (2005) suggest that early capitalization studies used public school
expenditures per pupil because outcome measures were not available. However, a proper
treatment of school quality requires some alternative measures of public school output. The
common approach in the literature is to substitute proficiency test scores for expenditures on
local education inputs as a measure of school quality. Crone (2006) notes that the profusion
of test scores as a standard measure of school quality was favored as they were required by a
number of states in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 in
the United-States requires students in grades three through eight take statewide standardized
tests every year.
22In the second regression the aggregate property tax is also decomposed into school and nonschool property
tax to take into account the impact of separate taxing authorities. Regression results indicate that only school
tax rates are capitalized into property values and not into rents.
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Rosen and Fullerton (1977) replicate the Oates regression using achievement test scores in-
stead of per pupil municipal school expenditures.23 More precisely, various forms of test
scores derived from data on average grades for fourth-grade pupils on readings and mathe-
matics examinations in each community are included: reading score, math score, average of
reading and math score and the logarithm of the average test score. They do not focus on a
particular form of test score because theory does not specify which test is valued by home
buyers and how it enters in the hedonic regression. The public schools quality variables are
all significant, with the expected positive sign and perform better than expenditures vari-
ables. Moreover, including test scores variables seems to increase also the tax capitalization
estimates. Their results imply that about 88% of a 1% tax differential would be capitalized
in the form of reduced property value.24
A better control for public school quality does not solve the problem of omitted variables. For
instance, if the public safety is positively related to property tax rate, tax capitalization will
be underestimated. To obtain unbiased estimates of public services and tax capitalization,
other local public services than public schools that are relevant for home buyers should enter
the hedonic regression. McDougall (1976) includes the quality measure for four primary
local services: police, education, fire protection and parks and recreation. As in Rosen and
Fullerton, education services are measured by test scores. Police services are measured by
two crime rates: the number of personal crimes per unit of population and the number of
property crimes per unit of property values. Property crimes are weighted by the property
value to take into account the incentives for criminals to operate in high property values
communities. A better effectiveness of police protection is expected to be negatively related
to crime rates. Parks and recreation services are measured by an index that indicates the
number of subfunctions that is performed within the parks and recreation program for each
city. A scale of one to ten is used as a proxy for fire protection services. This rating is
provided by the Insurance Service Office in each community and the highest level indicates
the lowest level of fire protection. It is based on different criteria like city water supply, the
fire system alarm, the fire prevention program, etc. The advantage of this approach is to
23They reestimate the Oates’s equation using the same community sample but for 1960 and 1970 and find
an inconsistent negative effect of per pupil municipal school expenditures on the median property value in the
2SLQ regression.
24This capitalization rate rests on the assumption of a $30,000 house with a 40-year use life and a discount
rate of 6%.
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distinguish the extent to which each public service is valued by home buyers. The results
show that, for thirty-five communities within the Los Angeles metropolitan region, property
values are responsive to differences in the availability of local public goods but there is
heterogeneity regarding the degree to which each public service is capitalized. In particular,
households’ location is more influenced by public education and police services than by
parks and recreation services, and fire protection services.
Controlling Public School Quality: The Value Added Approach
Theory suggests that households care about public school output but proficiency test scores
as a measure for school quality present some limitations. Public school quality may not com-
pletely explain the differentials in test scores achievement. A part of test scores achievement
may also be explained by the native ability of students, the family characteristics of students
or even peer group effects. These characteristics should be controlled for if one wants to
discriminate the marginal effect or the value added of the school.25 Some studies (Sonstelie
and Portney, 1980a; Reinhard, 1981; Downes and Zabel, 2002) compute the school’s value
added as the change in test scores between different grades. However, students mobility does
not ensure that the scores in the two period refer to the same cohort of students, so that part
of the change in test scores may be explained by a component other than the marginal ef-
fect of school. Using data on student characteristics, on contemporaneous and previous test
scores in the Dallas Independent School District (DISD), Hayes and Taylor (1996) are able to
econometrically decompose the students test scores achievement into a school contribution
and a peer group contribution.26 They find no significant effect of the peer group component.
The school’s value is statistically significant at least in northern Dallas and positively affects
house prices. At the same time, using only test scores achievement gives the same qualitative
results.
25A brief review of the literature on the decomposition of test scores between students ability, peer group
effect and the marginal effect of school is given in Crone (1998).
26They cannot however extract any information on students ability because student-level data are not avail-
able.
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Brasington and Haurin (2005) not only decompose the test scores in 123 Ohio school districts
into a school and a peer group contribution, but also into a parental component. For this
purpose, they assume an additive educational production function that relates, at the district
level, the average student achievement to the average of parental inputs, the school district
inputs and the average of innate abilities of students. The production function is modified to
address the problem of unobserved innate abilities of students and peer effects. Brasington
and Haurin (2005) cast doubt on the importance of the value added as a measure of school
quality for households, even if such measures would be theoretically more appropriate for
researchers. In contrast to Hayes and Taylor (1996), they find little effect of the school’s
value added on house prices. This is confirmed by the estimation of an alternative model that
only includes the deviations from the mean of the fourth, ninth and twelfth grade proficiency
tests. The aggregate level of achievement seems to perform better than the value added
model. Brasington and Haurin (2005) argue that homebuyers are more likely to consider
standardized indicators of school quality that are easily obtained.
In conclusion, it is not clear which attributes of local public schools are relevant when indi-
viduals make their location choice. For instance, Crone (2006) shows that in the Montgomery
County, Pennsylvania, test scores at the district level are better indicators of the quality of
public education than test scores at the local school level, as they are more valued by home
buyers.
Taking Advantage of School Reforms
Other studies take advantage of the specificities of the school system or school reforms to
measure the impact of school quality on property values, without introducing any explicit
variables that are supposed to represent the school’s output. The main advantage of these
approaches is that one does not have to make incorrect assumptions on which attributes are
valued by home buyers.
Dee (2000) takes advantage of the Serrano decision taken by the California Supreme Court
in 1971 and according to which the local property taxation main basis of financing for public
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education was unconstitutional since it did not provide equal opportunity for all California’s
students. This decision was followed by a large number of states and modified the structure
of education finance. In particular, states were encouraged to increase their per-student aid to
poorer school district. Dee (2000) tests whether this new external funding toward education
increases median housing values and rents through a gain in school quality. However, he
does not include school expenditures or school quality variables in the hedonic regression.
He constructs an interaction variable which is the product of an indicator for the position
in the state distribution of the district in terms of locally generated per-pupil revenues and
a dummy variable that indicates if state court-ordered education finance reform has been
adopted. It allows heterogeneous effects of education finance reform over poor and rich
districts. The results show that school finance reforms had larger effect on housing values
and rents in poorer districts.27
Using repeated sales of individual residential properties in the state of Florida, Figlio and
Lucas (2004) test whether the Florida’s grading system influences house prices. In 1999,
Florida adopted a school grade assignment system in which each school would receive a
letter grade ranging from "A" to "F." The grading system was largely based on test scores
achievement, but also on socio-demographic structures of schools, suspension rates and ab-
sentee rates. Figlio and Lucas (2004) ask whether the information on school reputation con-
tained in the grading system is valued by the housing market in Florida. To test whether there
is an autonomous effect of the grading system and neutralize cross-time and cross-section
variation in school output, they also include a set of school attributes variables. Differences
in school grade assignment strongly affect house values: for instance, the attribution of grade
"A" rather than grade "B" rises house prices by 19.6% once one controls for other measures
of school quality, neighborhood and structural attributes of properties.
Reback (2005) gets advantage of the particularity of the inter-district school choice program
in Minnesota. Since the 1987-1988 school year, an inter-district open enrollment program
enables the students of a particular school district to attend the school of another district.
Under open enrollment program, property values rise in relatively unpopular districts with a
high fraction of outgoing transfers because parents have the opportunity to send their children
27In the first part of the paper, Dee (2000) regresses the same variables on current expenditures per pupil and
finds that, following the court-ordered reform, poorer districts received more state aid relative to richer districts.
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in a relatively high-quality school without having to pay a premium for living in that school
district. For the same reason, property values decrease in districts with a high-quality school
and with a high fraction of incoming transfers.
An original alternative approach to characterize the quality of local public services is to
use survey data instead of input measures. Carlsen et al. (2009) include in their hedonic
regression local public output measures that are based on a questionnaire covering the main
services provided by Norwegian municipalities, like school, culture and health care. Each
local public service was ranked by respondents on a scale from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 6
(very satisfied) and the municipality average satisfaction was regressed on personal, socio-
demographic characteristics and dummy variables for each municipality to take into account
the composition of respondents. They find positive and significant effect for three public
services (culture, health care and transport). However, in a separate regression that includes
input measures, they find no significant effect on house prices. They conclude that previous
studies based on input measure may have wrongly rejected capitalization of local public
service into house values due to the use of improper proxy.
Taking Advantage of Special Jurisdictions
Finally, a major issue of local public service capitalization is the specification error that
may arise from particular assumptions on the local government budget constraint. Linneman
(1978) argues that if local expenditures are entirely financed by property tax revenues, taxes
and public goods will be perfectly correlated. The estimation of a property value equation
will be econometrically impossible, unless measurement errors and omitted variables are
present, which would bias the coefficient estimates. A first approach to solve this problem
is to restrict the sample of properties to a single taxing jurisdiction where, by definition,
there is no variation in the level of local public services, that is to focus on intrajurisdictional
capitalization.
A second approach to isolate the tax rate effects from public service effects takes advantage
of the particular structure of some local taxing jurisdictions in the United States. Richard-
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son and Thalheimer (1981) use a sample of 861 single family residence in Fayette County,
Kentucky sold during 1973-74. The properties are located in two intermixed taxing juris-
dictions within the county, one with a low tax level and one with a high tax level.28 While
the nonschool tax rate is almost four times as high in the city as in the rest of the county,
Richardson and Thalheimer (1981) argue that there is no variation in the perceived quality of
services. The only difference is that the city provides streets lightening and trash pickup for
its residents. According to the authors, tax differentials would be explained by spillovers and
inefficiencies in the provision of city services. Richardson and Thalheimer (1981) estimate
property tax capitalization with a linear specification similar to equation (2.12) and a multi-
plicative specification similar to equation (2.19). In each specification, the tax term enters as
a dummy variable, indicating low or high tax jurisdiction. The multiplicative specification
gives the more significant results and implies, for a discount rate of 8% and a 10-year hori-
zon, that tax differences are capitalized at 73% of full capitalization. However, Yinger et al.
(1988) show that with a more realistic assumption of a 3% discount rate and an infinite hori-
zon, the capitalization rate drops to 15%. Moreover, they fail to explain properly the source
of tax rate differences between the two jurisdictions, leading to a likely inexact control of
public services.
Palmon and Smith (1998b) study the case of properties located in jurisdictions with unusual
features. In the northwest suburbs of Houston, Texas, municipal utility districts (MUDs)
were created to finance public infrastructures.29 The MUDs were financed through the is-
suance of municipal bonds, the debt service being reimbursed by property taxes. While
MUDs had the same level of services, there were substantial variations in the property tax
rates because of differences in the borrowing conditions (distribution of bond maturities, pe-
riod of bond issuance, etc.), the level of development of building activities, the proportion of
nonresidential taxable property and economies of scales. This unique data set is used to es-
timate by a nonlinear maximum likelihood procedure an equation similar to (2.19). Palmon
and Smith find substantial capitalization30 and conclude that spurious correlation between
28The first jurisdiction is the city of Lexington and the second jurisdiction is the areas in the county that have
not been annexed by the city.
29The area was administered by the Harris County and three suburban school districts with a similar level of
educational services.
30The degree of capitalization varies from 62% to more than 100% according to the econometric specification
and the assumption on the discount rate.
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taxes and public services may have led to downward bias of the degree of capitalization in
previous studies.
2.4.2 The Control for Neighborhood Characteristics
An exact estimation of the capitalization of public school quality requires a proper control
of the neighborhood attributes. For instance, Black (1999) suggests that to the extent that
better public schools are located in better neighborhoods, inexact control for neighborhood
characteristics will bias upward the effect of a better education. A straightforward solution
to this problem would simply rely on the use of improved data set including a large number
of neighborhood variables. A second approach is based on the restriction of the sample of
properties in small areas with similar neighborhood amenities and variation in the level of
public school quality. This occurs at the border of two school districts.
Early treatment of this approach can be found in Cushing (1984) who argues that capitaliza-
tion of local differentials should be stronger at the border of two jurisdictions. This approach
limits the biases that stem from omitted neighborhood variables because amenities and dis-
amenities on houses located on the two sides of the border of two jurisdictions should not
vary as much as between houses located in the center of two jurisdictions. Moreover, re-
stricting the estimation of capitalization at the border of two jurisdictions makes the distance
to CBD less relevant, which is of particular interest to avoid the problem implied by noncen-
tral and multiple recreation locations. Using 86 observations from Detroit, in the Michigan
SMSA, the difference in the mean value of owner-occupied units between adjacent central
city and the ring blocks is regressed on housing and neighborhood characteristics and on
differences in property tax rate and public services (which include education, libraries and
fire protection). While Cushing (1984) finds a full capitalization of tax differentials and sub-
stantial effects of public services, the results are weakly significant.31 This may be related to
the lack of accuracy in the sample delimitation.32
31The public sector variables are significant at the 0.10 level.
32In particular no information is given on the maximum distance of properties from the jurisdictions bound-
aries.
The Simultaneous-Equations Approach 75
A more recent and refined treatment of this approach is used by Black (1999), who esti-
mates the effect of a better school quality on house prices on the opposite sides of attendance
districts boundaries within school districts in Massachusetts. Houses located in such areas
benefit from different school quality but with relatively little variation in neighborhood at-
tributes. As in Cushing (1984), this methodology reduces the biases that results from omitted
neighborhood variables. But Black (1999) goes further by substituting a full set of boundary
dummies that indicate houses that share (on either side) an attendance district boundary for
the vector of neighborhood characteristics. Moreover, her results are more detailed because
she uses several samples of houses that vary with respect to the distance from attendance
boundary (with smaller and smaller distance in order to obtain increasing neighborhood ho-
mogeneity). The boundary fixed effect model gives a coefficient on test scores that is about
half of the coefficient in a standard hedonic regression that includes a set of neighborhood
characteristics instead of boundary dummies. The school quality coefficient is even lower
when one restricts the sample of houses with the distance from boundary to 0.20 miles. The
results thus confirm the presence of an upward bias in the effect of test scores on house
values in previous capitalization studies, stemming from an incorrect control for neighbor-
hood variables. Boundary fixed effects have been largely used in the subsequent empirical
literature on school premium and house prices.
2.5 The Simultaneous-Equations Approach
Most of capitalization studies recognize the simultaneity problem that may arise between
house values and both taxes and public services. Two-stage least squares are thus generally
used to obtain consistent capitalization estimates. However, a number of studies provide a
rough treatment of the instruments used in the first stage regression.33
At least three papers explicitly analyze the foundation of the simultaneity and use a simultaneous-
equations approach to estimate the capitalization of taxes and public services into house val-
33For instance, Pollakowski (1973) criticizes the set of exogenous variables used by Oates (1969). In some
studies, simultaneity is not addressed (Richardson and Thalheimer, 1981; Brasington, 2001) or the list of in-
struments is not provided King (1977).
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ues. Dusansky et al. (1981) provide an explicit modeling of the simultaneous determination
of rents, land values, house values and school spending. The data contain 62 school districts
in Suffolk County, New-York in 1970. The authors use a three-stage least squares procedure
to estimate their equations and find a tax capitalization rate that ranges from 43% to 96%
(conditional on discount rate of 5% and a 10-40 years horizon). However, the results are
probably plagued by the lack of control variables (only five variables are included).
Meadows (1976) estimates a four-equation model with data from the northeastern New Jer-
sey in 1960 and 1970. In addition to the usual property value equation, three local public
sector equations are included. School and municipal expenditures and equalized property tax
rate are determined by several variables indicating expenditure needs and local fiscal capac-
ity. Meadows (1976) compares capitalization estimates that stem from the single-equation
model with those resulting from the four-equations model. The results show that the mag-
nitude of the tax capitalization that stems from the full system of equations is lower than
that in the single-equation model. This confirms the upward bias expected to occur when
simultaneity is not corrected.
The simultaneous-equations approach does not only address empirical purposes but also the-
oretical objectives. Gronberg (1979) provides an empirical counterpart of the Yinger’s view
(Yinger, 1982) that housing and political markets interact. He argues that any empirical strat-
egy should take into account that voting process alters the local fiscal package which in turns
affects households’ residential location and house values. In a single-equation approach the
local fiscal bundle is assumed to be fixed and no political adjustment through local election
is possible. This implies that voters do not respond to migration and property value changes
in the community. Gronberg (1979) introduces a six-equation model that characterizes a
"politico-housing equilibrium" (Gronberg, 1979, p. 445) through three sectors. The housing
sector includes a standard property value equation and another equation that explains the me-
dian income. The latter equation is designed to test for income stratification as it is expected
in the Tiebout model. It also captures the impact of the local fiscal package on income strat-
ification. In the school and municipal sector, related taxes and expenditures are regressed
on variables indicating local fiscal capacity and expenditure needs. Unlike Meadows (1976)
who has a budgetary accounting approach, Gronberg (1979) provides a behavioral founda-
tion for the determination of taxes and expenditures (based on the median voter approach).
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To this purpose, he includes in each local spending equation the Lindahl share price for ed-
ucational services. The sample includes 83 communities surrounding the city of Chicago
in 1970. TSLQ results reveal that municipal expenditures are insignificant in the property
value equation but influence significantly income stratification. On the contrary, school ex-
penditures have a positive and significant effect on property values but do not affect income
stratification. Gronberg (1979) suggests that these results are consistent with the Tiebout
mechanism and that a Tiebout equilibrium is reached in the school sector.
2.6 Within and Across Capitalization
Early empirical contributions on tax capitalization often use aggregate data and relatively
poor data set due to the lack of access to information on individual house sales. This leads
to a poor control of both structural and neighborhood characteristics of houses and to a weak
robustness of tax capitalization estimate. Micro data studies have the advantage to include
a large set of variables that control for structural characteristics of houses and are thus less
likely to suffer from omitted variables biases.34 Empirical studies with micro data can be
divided into two groups: studies with data covering only one jurisdiction and focusing on
intrajurisdictional capitalization and studies with data covering more than one jurisdiction
and capturing both intra and interjurisdictional capitalization.
2.6.1 Intrajurisdictional Capitalization
The tax payment for a house is the product of a nominal property tax rate which is set
uniformly for all houses within a jurisdiction, and the assessed value of the house. Intra-
jurisdictional tax capitalization then occurs as a result of differences in assessment of house
values, leading to differences in effective property tax rates within a jurisdiction.
34Part of studies mentioned in the previous sections are based on micro data.
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Wales and Wiens (1974) employ a set of 1,800 sales of improved residential property in
1972 to study tax capitalization in the municipality of Surrey. As argued by the authors,
one of the main advantages of restricting the sample to only one community is that there
is no need to control for public services since these services are provided uniformly within
a jurisdiction. They are also aware of the simultaneity bias which tends to overestimation
of the extent of tax capitalization when the effective property tax rate is introduced in the
capitalization equation and to underestimation of the extent of tax capitalization when using
the property tax payment.35 To correct for the simultaneity bias, they use an ad hoc procedure
instead of an instrumental variables approach.36 First, house prices are regressed on a set of
housing characteristics and location variables and without tax variable. Second, the fitted
values of house prices are introduced in a version of the equation (2.12) in the left-hand
side (as a modified dependent variable) and in the right-hand side (as the denominator of
the modified effective property tax rate). In this equation, the tax coefficient does not reflect
any capitalization effect since the fitted values of house prices have been generated in the
absence of tax variable. For this reason Wales and Wiens (1974) can only test the hypothesis
of no capitalization. Tax capitalization is tested using the usual F-test, which determines
whether the tax coefficient in the basic equation like (2.12) differs from the tax coefficient
in the equation that includes the fitted values of house prices. The results suggest that when
simultaneity is treated with their procedure, taxes are not capitalized into property values.
Chinloy (1978) argues that within a jurisdiction, the effective property tax rate may differ
from the actual tax rate applied to homeowners because of various tax reduction provisions
which tax liabilities. Using a sample of 1,224 single-family, owner-occupied dwellings in
London, Ontario, Chinloy (1978) estimates two capitalization equations with a TSLQ pro-
cedure: one that only includes the effective property tax rate and one in which both the
effective property tax rate and the tax credit are considered. In the first specification, the
tax coefficient implies a tax capitalization rate of 51%, but is not significant. The extent of
capitalization is reduced to zero when considering the effect of tax credit. Moreover, the
effective tax rate and the tax credit coefficient are not significantly different. These results
suggest no net capitalization of property taxes. Even if there was significant tax capitaliza-
35See section 2.3 on the choice of the tax price term.
36They justify this approach by the absence of any suitable instrument.
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tion, homeowners would be influenced by the actual effective tax rate net of tax credit rather
than the effective tax rate only.
2.6.2 Intrajurisdictional Capitalization and Assessment Errors
Intrajurisdictional tax capitalization will occur if, for constant quality houses, houses with
a relatively high assessed value have a relatively low market value. As a consequence, tax
capitalization may stem from assessment errors by assessors within a jurisdiction. There
will be random error assessment if assessors randomly under or over assess house values and
systematic error assessment if assessors systematically under or over assess a given type of
houses. Some studies try to discriminate the impact of random and systematic assessment
errors on intrajurisdictional tax capitalization. Ihlanfeldt and Jackson (1982) use an elaborate
procedure to discriminate between systematic and random assessment on a sample of 1321
single family properties from the 1976 Annual Housing Survey of St-Louis, Missouri. In a
first step, they estimate in a semi log equation the house values as a function of 31 housing
characteristics and without using a tax variable:
lnVi =∑
j
α jX ji+ εi, (2.26)
where Vi is the value of the ith property, X ji is the jth structural characteristics of the ith
property. Of course, the exclusion of the property tax rate may lead to an omitted variable
bias, but testing this possibility they find no significant bias in the estimated αˆ j. In a sec-
ond step, they calculate the total assessment error (AE), which is defined as the difference
between the actual and "fair" tax payment:
AEi = Ti− t¯Vi, (2.27)
where Ti is the tax payment and t¯ is the average effective property tax rate. The "fair" tax
payment is the one that the homeowner would pay if the effective property tax rate did not
differ from the average. In the third step, Ihlanfeldt and Jackson (1982) are able to distinguish
between systematic and random assessment errors. For this purpose, they regress the AE
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variable in equation (2.27) on the predicted value Vˆi of the house value in equation (2.26):
AEi = β0+β1Vˆi+φi. (2.28)
The predicted value Vˆi37 is interpreted as the systematic assessment error (SAE), that is
the assessment error that varies systematically with the assessed value of the house. The
error term φi represents the random error assessment (RAE). The last step consists in the
estimation of the impact of SAE and RAE on the difference between Vi the actual house
value and Vˆi the house value with no taxation:
Vi−Vˆi = γ0+ γ1SAEi+ γ2RAEi+θi. (2.29)
γˆ1 gives a consistent estimate of the capitalization of systematic assessment error. The results
coupled with the assumption of a 40-year horizon and a real discount rate of 5% imply
that tax differences that stem from systematic error of assessors are overcapitalized. With
a positive expected rate of house price inflation of 8%, a 30-years time horizon and a real
discount rate of 6.4%, the capitalization rate is reduced to 40%. Since RAE is measured with
error in equation (2.28), γˆ2 is biased and inconsistent.38
Taking Advantage of Tax Reforms to Estimate Intrajurisdictional Tax Cap-
italization
Some authors take advantage of revaluation to study whether a change in the tax payments
implies a change in house values, using equation (2.15) in change form. Smith (1970) an-
alyzes revaluation in the Sunset District in San Francisco and divides his sample in three
groups to see the dynamics of revaluation over time. The first sub-sample contains house
transactions that occurred when homeowners became aware that revaluation would be forth-
coming. With this sub-sample, Smith is able to test whether revaluation was anticipated by
37Vˆi is used instead of V in order to avoid the simultaneity between assessment error and property value. Vˆi
can be considered as an instrument that is correlated with V but uncorrelated with the error term φi.
38However, Ihlanfeldt and Jackson (1982) suggest that γ2 can still be interpreted as the lower bound of the
true amount of capitalization of random assessment error, because γˆ2 would have the same sign and would be
closer to zero if RAE was measured without error.
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homeowners. The second sub-sample contains house transactions that occurred when the tax
change was publicly announced. The third sub-sample contains house transactions that took
place when homeowners became aware of the actual size of the tax change. Smith (1970)
finds significant tax capitalization. Moreover, he shows that anticipated tax changes are
capitalized: house values already start to decline when revaluation is announced but before
revaluation is implemented.
Yinger et al. (1988) study the capitalization of tax changes produced by revaluation in seven
Massachusetts communities. The originality of their approach is that they carefully treat all
economic and econometrics problems involved in the previous empirical literature. Their
empirical specification takes into account the non linearity associated with the property tax
rate since it is based on a version of equation (2.18) which is modified in change form.
Their econometric equation removes interjurisdictional change in house values, takes into
account federal income taxes, anticipation of revaluation changes in relative housing prices
and in housing characteristics. To correct for simultaneity, Yinger et al. (1988) set a second
equation that explains the formation of the effective tax rate. As tax changes are involved
by the revaluation in their study, they base the determination of the effective tax rate on the
assessor’s behavior, whose objective is to reach the same assessment ratio for every house
after revaluation. They find an intermediate capitalization rate of 21.1% in Waltham and
15.8% in Brockton, where the set of control variables is the most comprehensive. They give
evidence that omitted variables or incorrect treatment of simultaneity bias the capitalization
rate.
Intrajurisdictional and Interjurisdictional Capitalization
Chaudry-Shah (1988) argues that the instability of the capitalization rate found in the pre-
vious literature may arise because usual empirical specifications do not distinguish within
and across variation in taxes and public goods quality. With micro data covering more than
one jurisdiction it is possible to test for intra and interjurisdictional tax capitalization. For
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instance, equation (2.20) may be amended as:
V = α+∑
i
βiXi+ν1(t− tm)+ν2tm+ ε, (2.30)
where V is the property value of the house, t the house effective tax rate, tm the municipal
effective tax rate and Xi the structural and neighborhood characteristics of the house. In this
specification, the tm variable captures the interjurisdictional influences of property taxes and
the t− tm variable measures the intrajurisdictional differences in property taxes.
Hamilton (1979) uses this approach. His objective is to show that local property taxes are
less progressive than it has been previously expected. Local jurisdictions have the incen-
tive to exclude low-income households in order to decrease the local tax price for existing
residents. Hamilton (1979) argues that jurisdictions can restrict the amount of low-income
housing by using zoning and land-use controls. Such a policy implies an indirect redistribu-
tion from poor to rich people, as it raises the price of the restricted low-income lots above
and decreases the price of high-income housing below the price that would arise in a free
market equilibrium. As a consequence, not only the direct burden of the property tax must
be studied, but also the price or the capitalization effect induced by zoning ordinance which
may offset the former effect and alter the progressivity of the tax. Empirically, the estimat-
ing equation differs from (2.30) as it distinguishes the capitalization of random assessment
errors within a community and the capitalization of fiscal surplus (defined as the difference
between the public benefits received and the property tax payment) across communities:39
V =∑
i
βiXi+β f s(B− tV )+βee+ ε, (2.31)
where V is the property value, Xi the structural characteristics of the house, B the public
benefits accruing to property owners, t the property tax rate, e the random component of the
property tax and ε an error term. The per-pupil current expenditure is used as a measure of
public benefits. The procedure used to discriminate between the systematic and the random
component of the tax is different from Ihlanfeldt and Jackson (1982). In a first step, Hamilton
39The observation subscripts are suppressed for convenience.
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estimates the following equation:
T = tV + e∗, (2.32)
where T is the property tax payment and t the estimated tax rate. The computed residuals e∗
resulting from this regression are not identical to the true random component of the property
tax that would stem from the following equation:
T = tV ∗+ e, (2.33)
where V ∗ is the unobservable predicted house value that would arise if there was no assess-
ment error. Even if e cannot be directly calculated, it is correlated with e∗. The relationship
between e and e∗ is found by considering that the house value is the predicted house value
less the present value of the tax liability due to the assessment error:
V =V ∗+βee. (2.34)
Combining (2.32), (2.33) and (2.34), we find the relationship between e and e∗:
e = e∗/(1−βet). (2.35)
Substituting (2.35) into (2.31) and rearranging we obtain the final form of the estimating
equation:
V =
∑iβiXi+β f sB+βe [e∗/(1−βet)]+ ε
(1+β f st)
. (2.36)
Equation (2.36) is estimated with a nonlinear least squares procedure on a sample of 410
residential properties in ten jurisdictions of the metropolitan Toronto in 1961. The findings
show that within a community $1 of random taxation decreases the property value by $16.80
and across communities a $1 difference in the fiscal surplus implies a difference of $9.37 in
the property value. These results confirm that attractive tax liability for low-income house-
holds is partially offset by zoning regulation as more than half (9.37/16.80) of the apparent
progressivity is compensated by the capitalization of the fiscal surplus into property values.
Thus, the local property tax is much more regressive than it could be supposed. However,
this conclusion may be biased by neighborhood omitted variables. Moreover, Yinger et al.
(1988) point out that the definition of the fiscal surplus is based on the inappropriate assump-
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tion that the willingness to pay for public services is invariant across people and communities
(everyone is willing to pay $1 for $1 of public spending). Finally Hamilton (1979) does not
deal with the simultaneity problem, which is particularly problematic as the simultaneity
may arise from both the assessor behavior and through the public expenditure determination.
Goodman (1983) also attempts to capture within and across capitalization as well as capital-
ization of tax base effects, using a sample of 1835 single-family houses in 10 communities
in the New Heaven metropolitan area in 1967-1969. In contrast to Hamilton, Goodman
(1983) includes a series of neighborhood variables, which are likely to reduce the omitted
variables biases. Moreover, his approach differs from that of Hamilton (1979) as he uses a
Box-Cox procedure to estimate house values. While this specification has the advantage to
be flexible with respect to the functional form of the hedonic regression and with the relation
between house value and the tax price term, Yinger et al. (1988) argue that this technique
is inappropriate when the empirical specification is based (as Goodman seems to do in the
first part of the paper) on the theoretical equation like (2.18) or (2.15).40 On the basis of a
5% discount rate and 40-year horizon, the results imply almost perfect or overcapitalization
of within-jurisdiction tax rate differentials. Across jurisdictions, fiscal deficits and surpluses
are capitalized in property values at a rate of approximately 60%.41
Conclusion
This chapter has provided a non-exhaustive review of the empirical literature on capitaliza-
tion. Since the original estimation of Oates (1969), the capitalization literature has benefited
from improvements of the techniques and from the use of better data set. These improve-
ments concerns the use of appropriate tax price variables (King, 1977; Reinhard, 1981),
control for public services (Rosen and Fullerton, 1977; Sonstelie and Portney, 1980a; Rein-
hard, 1981; Downes and Zabel, 2002) and neighborhood variables (Cushing, 1984; Black,
40Goodman (1983) is also subject to the same critics as Hamilton (1979) regarding the willingness to pay for
public services and the lack of treatment of the simultaneity.
41Goodman (1983) does not give direct evidence of interjurisdictional tax capitalization because he com-
bines, as in Hamilton (1979), tax and expenditure capitlization.
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1999). A large number of studies take advantage of natural experiments (school reforms,
tax reforms, special jurisdictions) to estimate tax capitalization (Richardson and Thalheimer,
1981; Yinger et al., 1988; Palmon and Smith, 1998b; Dee, 2000; Reback, 2005). Finally, the
use of micro data allows to include a large set of variables that control for structural charac-
teristics of houses and are thus less likely to suffer from omitted variables bias (Yinger et al.,
1988). Moreover, micro data that covers more than one jurisdiction allows to capture both
within and across capitalization.
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Chapter 3
Estimation of Capitalization in the Canton of
Zurich
THis chapter contributes to the empirical literature on capitalization and present estima-tion of capitalization of local fiscal variables into house prices from the municipalities
of the Canton of Zurich in Switzerland. The first section presents some stylized facts about
Switzerland, the Canton of Zurich, the functioning and the particularities of the Swiss local
pubic sector. As noted by Brulhart and Jametti (2006), Switzerland is a convenient "fiscal
laboratory". Local jurisdictions have large autonomy on taxation and spending decisions.
The Swiss political system is characterized by direct democracy at the federal, cantonal and
municipal level.
Our capitalization estimation is based on a sample of 169 municipalities of the Canton of
Zurich. For our purpose, we use a unique data set which exhibit special characteristics. Em-
pirical capitalization are based either on aggregate data (Oates, 1969, 1973; Rosen, 1982) or
on micro data (Palmon and Smith, 1998b; Black, 1999; Brasington, 2001). In these two ap-
proaches, the estimation of tax and expenditures capitalization requires to consider constant
quality houses, that is to control for many structural and neighborhood characteristics. In
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contrast, our endogenous variables is the price of a standardized and comparable single fam-
ily house in each community. This allows to ignore the control of the structural characteris-
tics in the estimation. However, we still have to control for neighborhood and environmental
variables.
In contrast to most of the previous literature presented in chapter 2, we focus on the capi-
talization of the income tax rate. To our knowledge, only one study (Stull and Stull, 1991)
of this type has been conducted with US data. The advantage of using the income tax rather
than the property tax is that it reduces the risks of omitted variables and simultaneity bias.
In section 3.2, we present a wide array of controls (such as neighborhood, environmental and
demographic variables) which are included in a standard capitalization equation. The results
are presented in section 3.3. Our standard OLS regressions give standard and consistent
results with respect to the previous literature. Finally, we check the sensibility of our basic
results to the inclusion of additional variables and the use of alternative functional form.
3.1 Institutional Background in Switzerland and in the Can-
ton of Zurich
Switzerland is characterized by federalism, decentralization and direct democracy. Switzer-
land has a federal structure with three layers of government: the Confederation, the cantons
and municipalities. There are 26 cantons and around 2500 municipalities (see Figure 3.1.
Since municipalities have high autonomy, Switzerland is often called a "federation of feder-
ations". A special feature of the Swiss political system that reinforces local autonomy is the
exercise of direct democracy through referendums and popular initiative.
Table 3.1 shows that in Switzerland, municipalities have autonomy over a wide range of
expenditures, from education to health and culture. Total expenditures of municipalities
represents about one third of expenditures of all public administrations.
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Table
3.1:
M
unicipalexpenditures
in
Sw
itzerland
by
functions,in
m
illions
ofC
H
F
Fonction
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
G
eneralA
dm
inistration
3372,984
3281,525
3335,328
3395,28
3361
3417
3691,204
3663,611
3863,123
3783,493
3825,689
3920,339
4069,358
Justice,Police,
1798,682
1789,41
1792,335
1808,952
1783
1834
1896,91
1966,344
2065,302
2097,495
2128,258
2171,728
2201,476
Fire
Protection
N
ationalD
efense
379,845
352,808
302,043
280,773
260
249
238,619
231,35
227,283
210,756
212,327
213,496
211,623
E
ducation
8768,6
8886,221
8923,6
9043,483
9028
9283
9662,847
9755,194
10057,229
9589,799
9777,613
9916,553
9776,43
C
ulture
2038,008
2045,197
1994,366
2093,792
2062
2158
2205,995
2291,3
2447,277
2495,85
2533,489
2630,547
2764,248
H
ealth
6903,056
6923,23
6922,349
7035,063
7260
7393
7741,352
8208,623
8747,355
9155,637
9226,531
9139,875
9422,062
SocialSecurity
4988,627
5206,023
5346,286
5592,103
5878
6013
5885,297
6118,144
6467,397
7001,931
7303,813
7567,654
7707,764
Traffic
2944,86
2939,774
2873,314
2787,268
2921
2913
3018,192
3027,357
3171,481
3165,044
3294,529
3419,62
3542,666
E
nvironm
ent
3288,009
3405,798
3378,031
3529,124
3485
3530
3603,008
3552,064
3579,743
3532,314
3501,299
3622,183
3629,363
Public
E
conom
ics
837,436
800,402
621,43
699,723
707
850
820,16
676,287
699,437
677,838
648,822
643,111
675,361
Finance
and
Taxes
3107,115
3065,661
2982,247
3061,795
2969
2958
2945,025
3007,928
2805,666
2620,199
2627,046
2608,816
2541,856
Total
38427,222
38696,049
38471,329
39327,357
39714
40599
41708,609
42498,202
44131,293
44330,357
45079,415
45853,923
46542,206
*
Source:A
dm
inistration
fédérale
des
finances,Sw
itzerland.
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The metropolitan area of Zurich (see Figure 3.2) has approximately 1.3 million inhabitants
and is the most populous of all 26 Swiss cantons. Moreover, it is also one of the most densely
populated areas in Europe. The city of Zurich itself is the economic core of the agglomeration
and also the biggest city in Switzerland. Including commuters, around a million people either
work or live there. The canton’s 171 municipalities are very autonomous: they have a wide
range of sovereignty concerning taxation and expenditures. The amounts and the evolution
of the municipal expenditures in the canton of Zurich are described in Table 3.2. Regarding
the taxation side, the main source of tax revenues is tax on individual income and net wealth.
The municipalities levy income taxes via a municipal collection rate, which is added to
the cantonal and the federal tax. The fact that income taxes are levied simultaneously by
the Swiss Confederation, the cantons and the municipalities implies tax base overlapping
(Brulhart and Jametti, 2006).
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Table
3.2:
M
unicipalexpenditures
in
the
canton
ofZ
urich
by
functions,in
thousands
ofC
H
F
Fonction
1991
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
G
eneralA
dm
inistration
1
084
710
876
601
905
009
898
958
896
472
947
539
1
210
919
N
ationalD
efense
553
246
756
408
778
963
794
681
810
973
823
038
914
038
E
ducation
1
357
814
2
176
523
2
211
250
2
191
347
2
223
896
2
259
428
2
504
404
C
ulture
609
722
796
213
803
985
752
781
839
043
868
197
894
894
H
ealth
649
191
1
012
454
1
017
769
1
091
904
1
127
297
1
186
729
1
276
638
SocialSecurity
1
101
367
2
240
547
2
414
285
2
540
014
2
584
423
2
645
280
2
587
678
Traffic
794
069
961
736
963
065
997
240
1
084
254
1
014
385
1
212
826
E
nvironem
ent
834
622
1
093
795
1
089
622
1
099
497
1
100
183
1
117
396
1
146
513
Public
E
conom
ics
1
187
915
1
082
041
1
118
167
1
166
346
1
185
753
1
171
699
1
367
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Finance
and
Taxes
1
920
545
2
403
036
2
380
777
2
473
880
2
940
233
2
939
380
2
257
060
Total
10
093
201
13
399
355
13
682
891
14
006
648
14
792
527
14
973
071
15
372
403
*
Source:G
E
FIS,Statistisches
A
m
tdes
K
antons
Z
ürich.
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3.2 Empirical Specification and Data
3.2.1 Empirical Specification
The basic estimating equation is based on the hedonic approach described in subsection 1.1
and relates the property value to a set of fiscal and non fiscal characteristics of the property:
Vjt = β0+
n
∑
i=1
βi jtZi jt +βτ jτ jt + ε jt , (3.1)
where Vjt is the property value in jurisdiction j at time t, the Zi’s are the locational and neigh-
borhood characteristics, including measures of public services. τ jt is the tax rate variable
and ε jt an error term. Equation (3.1) can be estimated by OLS.
Regarding the tax variable, previous capitalization studies generally focus on property tax
because it is the main tax instrument of the US local governments. However, as mentioned
in Stull and Stull (1991), in a Tiebout setting with tax and expenditure autonomy of jurisdic-
tions and free mobility of agents, differentials of income taxes may also result in residential
property value differences. Using aggregate data on the Philadelphia Metropolitan Statistical
Area (PMSA) in 1980, they show that not only the income tax rate set by municipalities and
school districts has significant and negative effect on the median value of owner-occupied
single-family houses but also that it is capitalized at an equivalent rate compared to the prop-
erty tax.
In contrast to most of the capitalization studies based on US data, we include the income tax
rate rather than the property tax rate as a measure of the tax variable. Unlike in the United
States, property taxes play a minor role in local tax revenues in Switzerland. The advantage
of including the income tax compared to property tax is twofold. First, it avoids the empirical
specification problem raised by Yinger et al. (1988); that is from the capitalization equation
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Figure 3.1: The Map of Switzerland
Source: Encyclopédie Universalis 2008
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Figure 3.2: The Map of the Canton of Zurich and its 171 municipalities
Source: Sozialbericht Kanton Zürich 2008, Bundesamt für Statistik
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we expect a nonlinear relationship between the property tax and the property value, as it
can be seen in equation (2.19). Generally, the nonlinear relationship is approximated by
including the log of the property tax rate in a hedonic regression (Oates, 1969; Pollakowski,
1973; Rosen and Fullerton, 1977). However, this approximation may be source of a bias
that depends on the values of the tax rate, the tax capitalization estimate and the discount
rate. In Switzerland, where income taxes are one of the main sources of local tax revenues,
there is no a priori or theoretical reason to expect a nonlinear relation between income tax
rate and property values. This reduces considerably the risk of specification bias. A direct
consequence is that the hedonic approach fits well with our data.
A second advantage of focusing on the income tax is that it may reduce the simultaneity
bias that follows from the reciprocal relationship existing between the property value and the
property tax rate. In particular, the definitional link (the fact that the property tax payment is
the nominal property tax rate multiplied by the assessed price of the house) and the behav-
ioral link (a random shock to a house’s market value, if observed by the assessor, changes the
assessed value and thus both the tax payments and the effective property tax rate) are com-
pletely ruled out. However, the simultaneity bias may remain if housing prices and income
are positively correlated, because higher property value will provide a given level of public
goods at a lower level of income tax rate.
3.2.2 Data
The dataset contains observations for all variables and all 171 municipalities located in the
Canton of Zurich for the 1998-2004 period. The variables were obtained from the Statistical
Office of the Canton of Zurich, the Secretary for Education of the Canton of Zurich, the
Financial Statistics of the Canton of Zurich and the Cantonal Bank of Zurich. The variables
include an array of different expenditure categories, the income tax rate, and a number of
population specific controls as well as location specific variables. The control variables,
their sources, medians, means and standard deviations are given in Table 3.3.
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The sample includes a large number of municipalities offering varying fiscal packages and
located in the same metropolitan area with a common CBD, the city of Zurich. This is in line
with the Tiebout setting where individuals live in a central city and reside in the community
which offers the most suitable tax-expenditure program.1
The originality of the current estimation relies on the nature of the house price variable.
The empirical review of the literature shows that capitalization studies use different units of
observation: municipalities for studies with aggregate data (the median property value) and
house sale for studies with micro data (sales price). All these studies look at price differences
between heterogeneous houses and thus have to control for structural characteristics in order
to separate the effects of taxes and public services. In contrast, the dependent variable for
this study is the price of a standardized and comparable single family house in each commu-
nity. The standardized house is end-terraced, has five rooms, two bathrooms, 450 m2 area
including garden, 750 m3 volume, and a single garage. The data has been obtained from the
Cantonal Bank of Zurich, the largest real estate bank in the canton, which evaluates houses
by the sales comparison approach based on actual transactions. The sales comparison ap-
proach is a commonly used valuation method in real estate appraisals. The Cantonal Bank of
Zurich uses a set of over 15000 house sales in the canton to determine the magnitude of the
effects of construction specific attributes only, such as the number of rooms, the age of the
house, the number of bathrooms etc. on property values in the cantonŠs communities. The
comparable single family house for each community with the same construction attributes is
derived from the estimates and used for economic decisions including mortgage provisions.
This approach is convenient because we do not really know which characteristics really mat-
ter for the valuation of houses. Moreover, it is difficult to gather exhaustive data on houses
structural characteristics. For instance, Hamilton (1979) finds an inconsistent negative im-
pact of the square feet of floor space on sale value; this result is probably biased by the
absence of some other important house characteristics. Johnson and Lea (1982) find that the
number of bedrooms negatively affects house prices but argue that this counter-intuitive find-
ing is explained by the presence of the square footage in the regression: for a given square
footage, an increase in the number of bedrooms implies smaller rooms. The specification
1Pollakowski (1973) shows that the choice of the sample has strong implications for the extent of tax
capitalization.
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of our dataset avoids this kind of problem. Looking at comparable houses, the effect of the
houses’ physical characteristics on prices is neutralized and we do not have to control for
these characteristics specifically.
The advantage of such a price is to reduce the risk of omitted variable bias. Studies based
on aggregate data generally include only one or two structural characteristics (Oates, 1969;
Rosen, 1982) like the age and the square footage of the house and their results are likely to
be plagued by omitted variables. The potential structural left-out variables are generally pos-
itively correlated with house value. These variables are considered by assessors to determine
assessed value and should boost both assessed value and property tax payments, leading to
an upward bias of tax capitalization estimate. This bias holds with income taxation if house
prices are positively correlated with income but it is less likely to happen because the income
tax payments or income tax rate are not directly linked to the house value.
On the public sector side, we have a number of different fiscal variables including taxes
and expenditures that allow us to analyze fiscal bundles. As argued in chapter 1, public
expenditure is not an ideal variable to measure the public services quality. As the public
production function or the production costs may differ from one municipality to another,
one euro may produces services of heterogeneous quality. However, this problem may be
moderate because the sample incorporates relatively homogeneous municipalities located in
the same metropolitan area. The harmonized public accounting standard of communities in
Zurich requires a clear functional accounting which allows us to derive results for specific
expenditure categories. Consequently, as opposed to Oates (1969), we have a complete set of
disaggregate data on public expenditures (expenditures for social well-being, administration,
health and culture). We take into account the municipal debt by constructing a theoretical
number of years that it takes for a community to fully pay back its debts. No bail-out is
possible in Switzerland as it has been ruled illegal by the Federal Court.
The current literature often focuses on education expenditures and school characteristics
when analyzing housing prices (Black, 1999; Figlio and Lucas, 2004; Brasington and Hau-
rin, 2005). The school organization in the canton of Zurich is different from other European
municipal school structures. In Europe, primary schools are usually managed by the com-
munities and standards are set by the national government. In Zurich, schools can either be
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managed by the municipality or a special school municipality. These special school commu-
nities can overlap and often include a number of other geographical neighbors. The school
communities have autonomous budgets and their accounts are often not consolidated in the
municipality because of the overlapping structure. Consequently we do not have a consis-
tent and reliable measure for education expenditures. Instead, we have constructed a dummy
variable which is 0 if municipality and school are apart and takes the value of 1 if the munic-
ipality itself manages its schools. Furthermore we control the presence of a grammar school
in the community and for the average class size in primary schools in all our regressions.
Consistent estimates of tax and public service capitalization require to reason on constant
quality houses. As argued above, our sample introduces comparable houses which neu-
tralize, by definition, structural differentials. However, there may remain neighborhood or
environmental characteristics differentials affecting house values. In the empirical analysis
we always control for the fraction of elderly people in the community. Furthermore, we
include the population density and the median income. The unemployment rate and the frac-
tion of foreigners are used in robustness tests. They represent controls for population and
demographic specific effects.
Besides we take account of mobility issues in a variety of specifications by including the
fraction of commuters that leave the municipality every day. In our sample, 69.7% of labor
force commutes outside of their municipality of origin to work. This is consistent with the
Tiebout world that requires an exogenous source of income. We also include the fraction of
foreigners, with no a priori on the sign of the coefficient, which depends essentially on the
socio-demographic background of the foreign population.
Our dataset allows us to control for real estate specific variables. These include the view
of the lake, the exposition of the house, the distance to Zurich main station and therefore
to the economic core, pollution. The view of the lake follows from the urban-amenities
theory. The distance to Zurich, denoted in travel time, is equivalent to the "distance to the
CBD" variable commonly used in the literature and is derived from the standard urban theory
(Alonso, 1964; Muth, 1969; Fujita, 1989). Local pollution levels are measured as the NO2
level in micrograms per cubic meter. Finally the exposition to the south and west for our
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comparable houses in each community is used as an additional location specific control. The
real estate characteristics remain constant over time.2
Finally, we do not include the city of Zurich and Winterthur in our estimations because as
opposed to the other municipalities they are clearly considered as cities and have a different
structure. For example, Zurich and Winterthur have each a number of separate districts
that form these cities. These districts differ in important aspects such as median incomes,
unemployment rates, the fraction of foreigners, etc.3
3.3 Estimation Results
3.3.1 Baseline Results
The results of the basic hedonic regressions are presented in Table 3.4. All regressions
include time fixed effects. The coefficients reported come from OLS regressions based on
versions of the model described in equation (3.1). We also derive from estimated coefficient
the impact in Swiss francs of one percent increase in the mean of the respective independent
variable on property prices for all significant variables. It gives an interpretable information
on the magnitude of capitalization and a clearer picture of the extent of the impact of each
variable on housing prices. From a general viewpoint, estimations are of a good quality (the
adjusted R2 ranges from 0.857 to 0.889) and most of the variables have the expected sign
and are highly significant.
Column (1) shows that the basic OLS estimates are significant and consistent with the theory
and the literature (Oates, 1969; Stull and Stull, 1991): the tax rate has a negative influ-
ence and public expenditures have a positive influence on housing prices. More precisely,
a one percent increase in the mean income tax rate reduces house values by 1066.3 Swiss
2The initial sample includes a greater number of control variables than those used in the current estimation.
In a previous study, a Bayesian Model Averaging has been used to find the most important independent variables
for capitalization. See Stadelmann (2010)
3Robustness tests show that results remain valid without excluding these observations.
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francs. As opposed to Oates (1969), we are able to distinguish between different expen-
diture categories. The harmonized public accounting standard of communities in Zurich
requires a clear functional accounting which allows us to derive results for specific expendi-
ture categories. Specification (1) shows that expenditures for culture, social well being and
health positively capitalize into house prices. The magnitude of expenditures capitalization
is largest for social-well being expenditures (this result holds for the other specifications).
A one percent change in the mean of this expenditure category increases house values by
328.7 Swiss francs. Health expenditures have an impact of 272.9 Swiss francs and a one per-
cent change in mean cultural expenditures increases house prices by 183.6 Swiss francs. In
contrast, administrative expenditures have a negative impact on property prices, even though
this negative effect is smaller than for other expenditure categories and non-significant. This
result is consistent with the intuition as households may consider that they do not directly
benefit directly from this expenditure category. Expenditures for environmental facilities and
environmental improvements are also capitalized in the form of lower housing prices. While
this result seems to be more paradoxical than for administrative expenditures, the coefficient
estimate is weakly significant (at 10% level), not robust to changes of the specification and
the impact of a one percent increase in the mean of environmental expenditures decrease
house values by only 65.9 Swiss francs. This result may reflect an inefficient environmen-
tal policy at the local government or that housholds consider that municipalities are not the
appropriate layer of government for the environmental policy.
The capitalization literature points that expenditures are inappropriate proxies for public
sector output. Thus, we include proximity to next school, the class size and the presence of a
grammar school in order to pick up public school quality more precisely. A house located at
a greater distance from a public school has a lower value. A one percent decrease in the mean
distance from a public school rises housing prices by 173.1 Swiss francs. Class size and the
presence of a grammar school have respectively a consistent negative and positive impact on
housing prices but are insignificant. The insignificance of these variables may be explained
by the fact that, as argued by Brasington and Haurin (2005) and Crone (2006), they are not
relevant for households’ choice of a community. Residents seems to be more influenced by
simple and readable information like public expenditures and proximity to public facilities.
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Table 3.4: Estimation of Capitalization in the Canton of Zurich
Specification Specification Specification Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coefficient Impact* Coefficient Impact* Coefficient Impact* Coefficient Impact*
in CHF in CHF in CHF in CHF
Intercept 820.353a 827.093a 801.252a 860.232a
(56.638) (57.169) (58.097) (58.600)
TaxRate -0.937a -1066.3 -0.841a -957.6 -0.846a -962.9 -0.944a -1075.0
(0.197) (0.196) (0.194) (0.187)
DebtRepay -4.713a -81.2 -4.537a -78.2 -4.030a -69.5
(1.258) (1.265) (1.292))
ExpCulture 0.197a 183.6 0.198a 184.6 0.184a 171.6 0.177a 164.5
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
ExpSocial 0.111a 328.7 0.114a 336.5 0.107a 315.5 0.086a 253.5
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
ExpHealth 0.179a 272.9 0.178a 271.6 0.173a 264.0 0.164a 250.6
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
ExpAdmin -0.017 -64.4 -0.009 -35.2 -0.005 -20.2 0.005 19.4
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
ExpEnvironment -0.109c -65.9 -0.098 -59.4 -0.086 -51.8 -0.057 -34.6
(0.064) (0.062) (0.061) (0.058)
DistSchool -0.020a -173.1 -0.019a -167.4 -0.020a -168.7 -0.017a -149.3
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
ClassSize -0.265 -52.7 -0.618 -122.9 -0.517 -102.8 -0.695 -138.4
(0.943) (0.945) (0.953) (0.916)
GrammarSchool 2.467 0.7 2.442 0.7 3.399 1.0 0.909 0.3
(6.971) (6.802) (6.694) (6.874)
MedianIncome 6.396a 3023.7 6.370a 3011.3 6.558a 3100.5 6.305a 2980.9
(0.588) (0.581) (0.595) (0.587)
Commuters -48.041c -331.0 -64.482b -444.3 -48.562c -334.6 -69.189b -476.7
(26.717) (26.261) (26.166) (27.358)
Elderly 536.244a 674.5 542.885a 682.9 551.155a 693.3 469.553a 590.6
(71.640) (71.356) (71.910) (70.874)
Lakeview 0.037a 134.0 0.037a 133.7 0.037a 134.4 0.035a 127.3
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
SWExposition 68.995a 295.5 66.759a 285.9 67.997a 291.2 70.108a 300.3
(5.532) (5.488) (5.489) (5.337)
DistCenter -6.346a -1701.1 -6.157a -1650.3 -5.962a -1598.1 -5.924a -1587.9
(0.315) (0.325) (0.344) (0.343)
DistShop -0.013a -163.4 -0.013a -159.6 -0.012a -146.5 -0.012a -150.4
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
NO2Pollution -6.314a -1121.7 -6.242a -1109.0 -6.408a -1138.4 -6.247a -1109.9
(0.544) (0.544 (0.545) (0.602)
Foreigners 106.422a 140.9 82.008b 108.6
(35.254) (36.022)
Unemployment -4.689b -104.6 -4.931b -110.0
(continued on next page)
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Table 3.4: Estimation of Capitalization in the Canton of Zurich (continued)
Specification Specification Specification Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coefficient Impact* Coefficient Impact* Coefficient Impact* Coefficient Impact*
in CHF in CHF in CHF in CHF
(2.115) (2.077)
Density 0.005 27.1
(0.005)
AccesFasttrain 0.142a 45.7
(0.050)
AvailablaLand -0.298a -148.9
(0.071)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Adj R2 0.892 0.893 0.893 0.896
N 1183 1183 1183 1183
*Impact in CHF denotes the impact of a one percent increase of the mean of the respective independent variable on property prices.
The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the average price of a comparable single family house for the respective years 1998
to 2004 across 169 municipalities. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a indicates a significance level of below 1 %; b indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %; c indicates significance level between
5 and 10 %.
Turning to non-fiscal variables, we find that most of them have the expected sign and are
significant at a 5% level. House prices react positively to a higher fraction of elderly. A one
percent increase in the mean of the share of elderly rises house values by 674.5 Swiss francs.
This result is easily explained by the fact that the population of elderly is characterized by
higher income and lives in high quality neighborhood. Moreover, a higher median income
in the municipality, which indicates a better neighborhood, has a signifiacant positive impact
on house values: A one percent increase in the mean of median income rises house values by
3023.7 Swiss francs. All location specific controls have the expected signs: while the average
view on the lake and a good exposition are positively capitalized, distance to the center and
the level of air pollution decrease house prices. In addition, we observe that locations specific
controls have heterogenous impact on house prices; While the view on lake and the average
distance to next shopping facility have relatively modest impact, the proximity to CBD and
the level of pollution have substantial effect on house prices. A one percent increase of the
mean of the distance to Zurich main station drops house values by 1701.1 Swiss francs and
a one percent increase of the mean of NO2 decreases house values by 1121.7 Swiss francs.
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3.3.2 Alternative Specifications and Robustness
We now present alternative specifications for the empirical equation (3.1) in order to check
the robustness of our basic coefficients. The results are presented in Table 3.4 (specification
(2) to (4)) and Table 3.5.
In the column (2) of Table 3.4, we add a variable indicating the capacity of municipalities
to repay debt with tax revenues as an additional fiscal variable. Indeed, for a given tax
rate a community has the possibility to finance additional expenditures by debt. We examine
whether residents consider local debt policy when they choose a jurisdiction. We find that the
Debtrepay variable negatively influences house prices. A one percent increase in the mean
of the number of years for full debt repayment using tax revenues decreases house values by
81.2 Swiss francs. This result means that local officials cannot use debt to decrease the tax
burden and increase house values and their chance of reelection, because actual homeowners
have to pay this indebtedness immediately through a lower house values. This implies a form
of Ricardian equivalence.
In specification (3), we consider the impact of two additional variables controlling for the
characteristics of the population on house prices, namely the percentage of foreigners and
the unemployment rate. These variables have moderate influence on house prices and do not
change significantly the previous results. The fraction of foreigners has a marginal positive
influence on house prices, as a one percent increase in the mean share of foreigners rises
house prices by 140.9 Swiss francs. This result is in contrast to the capitalization literature
based on North American data and can be explained by the large number of well educated
expatriates in the Canton of Zurich. The situation on the job market is also a relevant variable
for prospective homebuyers, as the unemployment rate negatively affect house prices.
Specification (4) investigates the impact of the proximity to a major rail transport network
and of the location of the municipalities in the metropolitan area on house prices and on the
previous capitalization effect. In contrast to the distance to the CBD, the dummy indicator
for access to fast train has only a marginal positive effect on house prices. Moreover, we
introduce two proxies for municipalities’ location in the metropolitan area, the density and
the available land for construction. We expect municipalities that are close to the CBD to
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have a denser population and less available space for construction. Results indicate that
while density has no effect on house prices, a one percent increase in unused construction
area entails a fall of 148.9 CHF of house values.
108 Estimation of Capitalization in the Canton of Zurich
Table 3.5: Estimation of Capitalization in the Canton of Zurich: Robustness
WLS log (pop) WLS Commuters Semi log log - log
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 817.799a 837.346a 6.806a 6.402a
(60.891) (57.984) (0.064) (0.297)
TaxRate -0.867a -0.877a -9.7E-04a -1.3E-01a
(0.186) (0.183) (2.1E-04) (2.5E-02)
DebtRepay -4.226a -3.218b -6.6E-03b -1.3E-02b
(1.489) (1.501) (1.6E-03) (2.9E-03)
ExpCulture 0.171a 0.184a 1.5E-04a 1.3E-02a
(0.037) (0.038) (3.8E-05) (3.5E-03)
ExpSocial 0.089a 0.088a 9.7E-05a 1.2E-02b
(0.016) (0.017) (1.8E-05) (4.5E-03)
ExpHealth 0.155a 0.168a 1.7E-04a 6.0E-03a
(0.026) (0.028) (3.0E-05) (2.9E-03)
ExpAdmin 0.011 0.011 -1.6E-05 1.4E-02
(0.012) (0.011) (1.3E-05) (5.2E-02)
ExpEnvironment -0.046 -0.063 -8.3E-05 -1.5E-02
(0.055) (0.059) (6.5E-05) (4.5E-02)
DistSchool -0.015b -0.014b -2.8E-05a -2.6E-02a
(0.007) (0.006) (7.1E-06) (8.1E-03)
ClassSize -0.727 -0.603 4.8E-04 1.0E-02
(0.956) (0.918) (1.0E-03) (2.2E-02)
GrammarSchool 0.902 -0.838 3.8E-03 1.3E-02c
(5.529) (7.600) (6.1E-03) (7.2E-03)
MedianIncome 6.810a 6.597a 6.5E-03a 4.1E-01a
(0.621) (0.616) (6.4E-04) (3.9E-02)
Commuters -69.705b -86.671a -7.1E-02b -3.1E-03
(29.176) (29.752) (3.2E-02) (4.4E-02)
Elderly 523.066a 462.304a 3.6E-01a 5.9E-01a
(68.012) (70.752) (7.5E-02) (8.4E-02)
Lakeview 0.035a 0.036a 4.2E-05a 1.1E-02a
(0.002) (0.002) (2.0E-06) (7.5E-04)
SWExposition 71.362a 67.231a 8.8E-02a 5.9E-02a
(5.461) (5.304) (6.0E-03) (7.1E-03)
DistCenter -5.727a -5.826a -7.8E-03a -1.3E-01a
(0.365) (0.354) (3.8E-04) (1.2E-02)
DistShop -0.013a -0.012a -1.8E-05a -1.6E-02a
(0.003) (0.003) (2.9E-06) (5.1E-03)
NO2Pollution -6.415a -5.911a -7.1E-03a -8.1E-02a
(0.581) (0.583) (6.7E-04) (1.7E-02)
Foreigners 101.402a 87.737b 9.2E-02b 1.9E-01a
(35.684) (37.056) (4.2E-02) (5.0E-02)
Unemployment -5.564b -4.733b -5.2E-03b -7.7E-03b
(2.166) (2.100) (2.4E-03) (3.0E-03)
Density 0.005 0.002 2.0E-06 1.3E-05
(0.005) (0.005) (5.7E-06) (6.5E-05)
(continued on next page)
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Table 3.5: Estimation of Capitalization in the Canton of Zurich: Robustness (continued)
WLS log (pop) WLS Commuters Semi log log - log
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
AccesFasttrain 0.125b 0.129b 1.7E-04a 4.0E-03a
(0.052) (0.051) (5.8E-05) (1.2E-03)
AvailablaLand -0.301a -0.328a -4.0E-04a -1.8E-02a
(0.076) (0.070) (8.3E-05) (4.6E-03)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Adj R2 0.899 0.893 0.898 0.857
N 1183 1183 1183 1183
The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the average price of a comparable single family
house for the respective years 1998 to 2004 across 169 municipalities. Robust standard errors
in parenthesis.
a indicates a significance level of below 1 %; b indicates a significance level between 1 and 5 %;
c indicates significance level between 5 and 10 %.
In specification (1) and (2) of Table (3.5), we weight the OLS estimates by the logarithmic
population of the communities and the share of commuters outgoing over labor force in com-
munity, in order to ensure that our results are not driven by a number of small communities
or by mobility issues. The results do not exhibit outstanding changes with respect to the
previous coefficient estimates.
In specification (3) and (4) of Table (3.5), we check whether the functional form of the
estimated equation has an impact on the previous results. A number of capitalization studies
use semi log specification by considering the logarithm of the house prices variables (Oates,
1969; Black, 1999). Brasington (2001) note that the semilog is the most popular form used
in the literature. To test for the possible influence of a logarithmic form, we estimate in
specification (3) a partial logarithmic model using the house prices in logarithmic form and
in column (4) a log-log specification. Clearly, the coefficient estimates change with respect
to the previous specifications but the interpretation is also different. The qualitative results
on the tax, expenditures and other control variables are preserved.
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Conclusion
This chapter provides estimation of capitalization of local fiscal variables into house prices
for the municipalities of the Canton of Zurich in Switzerland. Switzerland is a convenient
"fiscal laboratory" because local jurisdictions have large autonomy over taxation and spend-
ing decisions. The originality of the current estimation relies on the nature of the house price
variable. Usual literature uses either the median property value for studies with aggregate
data and sales price for studies with micro data. All these studies look at price differences
between heterogeneous houses and thus have to control for structural characteristics in order
to separate the effects of taxes and public services. In contrast, the dependent variable for our
study is the price of a standardized and comparable single family house in each community.
Our approach allows to ignore the control of the structural characteristics.
Our main findings exhibits standard and consistent results with respect to the literature. Most
of the control variables have an expected sign and are significant at a 5% level. The tax rate
has a negative and public expenditures have a positive influence on housing prices. Moreover,
fiscal variables have a significant magnitude, especially the income tax rate: a one percent
increase in the mean income tax rate reduces house values by around 1000 Swiss francs. The
robustness tests show that baseline results are not altered qualitatively by the introduction of
additional control variables or by changes of the functional forms of the estimated equation.
Chapter 4
Persistence of Capitalization
THe findings of significant tax and public expenditures capitalization, as we find in chap-ter 3, has been largely documented in the empirical literature. Testing the presence of
fiscal capitalization is often referred to a test of the Tiebout hypothesis. For instance, Oates
(1969) argues that similar magnitude of tax and expenditures capitalization implies that the
provision of local public services is efficient and that communities are in Tiebout equilib-
rium. However, some authors criticize this interpretation of the Tiebout model. Hamilton
(1976a) and Levin (1982) argue in contrast that capitalization of local fiscal variables is a
temporary phenomenon that stems from a short term disequilibrium between housing de-
mand and supply. Henderson (1985) considers that jurisdictions’ boundaries are flexible and
that active land developer can reallocate land appropriately in order to eliminate capitaliza-
tion. While this view has several implications for the test of the Tiebout hypothesis and for
the efficiency provision of local public services, it has been rather neglected in the literature.
The first section exposes the controversy on the Tiebout hypothesis and its relation with the
capitalization. Then we use our data set from the Canton of Zurich to the test the hypothesis
of varying capitalization rate over the metropolitan area and to contribute to the debate on
the persistence of capitalization. If the no-capitalization faction is right, we expect to find
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greater capitalization of taxes and public expenditures in communities with lower housing
supply elasticity.
Section 4.2 put the controversy on the existence of capitalization in a dynamic framework.
Most of capitalization studies are based on cross-sectional differences of house prices. In
this static framework, it is not surprising to find significant capitalization. The reaction of
housing supply cannot take place instantaneously. This supply side reaction requires some
times, for land developers to reallocate land so as to eliminate completely capitalization. For
example, Edel and Sclar (1974) estimate capitalization in 5 separate regressions over several
decades for the Boston area and find that the degree of capitalization decreases over time, as
housing supply approaches long-run equilibrium. To our knowledge, this is the only attempt
to estimate the change of capitalization over time. Thus, in section 4.2, we take advantage
of our panel data set from the Canton of Zurich to give additional evidence on the timing of
capitalization.
4.1 Capitalization and the Supply Side Reaction
The empirical literature shows that a number of authors find significant substantial capitaliza-
tion of fiscal variables into property values. Our basic estimation confirms that capitalization
also occurs in the Canton of Zurich. However, part of the theoretical and empirical literature
on capitalization points out that capitalization is a disequilibrium phenomenon that should
disappear if the supply side of the market is taken into account.
In this section, we examine the theoretical and empirical debate between the yes and no-
capitalization faction. We then present a theoretical model that reconciles the two sides of
the debate and argues, following Brasington (2002) and Hilber and Mayer (2001, 2009),
that fiscal capitalization should vary across an urban area depending on the value of the
elasticity of housing supply. We use our panel data set from the Canton of Zurich to test
whether the capitalization effectively differs depending on the location of the community in
the metropolitan area.
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4.1.1 The Theoretical and Empirical Debate
In chapter 1, we have seen with Oates (1969) that both property tax and public goods which
are approximated by expenditures were capitalized into house prices. Oates (1969) argues
that if consumers migrate to the jurisdiction offering the tax-public good package which is
the best suitable to their preferences, they have to be aware of local fiscal variables among the
different jurisdictions. These differences should be reflected in the price of housing services
that individuals are willing to pay to live at a certain location providing their preferred tax-
public service combination. It seems reasonable to think that, given a certain level of taxes,
households bid up property values in the community providing the best quality of public
goods.
In the subsequent empirical capitalization literature, a number of papers confirm Oates’ re-
sults but report various degrees of tax capitalization. Oates (1973), Church (1974) and Rein-
hard (1981) report full or overcapitalization. Rosen and Fullerton (1977), Richardson and
Thalheimer (1981) and Palmon and Smith (1998b) report intermediate rate of capitaliza-
tion. In a comprehensive study, Yinger et al. (1988) present more modest but significant tax
capitalization.
Edel and Sclar (1974), Hamilton (1976a), Henderson (1985) or Henderson and Thisse (2001)
defend a completely opposite vision about fiscal capitalization. They state that capitalization
does not or at least should not occur in a fully Tiebout equilibrium because it is a demand
side phenomenon. The common critic is that in Oates (1969), capitalization occurs because
the supply reaction of housing has not taken place yet. Fiscal capitalization results from
scarcity of land that prevents households from moving toward communities with favorable
tax-expenditure packages. Hamilton (1976a) argues that rational behavior of consumers
could even imply negative capitalization of public services in property values if there was a
shortage of low-expenditure communities since these communities would be bid up. How-
ever, according to these authors land and community developers can react strategically (Hen-
derson, 1985; Henderson and Thisse, 2001) and housing supply can adjust in the long run.
As soon as a community offers more favorable taxes and demand increases, house devel-
opers seize the opportunity and supply new dwellings until the market clears. In addition,
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Hamilton (1976a) argues that there is no reason preventing land developers from creating
new communities with the desired fiscal bundle and then eliminate the capitalization of tax
and public expenditures into property values. Little tax capitalization can also be explained
if jurisdiction boundaries are flexible and fiscal zoning is used. Communities with desirable
tax-public spending packages will devour others and price differentials, due to differences in
taxes and public services, will vanish: communities can freely expand in response to demand
and the supply of new houses is perfectly elastic. House prices are then constant across com-
munities. Therefore, the supply of any arbitrary tax-public service combination is perfectly
elastic; capitalization can only be considered as a temporary disequilibrium and vanishes
once housing supply occurs.
There are some empirical evidences supporting the no capitalization hypothesis. Wales and
Wiens (1974), Chinloy (1978), and Gronberg (1979) find no capitalization of property taxes
into property values. Edel and Sclar (1974) estimate the evolution of the extent of tax and
school expenditures capitalization in 5 separate regressions over several decades for the
Boston area and find that the degree of capitalization decreases as communities approach
the complete Tiebout equilibrium. Gronberg (1979) and Man and Rosentraub (1998) also
confirm the lack of non-schooling municipal expenditures and changes in schooling ex-
penditures capitalization respectively. In two related papers on the effect of property tax
differential on residential rents and property values in North Carolina, Hyman and Pasour
(1973a,b) postulate that the supply of housing capital is considerably more elastic than in
the North-eastern cities treated by Oates (1969). They find the consistent result that property
taxes do not affect property values and are rather shifted forward to tenants.
The debate over the existence of fiscal capitalization is important because it has implication
for the efficiency and the interpretation of the Tiebout hypothesis. Again, there are two
competing views about the implication of fiscal capitalization for the efficiency. Oates (1969)
argues that if the magnitudes of the capitalization of public services and taxes are similar,
then the community is at the Tiebout equilibrium in the sense that taxes represent an efficient
price for entry in the community, a price of the public services enjoyed by residents. In
Oates’ study, the effects of the tax and public school expenditures are of a roughly equivalent
magnitude, allowing him to claim that his results are consistent with the Tiebout hypothesis.
Instead, Edel and Sclar (1974) and Hamilton (1976a) argue that the Tiebout hypothesis is
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confirmed and efficiency is achieved only if there is no significant relationships between
fiscal variables and property values.
Recently, Brasington (2002) and Hilber and Mayer (2001, 2009) find a common ground be-
tween the two opposing views of fiscal capitalization. Brasington (2002) argues that the two
views are consistent if one considers that the elasticity of housing supply -the source of the
controversy- varies across the urban area. It is quite intuitive that land developers have few
opportunities to develop housing near the center of a metropolitan area, because of the high
population density and land scarcity. Therefore, land supply should be fairly inelastic and
capitalization of amenities and fiscal variables should occur to a much greater extent toward
the interior of the urban area. Conversely, land developers have greater opportunities to de-
velop housing toward the edge of an urban area, where there is lower population density, land
is more readily available and the community boundaries are more flexible. Thus land supply
should be more elastic in the exterior of the metropolitan area, yielding a lower extent of
capitalization. Using a set of housing purchases that occurred during 1991 in Ohio, Brasing-
ton (2002) tests the prediction that the rate of capitalization varies depending on the location
over the urban area. He splits the total sample into two sub-samples: communities on the
inside and communities on the edge of the urban area. Brasington (2002) uses the population
density to discriminate between the two types of communities. Communities located in the
edge and inside the urban area have at least 100 persons per square miles.1 However, edge
communities are those jurisdictions that share common boundaries with school districts that
have less than 100 persons per square miles. In a first stage, Brasington (2002) separately
estimates the two sub-samples applying OLS procedure. The results show that capitalization
of public service quality inside communities is twice greater than in the urban fringe. In a
second stage, Brasington (2002) includes in the first model new variables that interact taxes
and public service quality and a dummy variable indicating whether the community belongs
to the inside of the urban area. All the interaction variables except the one involving the
effective property tax rate are highly statistically significant and suggest that the extent of
1Note that the split leads to two balanced sub-samples as the number of observations in the inside and edge
sample is respectively 12,864 and 14,115.
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capitalization is greater near the center of the urban area, where the elasticity of housing
supply is lower.2
Like Brasington (2002), Hilber and Mayer (2001, 2009) argue that the degree of capitaliza-
tion depends on the elasticity of land supply for housing and thus on the amount of devel-
opable land. They use repeated sales data from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts over
the 1990-94 period and take advantage of the Proposition 21/23 to show that supply side
reaction effectively decreases the extent of capitalization. In contrast to Brasington (2002),
Hilber and Mayer (2001, 2009) do not base the distinction between high and low elasticity
supply communities on a measure of population density. They argue that population density
might be related to other factors than land availability such as the mix of residential and com-
mercial activities and local zoning restrictions. They also exclude the distance from the CBD
variable because it is especially inappropriate for urban areas with multiple suburban centers.
Instead, they use a direct measure of land availability as a proxy for housing supply elastic-
ity, namely the percent of developed land in each community. Then they divide the total
sample into two equal-sized sub-samples indicating communities with less developable land
and communities with more developable land. They find that school spending has a greater
effect in communities with more developed land than in communities with less developed
land. As opposed to Brasington (2002), Hilber and Mayer (2001, 2009) do not interact fiscal
variables with their proxy for housing supply elasticity. They rather provide further empiri-
cal evidence on the fact that the land supply is effectively more elastic in communities with
more developable land.
The reasoning of Brasington (2002) and Hilber and Mayer (2001, 2009) is interesting be-
cause it explains why previous empirical studies find various degrees of capitalization. It
might be the case that complete capitalization occurs because the sample includes a well
developed urban area or an area where zoning regulations prevent land developers from ad-
justing housing supply. Intermediate capitalization may reflect that the supply side is react-
ing to house price differentials and that communities are effectively approaching the Tiebout
2Brasington (2002) addresses the issue of heteroskedasticity by performing Generalized Least Square (GLS)
and finds the same qualitative results about capitalization.
3The objective of the Proposition 21/2 was to restrict the effective property tax rate and the nominal annual
growth in property tax revenues to 2.5 percent. Communities had the possibility to exceed the latter limit
through a referendum.
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Figure 4.1: Capitalization with inelastic housing supply
equilibrium. Finally, no capitalization results would concern communities that are located in
the urban fringe, where there is considerably more land to develop.
The difference of capitalization rate with respect to housing supply elasticity is illustrated in
figures 4.1 and 4.2 that represent housing market in a community. In figure 4.1 we consider,
as in Oates (1969) or Sonstelie and Portney (1980a), an inelastic supply of housing. Suppose
that the community improve the quality of local public services without any increase of
taxes; New households migrate in that community and housing demand increases. The price
effect is relatively large because of the inelastic housing supply. In figure 4.2 we consider
in contrast an elastic housing supply as in Hamilton (1976a) and Henderson (1985). In this
case, the positive demand shock has a relatively little impact on housing prices because land
developers have the possibility to convert agricultural and available land into residential land
in response.
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Figure 4.2: Capitalization with elastic housing supply
4.1.2 A Simple Theoretical Model
In order to illustrate the theoretical controversy outlined in the previous sub-section, we
develop a basic model that includes the two sides of the debate. The model is a very simple
version of a "Tiebout model"4 described by Epple and Zelenitz (1981) in which the property
tax is replaced by income tax to fit with the Swiss case.
We consider a metropolitan area composed of N residents and I jurisdictions, each inhabited
by identical households who are perfectly mobile and have identical tastes and incomes. A
household’s income y can be spent on a composite consumption good xi with unit price and
on housing services hi with price pi. From its location independent income y the household
has to pay income taxes Ti = tiy for which it receives public services gi. When choosing
a residential location, it takes account of the level of public services. In other words, a
representative household tries to maximize the utility function
U(xi,hi)+ γ(gi), (4.1)
4As argued in the first chapter, the Tiebout world is sufficiently ambiguous to have various modeling inter-
pretation.
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which exhibits the standard properties5 and taking account of its budget constraint
yi = xi+ pihi, (4.2)
where yi = y−T is disposable income. As mentioned by Yinger (1982), the community’s
budget constraint is not included in the household’s maximization problem. When looking
for a jurisdiction to live in, households consider tax/service combinations as given. The
household’s maximization problem yields the indirect utility function V (yi, pi,gi) and a de-
mand function for housing services6 hi = hi(pi). Location decisions and housing demand
therefore depend on the price of housing and after-tax household income.
Housing Supply and Capitalization with Perfectly Competitive Jurisdictions
In a first case, we consider a sufficiently large number of jurisdictions I so that jurisdiction
are small enough with respect to the metropolitan area to assume that a unilateral change of
their policies will not affect housing prices and policies in other jurisdictions. This is the
utility-taking or the price-taking assumptions described in Brueckner (1983), Hoyt (1990,
1991). Perfect mobility across jurisdictions implies that in equilibrium, the utility level in
each jurisdiction must be equal to the utility level prevailing in the rest of the metropolitan
area:
V (y(1− ti), pi,gi) =V , i = 1, . . . , I. (4.3)
Suppose that equation (4.3) is not satisfied; for example a community enjoys a greater utility
level than in the rest of the metropolitan area. Then, a migration flow of individuals occurs
from the rest of the metropolitan area to that community. Housing prices increases in the
community with high utility and decreases in the rest of the metropolis until equation (4.3)
is satisfied. The price gradients are thus determined entirely by the equal utility constraint
(4.3). Differentiating equation (4.3) with respect to the level of public good gi and applying
5The separability assumption simplifies the analysis as it ensures that a change in public service level does
not affect the demand for housing.
6We omit the demand function for the numéraire since it is not of interest.
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Roy’s identity gives:7
∂ pi
∂gi
=
MRSi
hi
> 0, (4.4)
where MRSi = (∂V/∂gi)/(∂V/∂y) is the marginal rate of substitution between public goods
and income. Differentiating equation (4.3) with respect to the income tax rate ti yields:
∂ pi
∂ ti
=− y
hi
< 0. (4.5)
Equations (4.5) and (4.4) shows that, as expected, the income tax rate is negatively capital-
ized into housing values while the public good is positively capitalized into housing values.
More precisely, Equation (4.5) describes the decrease in housing prices in the jurisdiction i
required by a increase in the income tax to satisfy the utility constraint (4.3), following the
flow of individuals from the jurisdiction i to the rest of the metropolitan area.
From (4.5) and (4.4) we also observe that the capitalization rates are given for a particular
jurisdiction, as they do no depend on housing demand or supply elasticity. This means that in
perfectly competitive environment, the jurisdictions have no market power and are too small
to influence the capitalization rates by converting land for alternative use.
Jurisdictions with Market Power
We now consider a situation in which the number of jurisdiction is not too large, so that each
jurisdiction have a sizable population share of the metropolis (Scotchmer, 1986; Hoyt, 1991;
Henderson, 1994). In this case, a unilateral change of a jurisdiction’s policy will entail a
significant migration and will thus affect housing prices and utility level in the rest of the
metropolis. As a consequence, the utility level received by residents of a jurisdiction must
be treated endogenously and equation (4.3) must be amended as:
V (y(1− ti), pi,gi) =V (y(1− t j), p j,g j), j 6= i. (4.6)
7Detailed steps for equations (4.4) and (4.5) are given in appendix.
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Two additional equilibrium conditions must be considered. First, all N residents of the
metropolis must be housed such that:
I
∑
i=1
ni = N, (4.7)
where ni is the number of households residing in jurisdiction i. Second, equilibrium requires
that housing market clears in each jurisdiction:
nihi(pi) = Hi(pi), i = 1, . . . , I, (4.8)
where Hi(pi) denotes aggregate housing supply in community i. As noted by Hilber and
Mayer (2009), the use of aggregate housing supply simplifies the analysis but is analogous
to the case of an elastic supply of land. Substituting (4.8) in (4.7), we obtain:
I
∑
i=1
Hi(pi)
hi(pi)
= N, (4.9)
To analyze the impact of public goods on housing prices in a jurisdiction i, we differentiate
(4.6) and (4.9) with respect to gi:
−hi∂ pi∂gi +h j
∂ p j
∂gi
=−MRSi, (4.10)
ni
pi
(ηi− εi)∂ pi∂gi +∑j 6=i
n j
p j
(η j− ε j)∂ p j∂gi = 0, (4.11)
where η j = ∂H∂ p
p
H > 0 is the price elasticity of housing supply, and ε j =
∂h
∂ p
p
h < 0 is the price
elasticity of housing demand. Substituting (4.10) in (4.11) and solving for ∂ pi/∂gi yields:8
∂ pi
∂gi
=
∑ j 6=i
n j
p j
(η j− ε j)MRSi
Ω
> 0, (4.12)
8Detailed steps for equations (4.12) and (4.13) are given in appendix.
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where Ω = nipi (ηi− εi)h j +∑ j 6=i
n j
p j
(η j− ε j)hi > 0. Under standard assumptions regarding
housing demand and supply elasticities and utility function (MRS> 0) and assuming positive
population sizes and housing prices, public goods capitalize positively into housing prices.
Derivation of the tax capitalization effect is similar to the public goods case. We find that:
∂ pi
∂ ti
=−
∑ j 6=i
n j
p j
(η j− ε j)y
Ω
< 0, (4.13)
The income tax rate negatively capitalizes into housing prices. However, we observe that,
in contrast to the perfectly competitive environment, housing supply elasticity influences
capitalization rates. More precisely, the supply elasticity in a community may increase when
more land is available. Computing the effect on capitalization of public goods and taxes due
to an increase in the supply elasticity yields:
∂ 2 pi
∂gi∂ηi
=−
(
∑ j 6=i
n j
p j
(η j− ε j)MRSi
)(
ni
pi
h j
)
Ω2
< 0, (4.14)
∂ 2 pi
∂ ti∂ηi
=
(
∑ j 6=i
n j
p j
(η j− ε j)y¯
)(
ni
pi
h j
)
Ω2
> 0. (4.15)
Equations (4.10) and (4.10) means that increases in housing supply elasticity negatively af-
fect the capitalization rate of public goods and positively affect capitalization of taxes.
If enough land is available for construction, supply may be perfectly elastic, i.e. ηi→ ∞ and
capitalization rates become:
lim
ηi→∞
∂ pi
∂gi
= 0, (4.16)
lim
ηi→∞
∂ pi
∂ ti
= 0. (4.17)
Thus, for perfectly elastic supply, the model predicts that capitalization of fiscal variables
does not persist, as argued by Edel and Sclar (1974), Hamilton (1976a) and Henderson
(1985).
Capitalization and the Supply Side Reaction 123
4.1.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
In this sub-section, we use our panel data set from the Canton of Zurich to test the prediction
described in the previous theoretical model and under which capitalization rates decline when
the elasticity of land and housing supply increases. Of course, we do not have a direct
measure of land supply elasticity. Two different methods allow us to approximate land supply
conditions and to identify differences in capitalization of fiscal variables over space. Each of
these approaches uses the standard amenity model presented in the previous section.
The first approach is to divide the dataset into two distinct samples. This method is used by
Brasington (2002) and Hilber and Mayer (2001, 2009). As opposed to Brasington however,
the split is not based on population density but on a direct measure of the land availability
for construction. Hilber and Mayer (2001) argue that population density could obscure the
link between land supply elasticity and capitalization in the presence of zoning regulation.
For example, consider a sparsely populated community. Land supply will still be low if
zoning ordinance prevents new residential constructions or reserves the available land for
commercial use. The average available construction area over all 169 communities in the
dataset was 55.425 square meters per capita in 1998. Communities with less than 55.425
square meters of available construction area per capita form the “No space available” set,
while communities with more than (or equal to) 55.425 square meters per capita form the
“Space available” set. A dummy variable denoted DummyLandAvailablei identifies the com-
munities as belonging to the “No space available” set if DummyLandAvailablei = 0 or the
later “Space available” set if DummyLandAvailablei = 1.9 If housing supply reacts to differ-
ences in tax-public good packages, capitalization should be significantly higher in the “No
space available” set than in the “Space available” set. To formally test for such significant
differences in capitalization across communities, we interact the dummy variable for land
availability with tax rates, aggregate public expenditures as well as different public expendi-
ture categories. Housing supply can be sufficiently elastic only if developable construction
space is available . Moreover, if housing development reacts to capitalization we expect tax
interaction coefficients to be positive and expenditure interaction coefficients to be negative,
i.e. capitalization in communities with supply reactions should be lower.
9In robustness tests we consider changes in the definition of this dummy variable.
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Our second method to evaluate differences in capitalization of fiscal variables is to ana-
lyze a linear interaction model. The empirical model interacts a standardized measure for
available construction area with taxes and expenditure variables.10 If housing supply reacts
significantly to fiscal packages then the interaction of taxes with available construction areas
should be positive while the interaction of public expenditures with available construction
areas should be negative, i.e. capitalization tends to decrease with more construction space
within the communities.
As in the chapter 2, the set of explanatory variables includes fiscal variables like income taxes
and public expenditures, as well as location specific and environmental variables. Several
additional variables are used for robustness tests and are presented in Table 4.1.
10The standardized construction area is equal to available construction area in jurisdictions i minus the aver-
age construction area available, i.e. LandAvailablei−LandAvailable. Standardization is performed to facilitate
the interpretation of interaction effects.
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4.1.4 Estimation Results
The main results are presented in Table 4.2. Taking a look at coefficient estimates of spec-
ifications (1) and (2) we find that the tax rate has a negative and significant influence on
house prices. Similarly, aggregate public expenditures (column 1) as well as expenditures
for culture, social well being, and health (column 2) significantly increase house prices. Ex-
penditures for administrative purposes do not capitalize significantly. Moreover, the distance
to the nearest school has a negative impact on house prices in both specifications as does
class size which is significant for both samples. The form of school organization does not
have any significant impact. House prices react positively and significantly to higher median
incomes as commonly documented in the literature. More densely populated areas with a
higher fraction of elderly people have higher prices too but the significance depends on the
sample chosen. Clearly, commuting imposes costs on individuals and capitalizes negatively
and significantly in the “Space available” sample as does the unemployment rate in the “No
space available” sample. The fraction of foreigners has a positive and significant influence
on house prices in both specifications because of a large number of well educated expatriates
in the Canton of Zurich. All location specific controls have the expected signs. The average
view on the lake and good exposition increase prices, whereas the distance to the center and
the next shopping facility as well as the level of air pollution decrease them.
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Oates (1969) was criticized by Edel and Sclar (1974), Hamilton (1976a) and a number of
other authors who argued that capitalization rates should tend to zero because of housing
supply reactions. As more land for construction is available housing supply can react more
easily to differences in fiscal packages. Consequently capitalization of fiscal variables can
be expected to be lower in communities with ample construction possibilities. Looking at
the results for specifications (3) and (4) we find that a one percent increase in the mean
income tax rate reduces house values by 1298.80 Swiss francs in the “No space available”
set and by 745.40 Swiss francs in the “Space available” set. Thus, tax capitalization seems
to be lower when housing supply is able to react due to more developable land. Similarly,
capitalization of a one percent increase in aggregate expenditures is 669.80 Swiss francs
when fewer construction areas are available and 560.00 Swiss francs when more construction
areas are available.
Specifications (5) and (6) use diverse public expenditure categories instead of aggregate pub-
lic expenditures. Again, we find that taxes capitalize less in jurisdictions with more construc-
tion space. Similarly, a one percent increase in public expenditures for culture rises house
values by 222.70 Swiss francs when construction land is scarce as opposed to an increase
of 162.40 Swiss francs when construction possibilities are available. For social expendi-
tures the effects are less robust as capitalization of this category is lower in the “No space
available” set. Capitalization for administrative expenditure is negative and not significant
in both samples. Finally, health expenditures have again a marginally larger impact when
construction space is scarce.
Even though estimates for separate samples point to a lower capitalization in communities
with more available construction areas per capita, it is unclear whether these differences are
statistically significant. Point estimates of tax coefficients in columns (1) to (4) are signif-
icantly different from zero but not necessarily significantly different from each other. For
public expenditures point estimates are relatively close. In columns (5) and (6) we estimate a
dummy interaction model to test whether the differences in capitalization in the sets are sta-
tistically significant. The identifier whether construction areas are scarce or easily available,
DummyLandAvailablei, is interacted with the tax and aggregate public expenditure variables
in specification (5) and with tax and different expenditure categories in specification (6).
Taxes themselves capitalize negatively and significantly in both cases. The interaction be-
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tween taxes and the identifier for available land is positive but not significant. Consequently,
supply reactions when more construction areas are available do not tend to diminish capi-
talization of taxes in a statistically significant manner. Results for aggregate expenditures
as well as different expenditure categories show a similar picture. The interaction between
aggregate expenditures and available land is negative but not significant as shown in column
(5). Cultural expenditures and health expenditures also capitalize insignificantly less while
social expenditures seem to capitalize at an insignificantly higher rate when more space for
new constructions is available. Expenditures for administration do not have any significant
effect. Thus, capitalization is not significantly different when comparing jurisdictions with
more land for construction with jurisdictions having less developable land.
To make sure that these results are not only valid for the chosen threshold of the identifier
DummyLandAvailablei, we investigate the relationships when the threshold changes by +/-
15% in Table 4.3 and 4.4. We analyze the data in the same way as presented in Table
4.2 and find essentially the identical results. Generally, capitalization is lower when more
construction area is available but the effects are never significant. Thus, capitalization seems
to be robust even if supply reactions are possible.
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Table 4.3: Capitalization over Space with -15 % Change of the Land Availability Dummy
Variable No space Space No space Space Interaction Interaction
available available available available -15% -15%
-15% -15% -15% -15% (ExpAgg) (Categories)
(ExpAgg) (ExpAgg) (Categories) (Categories)
Intercept 750416a 986300a 774919a 1020000a 794245a 792296a
-59700 -103100 -62340 -104800 -129100 -133400
TaxRate -1059.517a -711.500c -1051.863a -561.600b -1081.153b -899.111c
(199.800) (401.700) (199.453) (277.300) (466.300) (465.700)
Int(Tax * 579.759 -122.245b
DummyLandAvailable) (841.300) (61.180)
ExpAgg 131.419a 81.180a 125.156a
(14.564) (27.830) (24.040)
Int(ExpAgg * -22.102
DummyLandAvailable) (43.750)
ExpCulture 206.798a 136.250a 226.303a
(40.290) (23.160) (84.700)
Int(ExpCulture * -105.580
DummyLandAvailable) (117.100)
ExpSocial 97.072a 51.490c 88.478b
(18.330) (26.510) (36.310)
Int(ExpSocial * -7.890
DummyLandAvailable) (56.770)
ExpAdmin -4.487 -17.980 -4.967
(16.650) (13.060) (37.400)
Int(ExpAdmin * -43.163
DummyLandAvailable) (40)
ExpHealth 158.148a 117.400a 156.025a
(30.910) (34.450) (47.340)
Int(ExpHealth * -48.661
DummyLandAvailable) (74.620)
LandAvailable (Dummy) -70991 -27705
(108600) (23730)
DistSchool -21.248a -15.720 -18.154b -21.540 -20.654 -18.329
(6.878) (12.390) (7.046) (13.240) (15.710) (15.240)
ClassSize -962.555 -2643b -932.328 -2046c -153.500 -210.271
(1034) (1238) (1076) (1216) (1840) (1831)
NoSchoolComm 8467.9 2300.0 8778.45 2210.0 3150.910 4178.265
(8541) (4353) (8484) (4971) (9982) (9871)
MedianIncome 6.822a 4.635a 6.262a 4.266a 6.890a 6.391a
(0.627) (1.052) (0.645) (0.968) (1.391) (1.394)
Density 2.680 92.640a 1.263 87.340a 5.887 7.186
(4.978) (15.420) (5.267) (15.020) (12.110) (12.860)
Elderly 6438.103a -1494 6172.415a -1671 5127.163a 4672.333a
(772.800) (1111) (797.100) (1108) (1493) (1505)
Commuters -28290 -224800a -29703 -23860a -40242 -37193
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.3: Capitalization over Space with -15 % Change of the Land Availability Dummy
Variable No space Space No space Space Interaction Interaction
available available available available -15% -15%
-15% -15% -15% -15% (ExpAgg) (Categories)
(ExpAgg) (ExpAgg) (Categories) (Categories)
(32630) (49040) (33500) (48380) (67450) (71220)
Unemployment -4496.54c 1326.00 -3775.02 1416 -6019.45c -5767.074
(2638) (3979) (2575) (3831) (3270) (3139)
Foreigners 1213.170a -1575b 1199.846a -1541b 1039.377 1067.884
(421.100) (783.100) (409.700) (746.900) (781.600) (724)
Lakeview 35.543a 32.590a 35.597a 38.710a 35.068a 35.181a
(1.832) (11.410) (1.840) (11.220) (4.650) (4.682)
SWExposition 70676.454a 46290a 71638.522a 44570a 68945.384a 70427.342a
(6108) (12020) (5985) (10610) (13830) (13010)
DistCenter -5600.569a -7038a -5670.456a -7299a -5941.547a -5937.229a
(385.500) (605.300) (396) (662) (805.500) (816)
DistShop -17.029a -0.026 -17.946a -1.101 -11.249 -12.120c
(3.261) (3.855) (3.263) (3.888) (6.852) (6.720)
NO2Pollution -6545.546a -5193a -6511.754a -4833a -6586.229a -6497.936a
(597.300) (1566) (624.800) (1639) (1421) (1482)
YearFixedEffects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Community Clusters NO NO NO NO YES YES
Adj. R2 0.901 0.760 0.902 0.768 0.893 0.894
N 901 282 901 282 1183 1183
The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the average price of a comparable single family house for the respective
years 1998 to 2004 across 169 municipalities. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a indicates a significance level of below 1%; b indicates a significance level between 1% and 5%; c indicates significance
level between 5% and 10%.
Capitalization and the Supply Side Reaction 133
Table 4.4: Capitalization over Space with +15 % Change of the Land Availability Dummy
Variable No space Space No space Space Interaction Interaction
available available available available 15% 15%
15% 15% 15% 15% (ExpAgg) (Categories)
(ExpAgg) (ExpAgg) (Categories) (Categories)
Intercept 771800a 824100a 788547a 864300a 807304a 798481a
(83770) (75580) (85940) (77928) (142100) (135200)
TaxRate -1158.159a -769.500a -1122.194a -758.200a -1121.501b -915.862b
(257.546) (271.200) (252.898) (274.452) (530.100) (465.500)
Int(Tax * 402.099 -94.933c
DummyLandAvailable) (581.500) (50.430)
ExpAgg 132.250a 119.800a 111.380a
(19.280) (19.490) (26.130)
Int(ExpAgg * -19.884
DummyLandAvailable) (32.590)
ExpCulture 190.734a 171.800a 227.580b
(48.820) (49.943) (92.670)
Int(ExpCulture * -97.624
DummyLandAvailable) (129.400)
ExpSocial 52.646b 93.340a 72.881b
(23.030) (24.997) (36.210)
Int(ExpSocial * 28.066
DummyLandAvailable) (41.340)
ExpAdmin -4.661 -9.494 -8.048
(20.630) (10.743) (46.540)
Int(ExpAdmin * -31.979
DummyLandAvailable) (44.950)
ExpHealth 135.893a 133.600a 162.873a
(34.700) (33.645) (49.010)
Int(ExpHealth * -13.720
DummyLandAvailable) (56.390)
LandAvailable (Dummy) -67408.96 -6817.81
(77740) (22210)
DistSchool -19.160c -17.370b -13.736 -14.960b -20.618 -16.534
(10.010) (7.561) (9.990) (7.439) (15.850) (15.170)
ClassSize -3582a -3025a -3347.236a -2505b -3.955 -14.410
(1195) (1111) (1240) (1140.459) (1833) (1833)
NoSchoolComm 6762 -8700 7460.150 -8773c 3085.383 3610.933
(5232) (8215) (5134) (5187.352) (9856) (9714)
MedianIncome 7.273a 6.528a 6.779a 5.895a 7.056a 6.531a
(0.828) (0.781) (0.816) (0.819) (1.396) (1.404)
Density 0.168 42.440a 1.541 42.790a 7.037 8.450
(5.411) (12.140) (5.665) (12.060) (12.100) (12.900)
Elderly 7726a 2868a 7597.201a 2312a 5173.488a 4902.997a
(961) (880) (968.400) (850.871) (1471) (1501)
Commuters -29490 -128500a -18928 -12330a -45568 -46478
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Table 4.4: Capitalization over Space with +15 % Change of the Land Availability Dummy
Variable No space Space No space Space Interaction Interaction
available available available available 15% 15%
15% 15% 15% 15% (ExpAgg) (Categories)
(ExpAgg) (ExpAgg) (Categories) (Categories)
(44300) (33610) (45160) (35061) (66910) (68780)
Unemployment -6794.12b -5350.56c -5442.60 -4877.21c -6512.24b -5591.84c
(3444) (2808) (3345) (2695.08) (3204) (3131)
Foreigners 2282a -813.400 2283.877a -836.200 1206.670 1104.305
(542) (604.700) (518.100) (569.309) (768.600) (709.300)
Lakeview 33.190a 40.610a 32.632a 43.640a 34.586a 34.309a
(1.813) (5.923) (1.822) (6.185) (4.571) (4.550)
SWExposition 75880a 46850a 75018.593a 47370a 71814.700a 70253.186a
(8277) (8160) (8039) (8251.254) (14370) (13110)
DistCenter -4985a -6945a -4981.802a -7058a -5956.137a -5935.330a
(534.500) (477.200) (534.600) (492.125) (817.200) (791.500)
DistShop -20.360a -4.305 -22.364a -5.632c -12.025c -12.847c
(4.212) (3.063) (4.251) (3.135) (6.860) (6.847)
NO2Pollution -6563a -6367a -6479.163a -6202a -6615.432a -6571.660a
(669.700) (1100) (699.800) (1167.192) (1462) (1497)
YearFixedEffects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Community Clusters NO NO NO NO YES YES
Adj. R2 0.903 0.849 0.904 0.851 0.893 0.895
N 617 566 617 566 1183 1183
The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the average price of a comparable single family house for the respective
years 1998 to 2004 across 169 municipalities. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a indicates a significance level of below 1%; b indicates a significance level between 1% and 5%; c indicates significance
level between 5% and 10%.
We now turn to the results from the linear interaction model, presented in Table 4.5. The
base effect of taxes in column (1) is negative and significant while the base effect of ag-
gregate public expenditures is positive and significant. Their impacts in Swiss francs on
house prices are comparable to previous estimates. The interaction effect for taxes and the
standardized measure for available construction area has a positive sign but is insignificant.
The interaction effect for aggregate expenditures is negative and insignificant. Thus, capital-
ization of fiscal variables is not significantly different when more space for construction is
available for housing supply to react.
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Table 4.5: Capitalization over Space: Linear Interaction Model
OLS OLS IV IV
ExpAgg Categories ExpAgg Categories
Variable (1) Impact* (2) Impact* (3) Impact* (4) Impact*
in CHF in CHF in CHF in CHF
Intercept 781600a 826300a 764997a 864100a
(48990) (129800) (132100) (141200)
TaxRate -976.300a -1111.7 -961.100b -1094.4 -812.618a -925.3 -848.600a -966.3
(164.000) (431.300) (214.600) (283.800)
Int(Tax * 6.174 6.612 17.919 10.330
LandAvailable) (4.048) (12.640) (27.940) (24.390)
ExpAgg 123.300a 667.0 102.178a 553.0
(11.280) (31.050)
Int(ExpAgg * -0.343 -1.513
LandAvailable) (0.285) (1.788)
ExpCulture 168.100b 156.6 133.100a 124.0
(77.610) (30.790)
Int(ExpCulture * -2.145 -2.100
LandAvailable) (2.186) (7.338)
ExpSocial 82.150a 242.8 104.300a 308.2
(31.200) (37.880)
Int(ExpSocial * 0.342 2.231
LandAvailable) (0.984) (2.517)
ExpAdmin -0.636 -2.132
(28.850) (29.260)
Int(ExpAdmin * -1.314 -2.701
LandAvailable) (0.816) (3.414)
ExpHealth 182.500a 278.3 153.700b 234.3
(47.070) (61.860)
Int(ExpHealth * -2.055 -0.719
LandAvailable) (1.332) (4.414)
LandAvailable (standardized) -1150.02b -575.2 -704.600 -988.206 267.600
(515.151) (1706.12) (3122.02) (2861.03)
DistSchool -21.040a -181.9 -20.930 -18.948 -27.410c -237.0
(6.787) (14.790) (15.620) (15.940)
ClassSize -85.750 -92.090 -100.561 -67.180
(786.600) (1808.00) (1898.00) (1971.00)
NoSchoolComm 3208 -4104 -1059.391 2209
(3708) (9913) (10990) (10390)
MedianIncome 6.934a 3278.1 6.045a 2857.8 7.186a 3397.0 5.860a 2770.2
(0.449) (1.390) (1.417) (1.439)
Density 4.744 9.078 9.640 32.630c 195.0
(4.658) (13.850) (20.230) (19.220)
Elderly 5308a 667.7 4779a 601.1 4546.750a 571.9 4599a 578.4
(675.200) (1458) (1510) (1545)
Commuters -42460 -35490 -40659 -51860
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.5: Capitalization over Space: Linear Interaction Model (continued)
OLS OLS IV IV
ExpAgg Categories ExpAgg Categories
Variable (1) Impact* (2) Impact* (3) Impact* (4) Impact*
in CHF in CHF in CHF in CHF
(27250) (68960) (71070) (74610)
Unemployment -6017a -134.2 -4729 -5155.606 -2998
(2189) (3140) (3543) (3255)
Foreigners 1162.40a 153.9 1074.14 1373.150 673.400
(373.40) (763.900) (868.400) (873.400)
Lakeview 34.600a 125.3 34.910a 126.4 36.035a 130.5 35.140a 127.2
(1.864) (4.495) (4.690) (4.532)
SWExposition 69930a 299.5 73020a 312.7 72630a 311.1 75800a 324.6
(5251) (12990) (14510) (13840)
DistCenter -5906a -1583.2 -6152a -1649.2 -6004.977a -1609.7 -7081a -1898.1
(307) (817) (1055) (1058)
DistShop -12.090a -147.4 -13.030c -158.9 -11.370c -138.7 -10.450
(2.240) (6.811) (6.653) (6.554)
NO2Pollution -6575a -1168.2 -6688a -1188.2 -7110.985a -1263.4 -7774a -1381.2
(506.800) (1496) (1645) (1547)
YearFixedEffects YES YES YES YES
Community Clusters YES YES YES YES
Adj. R2 0.893 0.896 0.902 0.895
N 1183 1183 1183 1183
J-Test 0.458 0.122
F-Test (LandAvailable) 20.160 18.570
Instruments Center + Border + Center + Border +
AreaTraffic AreaTraffic
*Impact in CHF denotes the impact of a one percent increase of the mean of the respective independent variable on property prices.
The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the average price of a comparable single family house for the respective years 1998
to 2004 across 169 municipalities. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a indicates a significance level of below 1%; b indicates a significance level between 1% and 5%; c indicates significance level
between 5% and 10%.
In specification (2) higher taxes capitalize again negatively and significantly. Moreover,
aggregate expenditures are divided into different categories. Expenditures for culture, social
welfare and health have a positive and significant impact on house prices while administrative
expenditures capitalize negatively but insignificantly. All interaction effects are insignificant
and consequently no housing supply reactions can be found even though more space for
construction is available.
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So far, we only reported results from OLS estimations. However, such estimates could suffer
from a possible simultaneity bias.11 Available construction areas do not only depend on ge-
ography but also on political decisions by citizens. Even though available construction space
in the canton of Zurich only slightly changed over time, it is not necessarily exogenously
given but might be the result of fiscal preferences. It could be possible that high house prices
induce communities to either restrict the amount of land for construction in order to preserve
house values or to increase the amount of land for construction to make additional profits
by selling land. In either case additional land for construction could emerge endogenously.
This, of course, would leave our coefficient estimates for available land and the interaction
effects biased. To address this problem, we estimate 2SLS regressions in columns (3) and
(4). As instruments we use geographical variables which are independent of local political
decisions. The first instrument is whether the community is next to the cities of Zurich or
Winterthur and consequently forms part of the densely populated center. As a second instru-
ment we look if the community lies at the cantonal border where densities are lower and more
framing land might be rezoned and used for construction. Finally, we take the fraction of
traffic area as a measure for communal development as well as communal importance. This
measure is stable over time and is usually influenced only by cantonal decisions instead of
local decisions. All instruments do not have a directly discernible influence on house prices
and on fiscal variables when controlling for measures of density and distance to the center.
Specifications (3) and (4) show that the F-Test for the first stage and the variable "available
land" are highly significant concerning the quality of the instrument.12 The J-statistics which
deal with the overidentifying restrictions, do not point to problems with the instruments. The
coefficients of the fiscal variables and the interaction effects are similar to the OLS estimates.
Taxes capitalize negatively and significantly while aggregate expenditures as well as the dif-
ferent expenditure categories capitalize positively and significantly.13 The hypothesis that
housing supply reacts more when construction space is available can be rejected as none of
the interaction effects is statistically significant.
11Most recent articles on capitalization do not focus on endogeneity problems (Palmon and Smith, 1998b;
Brasington, 2001).
12F-Tests for the first stages of the interaction effects which are instrumented are also highly significant.
13An exception is capitalization of administrative expenditure which has a negative coefficient and is in-
significant.
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Table 4.6: Yearly Estimates for Testing for Decreasing Capitalization over Space
(Aggregate Expenditures)
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
ExpAgg ExpAgg ExpAgg ExpAgg ExpAgg ExpAgg ExpAgg
Intercept 684000a 751358a 759100a 708103a 769900a 719000a 824900a
(130200) (131800) (147600) (134400) (143700) (143300) (144700)
TaxRate -984.50b -1268.95a -916.60c -831.78c -937.30c -954.40c -1137.10b
(460.600) (440.600) (492.100) (440.900) (521.900) (504.500) (527)
Int(Tax * 10.330 5.131 14.080 11.795 7.907 2.970 1.926
LandAvailable) (12.420) (13.600) (13.280) (13.390) (16) (14.340) (15.600)
ExpAgg 84.810a 92.487a 72.220b 167.721a 164.300a 167.400a 132.800a
(31.040) (31.830) (35.850) (33.220) (29.270) (34.340) (35.090)
Int(ExpAgg * -0.071 -1.016 -0.573 -1.301 -0.264 -0.274 -0.124
LandAvailable) (0.773) (0.862) (0.967) (0.969) (0.911) (0.915) (0.822)
LandAvailable -1532 -1387.20 -2170 -2206.45 -1244 -754.100 -85.390
(Continous) (1535) (1699) (1655) (1804) (2038) (1760) (1834)
DistSchool -24.080 -28.702c -22.110 -20.300 -20.250 -16.730 -18.990
(15.510) (16.870) (16.860) (15.420) (16.480) (15.550) (15.880)
ClassSize -908.400 -2729 -910.300 -27.654 -3083 -839.500 -523.400
(2194) (2102) (2252) (2194) (2269) (2303) (2419)
NoSchoolComm -76.500 1499.468 -259.600 6135.988 5403 6553 2419
(11230) (11430) (11210) (10550) (9030) (9293) (9739)
MedianIncome 9.053a 7.455a 7.430a 6.586a 7.318a 6.633a 6.230a
(1.718) (1.652) (1.719) (1.622) (1.410) (1.317) (1.203)
Density 3.169 5.940 10.780 4.629 1.025 -0.304 9.321
(13.880) (14.030) (15.870) (14.240) (13.170) (13.900) (12.600)
Elderly 7162.10a 6927.48a 6494a 3511.88b 3087.23c 3291.15c 3909.45b
(1599) (1559) (1683) (1576) (1819) (1718) (1884)
Commuters -61300 -86221 -83490 -18766 -27740 -39900 -62040
(62220) (61220) (73180) (73640) (71120) (74780) (69680)
Unemployment 2027 -4427.30 6101 -10663.8 -7747 -9335 -16360b
(5231) (7547) (10620) (10200) (6298) (6940) (6469)
Foreigners 1098 1270.307 557.300 936.802 1217 1263 2169c
(916.100) (890) (920) (969.100) (1010) (1140) (1274)
Lakeview 36.030a 34.108a 33.410a 32.440a 32.830a 34.420a 34.120a
(5.122) (4.940) (5.165) (4.749) (4.814) (4.518) (4.357)
SWExposition 75510a 70471a 70640a 57719a 63290a 62930a 75200a
(13500) (14260) (14040) (14180) (14060) (14670) (14010)
DistCenter -6063a -6284.35a -6224a -5387.41a -5437a -5599a -6063a
(901.980) (784.450) (822.200) (895.102) (874.300) (894.500) (836.300)
DistShop -11.290 -10.338 -13.940c -12.254c -12.230c -11.170 -11.120
(7.003) (7.476) (7.215) (7.131) (7.209) (6.966) (6.744)
NO2Pollution -7979a -7657.70a -6515a -6468.90a -6212a -5725a -5835a
(1447) (1425) (1540) (1401) (1317) (1468) (1570)
Adj. R2 0.879 0.875 0.871 0.890 0.898 0.892 0.887
N 169 169 169 169 169 169 169
The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the average price of a single family house for the respective years
1998 to 2004 across 169 municipalities. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a indicates a significance level of below 1%; b indicates a significance level between 1% and 5%; c indicates sig-
nificance level between 5% and 10%.
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Table 4.7: Yearly Estimates for Testing for Decreasing Capitalization over Space (Disaggregate
Expenditures)
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Categories Categories Categories Categories Categories Categories Categories
Intercept 748900a 750087a 770892a 734400a 833600a 817400a 901400a
(143000) (137400) (156300) (139800) (151600) (147900) (141300)
TaxRate -989.60b -1167.27a -885.71c -834.12c -949.50c -927.95c -1175.02b
(488.600) (432.400) (525.200) (467.100) (500.600) (473.600) (466.700)
Int(Tax * 22.350 101.492 150.636 160 44.310 72.470 -96.250
LandAvailable) (88.840) (78.700) (92.920) (99.210) (121.600) (124.300) (125.700)
ExpCulture 150.100c 155.088c 168.179c 186.800b 140.600c 163.300c 110.300
(81.580) (83.800) (87.550) (86.560) (83.820) (86.090) (76.950)
Int(ExpCulture * -2.062 -3.218 -3.475 -1.242 -0.726 -2.953 -2.312
LandAvailable) (2.471) (2.759) (2.604) (2.706) (2.257) (2.470) (2.335)
ExpSocial 63.160c 74.833c 49.532c 111.400b 104b 88.920b 71.600b
(37.290) (40.350) (31.780) (45.750) (45.790) (44.670) (38.320)
Int(ExpSocial * -0.392 1.585 0.783 1.188 0.113 0.372 0.373
LandAvailable) (1.449) (1.396) (1.779) (1.710) (1.436) (1.200) (0.949)
ExpAdmin -62.370 -5.330 -20.866 -8.992 -4.038 -16.120 -9.178
(39.290) (34.410) (35.510) (36.570) (32.550) (28.250) (28.820)
Int(ExpAdmin * -1.344 -1.931 -1.137 -0.620 -1.086 -1.194 -2.495
LandAvailable) (1.037) (1.374) (1.136) (1.124) (0.853) (0.801) (2.921)
ExpHealth 137.500c 97.786c 88.379c 249.400a 308.300a 343.300a 337.500a
(70.300) (60.100) (54.840) (52.950) (73.580) (91.090) (113.600)
Int(ExpHealth * -1.269 -2.844 -1.204 -1.162 -1.508 -2.191 -3.739
LandAvailable) (2.712) (3.392) (2.962) (1.375) (2.427) (3.250) (3.271)
LandAvailable 335.600 309.004 830.855 2.374 131.600 162.600 665.500
(Continous) (581.300) (696.500) (738.900) (799.600) (793.900) (868.100) (911.600)
DistSchool -22.280 -24.728 -21.737 -17.880 -18.840 -13.650 -23.850
(15.260) (16.620) (16.430) (16.520) (15.600) (14.920) (15.250)
ClassSize -650 -2489 -713.158 -1128 -3257 -1361 -678.600
(2339) (2114) (2310) (2551) (2408) (2371) (2430)
NoSchoolComm 1727 1575.259 376.838 8426 8834 10720 3682
(11490) (11190) (11220) (9801) (8701) (8958) (9228)
MedianIncome 8.049a 6.963a 6.861a 6.178a 6.607a 5.137a 4.584a
(1.756) (1.656) (1.725) (1.652) (1.469) (1.448) (1.274)
Density 4.275 13.955 21.167 10.878 5.721 6.959 14.630
(15.740) (13.910) (16.370) (15.820) (14.570) (14.020) (11.400)
Elderly 7098.68a 5882.91a 5222.32a 2916.89c 2451.65 2652.45 3264.87c
(1641) (1464) (1579) (1507) (1811) (1741) (1836)
Commuters -31200 -60110 -65334 -48620 -62790 -77660 -75000
(63790) (66630) (80900) (88180) (77740) (75100) (69210)
Unemployment 278.600 -3044.35 7778.290 -8354 -5760 -7205 -15250b
(5348) (7965) (10220) (10400) (5827) (6298) (5896)
Foreigners 752.700 1001.098 216.090 617.700 1056 1014 2255c
(882.400) (858.700) (840.800) (893.100) (949.100) (1055) (1155)
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.7: Yearly Estimates for Testing for Decreasing Capitalization over Space (Disaggregate
Expenditures)
Variable 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Categories Categories Categories Categories Categories Categories Categories
Lakeview 36.850a 34.298a 34.078a 31.920a 31.940a 32.880a 33.240a
(5.460) (4.792) (5.188) (4.320) (4.778) (4.354) (4.009)
SWExposition 80440a 75061a 72749a 51220a 60050a 63680a 77260a
(13230) (13310) (13260) (13810) (13670) (13790) (13080)
DistCenter -6398a -6123.63a -6144.66a -5268a -5584a -6009a -6334a
(936.400) (793.200) (847.100) (841.400) (872.015) (948.026) (840.700)
DistShop -10.620 -9.691 -12.905c -12.900c -12.520c -13.130c -11.130c
(6.715) (7.425) (7.199) (7.369) (7.226) (6.673) (6.394)
NO2Pollution -8158a -7477.22a -6526.56a -6502a -5942a -5655a -5660a
(1470) (1432) (1557) (1367) (1354) (1568) (1582)
Adj. R2 0.879 0.877 0.871 0.890 0.898 0.895 0.894
N 169 169 169 169 169 169 169
The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the average price of a comparable single family house for the respective years 1998
to 2004 across 169 municipalities. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a indicates a significance level of below 1%; b indicates a significance level between 1% and 5%; c indicates significance level
between 5% and 10%.
To ensure that these results do not only depend on a specific time frame chosen, we inves-
tigate the relationships for each year individually. The respective specifications (1) and (2)
of Table 4.5 are estimated separately for the 1998-2004 period in Tables 4.6 and 4.7. The
base effects for taxes remain negative and significant. Public expenditures usually have a
positive and significant influence. None of the interaction terms with available land for con-
struction and fiscal variables ever turns significant. Thus, housing supply does not influence
capitalization of fiscal variables when more construction area is available.
4.2 The Dynamic of Capitalization
In the previous section, we find no empirical evidence of a decrease in capitalization as land
supply elasticity rises. Contrary to the outcome of similar American studies (Brasington,
2002; Hilber and Mayer, 2009), capitalization of fiscal variables seems to persist across
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space in the Zurich metropolitan area. This suggests that supply side is not effective or that
land and housing developers do not necessarily react to local fiscal differentials. However,
this result focuses on cross-sectional differences in land availability between communities.
In this section, we show that the theoretical criticism made to Oates (1969) implies that sup-
ply side reaction can take much time to be effective. Thus, we should explore capitalization
as a dynamic process. Taking advantage of our panel data set from the Canton of Zurich we
test whether capitalization decreases over the 1998-2004 period, indicating some housing
supply reaction over time.
4.2.1 Some Theoretical Considerations
Finding no reaction of fiscal capitalization to differences in housing supply conditions across
space seems to give empirical support against the argument that supply side reaction in
the housing market completely eliminates capitalization. However, in its criticism of the
Oates’s reasoning about the Tiebout hypothesis and capitalization, the no-capitalization fac-
tion stresses the importance of the timing for the achievement of supply reaction.
For example, Edel and Sclar (1974) argue that Oates’s single period cross-section hedonic
regression is inappropriate to characterize the impact of local fiscal variables on property val-
ues. More precisely, capitalization occurs simply because supply is not in long-run equilib-
rium. As a consequence, capitalization regressions have to be performed over a long period
of time in order to allow housing supply to react effectively. Edel and Sclar (1974) estimate
the change in tax and school expenditures capitalization rates in five separate regressions
over several decades for the Boston area. They find that the degree of capitalization de-
creases over time, as housing supply approaches long-run equilibrium. This result indicates
that housing supply does not adjust instantaneously to fiscal differences and that the de-
crease of fiscal capitalization needs a minimum period of time to hold effectively. Similarly,
the flexibility of the American community numbers and boundaries stressed by Henderson
(1985) becomes effective only after several decades.
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Therefore observing capitalization persistence across space in our data set is not surprising.
First, it means that the sample period is too short to allow supply reaction to completely
eliminate capitalization. Second, in the previous section we focus on the cross-sectional
differences in land supply elasticity between communities. However, the existence of cap-
italization at a given point in time does not rule out supply side reaction and a decreasing
pattern of capitalization, as cross-section regression gives only a snapshot of the situation.
Fortunately, the panel structure of our data set allows us to study the change of fiscal capital-
ization over time. In particular, if housing supply reacts during the sample period, we should
observe a decrease in capitalization rates over time, as argued by Edel and Sclar (1974) and
Henderson (1985). In contrast, if housing supply reaction does not react during the sample
period, we should observe capitalization persistence over time.
The impact of capitalization over time is theoretically ambiguous. As opposed to Edel and
Sclar (1974) and Henderson (1985), Yinger (1981, 1982) sets up an elaborated model in
which capitalization is a feature of the long-run equilibrium. He argues that as land develop-
ers create new communities that are under-supplied or housing suppliers build new houses
in scarce communities, land becomes scarcer and prices rise. Inevitably, there is a moment
where the opportunity cost of converting land from non-residential to residential use be-
comes so important that it is no longer profitable for land developers to supply new houses
or create new communities. Yinger (1981, 1982) concludes that jurisdictions with desirable
tax/public service packages will devour others and capitalization will disappear only if juris-
diction boundaries are flexible. If this is not the case, then all remaining variation in local
fiscal variables will be capitalized into house values and capitalization occurs even in the
long-run.
There are two visions on the persistence of capitalization over time. Thus this question has
to be answered empirically. The next section presents the empirical setting used to test if
there is a change of capitalization rates over time.
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4.2.2 Data and Empirical Strategy
Our first approach is a linear interaction model. In a fist step, we use the panel structure of
our dataset from 1998 to 2004 and all fiscal variables are interacted with year dummies. The
base year is 1998. Our empirical model for yearly interactions has the following form:
Vit = β1+β2(TaxRate)it +β3(TaxRate)it(1999)i+ ...+β8(TaxRate)it(2004)i
+β9(ExpAgg)it +β10(ExpAgg)it(1999)i+ ...+β15(ExpAgg)it(2004)i+(4.18)
+βX+ εi
where Vit is the price of the standardized house in community i at period t, and X represents
a matrix of covariates including the trend and β the corresponding vector.
We also perform a second model that interacts a time trend variable with fiscal variables:14
Vit = δ1+δ2(TaxRate)it +δ3(TaxRate)it(TimeTrend)i
+δ4(ExpAgg)it +δ5(ExpAgg)it(TimeTrend)i+ (4.19)
+βX+ εi
The coefficient of any fiscal variable that is not interacted with a year dummy represents the
capitalization effect for the base year. All interaction terms have to be interpreted relative to
1998. Thus, they represent changes between the year in question and the base year. The sum
of the base year’s coefficient (for example β2 or δ4 ) and the coefficient of the interaction term
(for example β3 or δ5) yields the capitalization of the given variable for the respective year:15
Changes in capitalization rates over time are therefore represented by significant interaction
terms. If capitalization is decreasing over time, we should observe significant interaction
terms starting with a certain year and persisting over time. The sign should be the opposite
of the base year’s coefficient. Note that this procedure estimates the longitudinal changes
14The time trend vector equals 0 for observations of the year 1998, 1 for observations of the year 1999, etc.
and 6 for observations of the year 2004.
15For the linear time trend specifications, the respective coefficients have to be multiplied by the trend to find
the impact for the year.
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in the slope of taxes and public expenditures.16 We perform this estimation strategy for tax
rates and aggregate fiscal expenditures as well as for disaggregate expenditure categories.
For our second approach, we run separate regressions for all seven years of our panel data
set with the same control variables in each regression. For each year, we take the coeffi-
cients and the robust standard errors of the models separately. If there is either an increasing
or decreasing linear trend in the coefficient, we can test this for this trend by calculating a
Spearman correlation for each coefficient using the seven different observations of the re-
spective coefficient over the years. Clearly the limited number of observations might be a
problem in this case. As it is generally known for asymptotic theory, the coefficients follow
for a large number of observations a normal distribution with the expectation equaling the
regression’s coefficient and the standard deviation equaling the regression’s standard error
(Greene, 2003). A straightforward approach is therefore to bootstrap the coefficients of each
year and calculate separate bootstrapped Spearman correlations for all fiscal variables.17
This allows us to identify linear trends in the coefficients and take account of possible small
sample bias.
The data used to estimate equations (4.18) and (4.19) are identical to those used in chapter
2 and can thus be found in Table 3.3. The only new variables included are time dummies
interacted with local fiscal variables.
4.2.3 Estimation Results and Robustness Tests
Year Dummies Results
As mentioned above, Oates (1969) estimations were criticized by Edel and Sclar (1974)
and Henderson (1985) and a number of other authors who argued that capitalization rates
should change over time because of supply side reactions. More precisely, the coefficients
16The coefficient of the interaction terms represents increases or decreases in capitalization of contempora-
neous variables with respect to the base year.
17For a detailed overview of bootstrap theory and applications, see Davison and Hinkley (1997).
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for capitalization of fiscal variables should decrease in absolute values as housing suppliers
react to rent differentials and develop more housing projects in areas with favorable fiscal
packages. The results are presented in Table 4.8. In specifications (2) and (3) we have the
possibility to test this hypothesis for a panel of seven years by using interaction effects for
all fiscal variables.
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Table 4.8: House Values and Capitalization: Testing for Decreasing Capitalization
Specification Specification Specification Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coefficient Impact Coefficient Impact Coefficient Impact Coefficient Impact
in CHF in CHF in CHF in CHF
(Intercept) 657255a 676746a 725699a 769739a
(-45707) (-46339) (-67552) (-64984)
TaxRate -762.006a -867.70 -702.443a -799.80 -1228.23a -1398.50 -1343.66a -1530.00
(197.959) (188.100) (429.460) (401.615)
Int.TaxRate.1999 204.348 194.409
(558.342) (523.491)
Int.TaxRate.2000 364.769 367.678
(534.633) (520.742)
Int.TaxRate.2001 624.584 898.842c 1023.50
(522.998) (494.361)
Int.TaxRate.2002 550.164 816.201
(531.098) (509.762)
Int.TaxRate.2003 688.196 1043.83b 1188.60
(542.033) (506.755)
Int.TaxRate.2004 751.605 882.973c 1005.40
(529.595) (512.927)
ExpCulture 208.692a 194.40 237.696a 221.50
(33.863) (84.010)
Int.ExpCulture.1999 15.917
(117.186)
Int.ExpCulture.2000 -17.330
(123.646)
Int.ExpCulture.2001 -52.120
(112.395)
Int.ExpCulture.2002 -68.148
(114.724)
Int.ExpCulture.2003 -63.864
(119.127)
Int.ExpCulture.2004 -57.084
(115.319)
ExpSocial 112.482a 332.40 77.558b 229.20
(15.376) (34.939)
Int.ExpSocial.1999 36.744
(44.950)
Int.ExpSocial.2000 30.688
(46.078)
Int.ExpSocial.2001 28.133
(44.159)
Int.ExpSocial.2002 40.520
(43.160)
Int.ExpSocial.2003 40.946
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.8: House Values and Capitalization: Testing for Decreasing Capitalization (continued)
Specification Specification Specification Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coefficient Impact Coefficient Impact Coefficient Impact Coefficient Impact
in CHF in CHF in CHF in CHF
(40.627)
Int.ExpSocial.2004 42.539
(39.780)
ExpAdmin -24.257b -91.00 -58.443c -219.30
(10.546) (31.645)
Int.ExpAdmin.1999 48.506
(43.224)
Int.ExpAdmin.2000 44.076
(39.859)
Int.ExpAdmin.2001 39.277
(37.077)
Int.ExpAdmin.2002 36.894
(39.466)
Int.ExpAdmin.2003 13.246
(41.787)
Int.ExpAdmin.2004 38.137
(44.881)
ExpHealth 155.499a 237.10 156.220b 238.20
(28.507) (68.447)
Int.ExpHealth.1999 -155.159
(115.365)
Int.ExpHealth.2000 -78.895
(96.177)
Int.ExpHealth.2001 22.078
(84.306)
Int.ExpHealth.2002 82.486
(88.776)
Int.ExpHealth.2003 98.200
(98.007)
Int.ExpHealth.2004 98.167
(102.853)
ExpAgg 59.739a 547.50 38.347c 351.40
(9.723) (19.780)
Int.ExpAgg.1999 11.546
(28.131)
Int.ExpAgg.2000 7.600
(28.132)
Int.ExpAgg.2001 13.827
(28.274)
Int.ExpAgg.2002 36.398
(26.110)
Int.ExpAgg.2003 30.445
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.8: House Values and Capitalization: Testing for Decreasing Capitalization (continued)
Specification Specification Specification Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coefficient Impact Coefficient Impact Coefficient Impact Coefficient Impact
in CHF in CHF in CHF in CHF
(27.716)
Int.ExpAgg.2004 37.690
(25.948)
ClassSize -442.406 -292.772 -449.018 -347.877c -70.20
(316.145) (205.876) (318.075) (208.239)
Elderly 6513.83a 819.30 5062.13a 636.70 6601.45a 830.30 4996.82a 628.50
(718.18) (707.94) (706.053) (683.393)
Density 32.537a 194.50 14.171a 84.70 32.538a 194.50 13.534a 80.90
(4.278) (4.710) (4.257) (4.634)
MedianIncome 6.921a 3271.90 7.047a 3331.30 6.970a 3295.00 6.984a 3301.60
(0.466) (0.506) (0.474) (0.516)
Lakeview 36.035a 130.50 35.645a 129.10 35.856a 129.80 34.822a 126.10
(1.982) (1.952) (1.965) (1.932)
AccessFasttrain -6457.01a -1730.90 -6214.42a -1665.80 -6426.41a -1722.70 -6084.29a -1630.90
(295.645) (313.952) (292.922) (318.073)
NO2Pollution -5497.46a -976.70 -6294.34a -1118.30 -5497.40a -976.70 -6178.03a -1097.60
(580.718) (591.583) (576.638) (588.295)
SWExposition 65065a 278.70 64983a 278.30 64613a 276.70 63528a 272.10
(5699.53) (5451.85) (5686.99) -5407
Adj R2 0.873 0.887 0.873 0.8863
N 1183 (169) 1183 (169) 1183 (169) 1183 (169)
*Impact in CHF denotes the impact of a one percent increase of the mean of the respective independent variable on property prices.
The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the average price of a comparable single family house for the respective years 1998
to 2004 across 169 municipalities. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a indicates a significance level of below 1%; b indicates a significance level between 1% and 5%; c indicates significance level
between 5% and 10%.
Specification (3) does not distinguish between different expenditure categories but simply
uses aggregate expenditures. If capitalization rates of fiscal variables change over time, as
proposed by Edel and Sclar (1974) and Henderson (1985) then the interaction terms should
reflect these changes. For income tax rates we find positive interaction terms. For the base
year 1998 the effect of an increase in tax rates is negative. This negative effect is reduced (in
absolute values) over the years by the positive interaction terms but none of them is signifi-
cant. For example, in 2003 the total effect of an increase in tax rates is the absolute coefficient
of the base year 1998 minus the coefficient for the year 2003. Still, as no interaction term
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is significant the hypothesis of no changes in capitalization rates and therefore no reaction
of the supply side cannot be rejected. Looking at the possible changes in the capitalization
of public expenditures we find a positive effect of aggregate fiscal expenditures in base year
1998. The coefficients of the interaction terms are positive but insignificant. A positive inter-
action term indicates that capitalization becomes more important over time and supply side
adjustments do not seem to take place.
Looking in more detail at expenditures allows us to distinguish changes in capitalization
rates for different categories. In column (4) we interact the income tax rate and all four
expenditure variables with year dummies. Again, for the base year we find a negative and
significant capitalization effect of the income tax rate. Its impact is -1500 Swiss francs. In
this setting we find that there are positive interaction terms for the years 2001, 2003 and
2004. The impact of the income tax rate consequently decreases over time. Analyzing
different expenditure categories such an effect cannot be found. However, expenditures for
cultural activities seem to decline in their capitalization effect. Still the opposite is true for
expenditures on social well-being and health but not at a significant level. Finally, it seems
that there are no systematic supply side reactions to rent differentials which can be explained
by the inelasticity of the supply curve.
In order to further analyze the possibility of a supply side adjustment, we perform a number
of robustness tests in Tables 4.9 and 4.10.
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Table 4.9: Robustness-Tests for Interaction Model
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WLS pop WLS pop OLS controls OLS controls OLS commuter OLS commuter
(Intercept) 716370a 746312a 662752a 741738a 746772a 781431a
(66378) (64398) (67688) (65270) (69313) (68537)
TaxRate -1222.78a -1320.91a -1072.39a -1170.27a -1117.32a -1199.53a
(416.215) (391.118) (413.531) (401.846) (409.889) (402.412)
Int.TaxRate.1999 208.440 210.484 119.357 83.366 132.558 87.801
(543.908) (509.471) (531.347) (522.862) (527.347) (523.128)
Int.TaxRate.2000 397.858 395.811 341.697 303.420 365.709 310.954
(519.872) (506.680) (508.289) (521.306) (502.647) (520.139)
Int.TaxRate.2001 686.546 914.515c 581.213 788.050 622.814 810.871
(504.021) (476.997) (490.619) (494.225) (486.375) (493.624)
Int.TaxRate.2002 619.089 824.764c 440.555 622.334 506.811 663.409
(511.533) (495.316) (495.872) (507.587) (491.401) (506.639)
Int.TaxRate.2003 763.006 1061.501b 584.484 856.255c 654.028 899.881c
(521.575) (494.110) (512.181) (513.329) (507.755) (511.447)
Int.TaxRate.2004 828.543 935.c 665.808 717.812 731.672 770.874
(510.648) (500.600) (497.107) (514.390) (496.854) (515.059)
ExpCulture 228.781a 227.210a 215.700b
(83.778) (83.288) (83.879)
Int.ExpCulture.1999 20.563 -0.777 -1.724
(114.931) (117.446) (118.289)
Int.ExpCulture.2000 -17.186 -20.172 -20.117
(121.154) (124.996) (125.711)
Int.ExpCulture.2001 -55.643 -55.384 -55.836
(110.954) (113.089) (113.684)
Int.ExpCulture.2002 -61.551 -83.832 -84.648
(113.640) (115.553) (116.078)
Int.ExpCulture.2003 -55.851 -51.072 -53.539
(119.466) (120.480) (121.390)
Int.ExpCulture.2004 -41.921 -56.234 -55.392
(115.463) (116.106) (116.874)
ExpSocial 80.349b 75.805b 69.442b
(34.821) (34.255) (34.281)
Int.ExpSocial.1999 36.118 29.392 29.818
(43.993) (44.252) (44.062)
Int.ExpSocial.2000 31.589 12.211 12.670
(45.670) (45.305) (45.018)
Int.ExpSocial.2001 30.343 13.721 13.675
(44.063) (43.727) (43.369)
Int.ExpSocial.2002 44.640 36.415 37.220
(42.509) (42.314) (42.086)
Int.ExpSocial.2003 44.985 47.092 47.239
(40.250) (39.947) (39.736)
Int.ExpSocial.2004 45.565 48.729 49.109
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.9: Robustness-Tests for Interaction Model (continued)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WLS pop WLS pop OLS controls OLS controls OLS commuter OLS commuter
(39.581) (38.754) (38.529)
ExpAdmin -53.256c -48.031 -44.612
(32.065) (30.478) (31.043)
Int.ExpAdmin.1999 51.107 48.100 46.889
(44.055) (41.750) (42.281)
Int.ExpAdmin.2000 44.682 50.185 50.004
(41.410) (38.255) (38.698)
Int.ExpAdmin.2001 37.017 43.939 42.650
(37.907) (35.364) (35.950)
Int.ExpAdmin.2002 38.807 41.798 41.363
(40.278) (37.408) (38.014)
Int.ExpAdmin.2003 13.095 18.903 17.728
(42.360) (39.301) (39.912)
Int.ExpAdmin.2004 41.038 44.393 42.480
(45.325) (41.713) (42.232)
ExpHealth 152.499b 160.367b 161.506b
(70.093) (68.585) (68.330)
Int.ExpHealth.1999 -164.818 -142.031 -135.649
(115.281) (114.395) (114.215)
Int.ExpHealth.2000 -79.273 -63.906 -64.387
(96.334) (94.825) (94.534)
Int.ExpHealth.2001 23.015 15.063 17.122
(84.543) (83.492) (83.408)
Int.ExpHealth.2002 71.636 63.854 67.465
(89.623) (88.613) (88.191)
Int.ExpHealth.2003 83.718 69.342 75.695
(97.798) (96.271) (95.902)
Int.ExpHealth.2004 81.385 66.735 73.143
(101.774) (101.401) (100.519)
ExpAgg 44.185b 44.686b 41.483b
(19.142) (19.205) (19.433)
Int.ExpAgg.1999 10.881 5.348 6.097
(27.289) (27.960) (27.895)
Int.ExpAgg.2000 9.454 0.417 1.443
(27.392) (27.222) (27.105)
Int.ExpAgg.2001 16.988 9.083 11.262
(26.825) (26.427) (26.300)
Int.ExpAgg.2002 38.988 30.247 32.714
(25.008) (24.898) (24.881)
Int.ExpAgg.2003 33.354 31.585 33.343
(26.363) (26.615) (26.529)
Int.ExpAgg.2004 40.428 36.504 37.552
(24.846) (25.123) (25.382)
ClassSize -417.960 -335.756c -352.881 -322.019c -390.358 -342.541c
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.9: Robustness-Tests for Interaction Model (continued)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WLS pop WLS pop OLS controls OLS controls OLS commuter OLS commuter
(296.236) (198.648) (244.508) (187.980) (238.291) (189.604)
NoSchool 1460.84 3007.05 -962.37 2069.12 -754.82 2075.89
Community (4052.55) (3902.85) (4127.61) (4015.61) (4089.31) (4004.67)
Elderly 7050.57a 5619.62a 7171.72a 5337.58a 6216.55a 4946.89a
(700.851) (688.095) (675.971) (688.475) (689.383) (701.025)
Density 30.028a 13.374a 20.597a 10.898b 24.511a 13.235a
(4.089) (4.521) (4.289) (4.633) (4.476) (4.927)
MedianIncome 7.144a 7.308a 7.598a 7.091a 7.964a 7.269a
(0.481) (0.528) (0.521) (0.537) (0.550) (0.555)
Lakeview 35.243a 34.138a 36.879a 35.337a 35.565a 34.698a
(1.874) (1.872) (1.842) (1.888) (1.816) (1.868)
DistCenter -6403.54a -5981.87a -5595.97a -5723.30a -5775.00a -5807.34a
(300.262) (325.577) (325.634) (342.516) (319.376) (342.572)
NO2Pollution -5857.69a -6447.12a -6139.32a -6328.92a -6039.98a -6246.79a
(557.637) (580.625) (557.731) (572.450) (569.548) (574.353)
SWExposition 66151.39a 65445.86a 65931.95a 63949.70a 66494.79a 64147.59a
(5698.69) (5430.85) (5558.49) (5384.18) (5464.30) (5326.62)
DebtRepay -5747.01a -4381.312a -6656.18a -4830.45a
(1804.54) (1499.82) (1853.62) (1507.61)
Unemployment -7499.97a -6981.76a -6642.30a -6557.45a
(2373.55) (2276.19) (2396.67) (2304.94)
Foreigners 2666.90a 1448.58a 2114.14a 1262.26a
(364.583) (360.715) (375.733) (356.651)
Commuters -108038a -53539c
(29408) (30303)
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj R2 0.879 0.891 0.886 0.889 0.888 0.889
N 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183
169 169 169 169 169 169
The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the average price of a comparable single family house for the respective years 1998
to 2004 across 169 municipalities. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a indicates a significance level of below 1%; b indicates a significance level between 1% and 5%; c indicates significance level
between 5% and 10%.
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Table 4.10: Robustness-Tests for Interaction Model (continued)
Variable (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
WLS commuter WLS commuter OLS log OLS log 2SLS 2SLS
(Intercept) 707440a 736320a 1.36E+01a 1.36E+01a 651229a 877902a
(65964) (64102) (7.68E-02) (7.37E-02) (63107) (132355)
TaxRate -1194.68a -1296.14a -1.15E-03b -1.29E-03a -905.26b -2001.86b
(411.887) (387.584) (4.82E-04) (4.48E-04) (446.641) (920.381)
Int.TaxRate.1999 205.299 210.391 5.14E-05 7.38E-05 -414.144 286.255
(539.254) (505.881) (6.27E-04) (5.93E-04) (733.109) (1293.649)
Int.TaxRate.2000 399.324 403.923 2.12E-04 2.48E-04 -505.084 173.673
(515.647) (502.763) (6.00E-04) (5.90E-04) (732.941) (1277.440)
Int.TaxRate.2001 688.313 915.721c 5.44E-04 8.95E-04 -258.309 -21.532
(498.987) (472.718) (5.87E-04) (5.61E-04) (732.050) (1261.442)
Int.TaxRate.2002 625.301 825.598c 7.50E-04 1.06E-03c -571.853 -305.507
(506.595) (491.703) (5.89E-04) (5.61E-04) (731.076) (1269.60)
Int.TaxRate.2003 774.821 1063.108b 8.41E-04 1.23E-03b -307.606 -223.024
(516.113) (491.054) (6.04E-04) (5.66E-04) (740.506) (1250.50)
Int.TaxRate.2004 841.355c 944.867c 9.60E-04 1.08E-03c -309.328 -6.821
(504.889) (497.019) (5.88E-04) (5.72E-04) (749.211) (1222.47)
ExpCulture 227.131a 2.19E-04b 243.713
(83.748) (9.12E-05) (446.114)
Int.ExpCulture.1999 21.802 3.08E-05 1.740
(114.695) (1.28E-04) (630.373)
Int.ExpCulture.2000 -14.795 -1.88E-05 11.785
(120.431) (1.37E-04) (614.234)
Int.ExpCulture.2001 -55.438 -5.87E-05 -27.315
(110.526) (1.23E-04) (611.755)
Int.ExpCulture.2002 -60.367 -9.19E-05 -22.080
(113.441) (1.21E-04) (622.705)
Int.ExpCulture.2003 -53.127 -9.90E-05 -25.041
(119.555) (1.23E-04) (616.642)
Int.ExpCulture.2004 -38.842 -1.02E-04 -82.032
(115.302) (1.20E-04) (618.660)
ExpSocial 81.765b 9.07E-05b 46.102
(34.806) (4.31E-05) (123.842)
Int.ExpSocial.1999 35.787 4.91E-05 22.020
(43.987) (5.41E-05) (173.193)
Int.ExpSocial.2000 30.988 4.18E-05 36.536
(45.610) (5.37E-05) (171.674)
Int.ExpSocial.2001 30.115 3.25E-05 77.982
(44.063) (5.11E-05) (172.326)
Int.ExpSocial.2002 44.823 4.15E-05 110.670
(42.476) (5.07E-05) (175.708)
Int.ExpSocial.2003 45.561 3.51E-05 134.738
(40.235) (4.78E-05) (175.798)
Int.ExpSocial.2004 45.572 3.97E-05 167.106
(continued on next page)
154 Persistence of Capitalization
Table 4.10: Robustness-Tests for Interaction Model (continued)
Variable (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
WLS commuter WLS commuter OLS log OLS log 2SLS 2SLS
(39.590) (4.66E-05) (176.228)
ExpAdmin -50.626 -1.01E-04b -209.942b
(31.930) (3.95E-05) (93.766)
Int.ExpAdmin.1999 51.426 5.50E-05 22.521
(43.940) (5.25E-05) (132.980)
Int.ExpAdmin.2000 44.226 5.37E-05 36.247
(41.371) (4.84E-05) (133.813)
Int.ExpAdmin.2001 36.143 5.49E-05 74.761
(37.441) (4.73E-05) (133.233)
Int.ExpAdmin.2002 38.810 4.48E-05 89.857
(39.852) (4.87E-05) (136.458)
Int.ExpAdmin.2003 13.623 1.85E-05 108.897
(41.807) (5.20E-05) (136.344)
Int.ExpAdmin.2004 41.803 3.67E-05 132.498
(44.878) (5.37E-05) (136.128)
ExpHealth 153.254b 1.56E-04b -416.571
(70.265) (7.54E-05) (378.265)
Int.ExpHealth.1999 -166.432 -1.53E-04 -20.642
(115.165) (1.28E-04) (546.869)
Int.ExpHealth.2000 -77.803 -9.15E-05 -70.571
(96.500) (1.13E-04) (532.345)
Int.ExpHealth.2001 23.517 4.14E-05 -146.496
(84.441) (9.45E-05) (522.169)
Int.ExpHealth.2002 69.598 9.18E-05 -211.697
(89.726) (9.60E-05) (508.249)
Int.ExpHealth.2003 79.674 1.07E-04 -280.234
(97.682) (1.07E-04) (492.302)
Int.ExpHealth.2004 78.083 1.17E-04 -264.519
(101.497) (1.12E-04) (479.570)
ExpAgg 46.213b 2.31E-05 67.423a
(19.017) (2.25E-05) (10.285)
Int.FinExpAgg.1999 10.551 1.94E-05 -47.626
(27.187) (3.07E-05) (33.468)
Int.FinExpAgg.2000 9.365 1.08E-05 -51.497
(27.327) (3.07E-05) (33.853)
Int.FinExpAgg.2001 16.804 1.92E-05 -51.575
(26.669) (3.02E-05) (33.644)
Int.FinExpAgg.2002 38.693 3.57E-05 -41.980
(24.880) (2.78E-05) (31.254)
Int.FinExpAgg.2003 33.405 2.55E-05 -36.611
(26.200) (2.96E-05) (31.280)
Int.FinExpAgg.2004 40.495 3.36E-05 -31.942
(24.677) (2.72E-05) (31.801)
ClassSize -411.588 -333.018c -6.17E-04 -4.70E-04c -430.620 49.182
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Table 4.10: Robustness-Tests for Interaction Model (continued)
Variable (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
WLS commuter WLS commuter OLS log OLS log 2SLS 2SLS
(290.661) (195.883) (4.12E-04) (2.76E-04) (322.884) (82.130)
NoSchool 1452.40 3037.57 -2.09E-03 -2.19E-04 467.60 269.863
Community (4052.61) (3903.79) (4.59E-03) (4.37E-03) (4170.98) (3950.09)
Elderly 7106.28a 5691.30a 5.28E-03a 3.64E-03a 5812.96a 9018.23a
(697.393) (684.858) (7.73E-04) (7.68E-04) (828.543) (771.741)
Density 29.448a 13.111a 4.21E-05a 1.71E-05a 33.204a 15.433a
(4.075) (4.498) (4.81E-06) (5.05E-06) (4.590) (5.047)
MedianIncome 7.221a 7.395a 7.45E-06a 7.79E-06a 7.391a 8.332a
(0.483) (0.531) (5.21E-07) (5.68E-07) (0.410) (0.417)
Lakeview 35.267a 34.161a 4.35E-05a 4.20E-05a 37.320a 33.464a
(1.877) (1.874) (2.23E-06) (2.13E-06) (1.992) (1.846)
DistCenter -6358.47a -5927.26a -8.65E-03a -8.16E-03a -6414.83a -6251.08a
(301.800) (327.102) (3.29E-04) (3.63E-04) (313.229) (265.825)
NO2Pollution -5873.26a -6430.198a -5.98E-03a -6.81E-03a -5552.44a -6052.68a
(556.425) (580.688) (6.59E-04) (6.59E-04) (573.101) (604.155)
SWExposition 65260.02a 64646.63a 8.30E-02a 8.04E-02a 66852.03a 67769.09a
(5686.68) (5429.58) (6.65E-03) (6.32E-03) (5814.62) (5401.24)
Time Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Adj R2 0.879 0.8903 0.8684 0.884 0.872 0.879
N 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183 1183
169 169 169 169 169 169
The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the average price of a comparable single family house for the respective years 1998
to 2004 across 169 municipalities. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a indicates a significance level of below 1%; b indicates a significance level between 1% and 5%; c indicates significance level
between 5% and 10%.
In specifications (1) and (2), we weight the OLS estimates by the logarithmic population of
the communities. This is done in order to ensure that the results are not only driven by a num-
ber of small communities. In column (1) no significant interaction term can be identified.
Though the base effect for taxes is negative and the interaction terms are positive, a system-
atic supply adjustment to tax rate differences cannot be found. As in the baseline results the
effect of aggregate expenditures is positive and again the interaction terms are positive but
insignificant. In column (2) we find similar results as in specification (4) of Table 4.8. The
base effect of income taxes is negative and significant whereas the base effect of the differ-
ent expenditure categories is positive and significant except for administrative expenditures
which seem to represent a burden. Concerning the interaction terms, only those of the tax
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rate for the years 2001 to 2004 are significant. Minor supply side adjustments might there-
fore occur in larger communities as far as tax differentials are considered. It is interesting
to note that expenditures do not change their capitalization coefficients significantly and that
the signs of the interaction terms indicate a larger capitalization.
In columns (3) and (4), we include two additional controls. The first one represents the the-
oretical number of years it takes to a community to fully pay back its current debts using its
tax revenue. Clearly, we expect a negative sign for this variable as longer debt repayment
periods make future tax increases more likely. Additionally, we include the communal unem-
ployment rate as a variable which represents further demographic characteristics. The sign
of the unemployment rate is negative and significant as expected. Concerning the interaction
terms for income taxes and aggregate expenditures, we note that the overall picture does not
change. Income taxes capitalize negatively in the base year and the interaction terms are
negative but not significant. Aggregate expenditures capitalize positively in the base year.
The interaction terms indicate higher capitalization over the seven years of this analysis.
However, the effects are not significant. In specification (4), we consider disaggregate ex-
penditures. Again, only minor changes can be identified. Neither the interaction terms for
the income tax rate nor the interaction terms for the disaggregate expenditure categories are
significant. Moreover, expenditures for administration do not capitalize significantly but the
sign of the coefficient in the base year remains negative.
Individuals mobility plays a central role for capitalization. In order to control for mobil-
ity issues, we include in specifications (5) and (6) the fraction of commuters who leave the
community to work in the city. Clearly, we expect a negative sign for this coefficient as
commuting imposes costs on individuals. The influence of this additional control on the cap-
italization coefficients for taxes and expenditures is minor. In column (5) we find that income
taxes capitalize negatively in 1998 and all interaction terms are positive but insignificant. For
aggregate expenditures we find a positive capitalization coefficient with positive interaction
terms. Disaggregate expenditure estimates lead to almost completely the same coefficients
as in column (4). Falling absolute capitalization rates can be rejected on the basis of this
data.
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In specifications (7) and (8), we perform additional tests concerning mobility issues. We use
the logarithmic total number of outgoing commuters as weights for our estimates. The sign
for the income tax rate in 1998 is negative in column (7), the other interaction terms being
positive. Only the interaction term for the year 2004 is significant. The capitalization effect
of income taxes decreases after a period of seven years. The reverse is true for aggregate
expenditures. Expenditures positively capitalize in the base year and all interaction terms
are positive too. The interaction term for the year 2004 is close to the 10% level. Although
taxes seem to capitalize less, this is clearly not the case for expenditures which seem to
capitalize more. Taking a closer look at the disaggregate data supports this view. In column
(8) interaction terms for the tax rate are positive and significant for the years 2001 to 2004.
The interaction terms for cultural expenditures show a negative sign but are far for being
significant. Interaction terms for social expenditures are always positive. Administrative
expenditures do not capitalize significantly in the base year 1998 nor in the other years of
this analysis. Finally, expenditures for health capitalize significantly at the beginning and
seem to increase their influence over time. The coefficients of all disaggregate interaction
variables are not significant.
Next, we examine whether the functional form of the estimated equation matters. A num-
ber of capitalization studies using amenity models look at the logarithm of the endogenous
variable house values (see Oates (1969) and Yinger et al. (1988)). Still, there is a large lit-
erature that considers non-logarithmic forms such as Stull and Stull (1991). To test for the
possible influence of a logarithmic form we estimate a partial logarithmic model using the
house prices in logarithmic form. Columns (9) and (10) give the results. The values of the
coefficients change but our main results remain almost unchanged. The effect of income
taxes in the base year 1998 is significant and negative. The interaction terms for all other
years are positive but not significant.
Analyzing aggregate expenditures, we find a positive but insignificant impact. Interaction
terms are also positive but insignificant. For disaggregate expenditures, we find a positive
impact of cultural, social and health expenditures and a negative one for administrative ex-
penditures. All coefficients are significant. Interaction terms for cultural and administrative
expenditures indicate falling absolute capitalization rates. On the other hand, expenditures
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for social well-being and health seem to capitalize more over time. However, none of the
effects of the interaction terms is significant at the 10% level.
Finally, we take account of a possible endogeneity problem. Usually reverse causation is not
a large discussion in the house price hedonic literature. Contributions such as Palmon and
Smith (1998b) and Brasington (2001) do not mention this problem nor do they control for
it. Oates (1969) discusses the problem of reverse causation for property taxes. As property
taxes are levied on the property value, some reverse causation might be a problem in this
case. Here, we do not consider property taxes but local income taxes which should not
increase if house prices rise. Still, we instrument our tax and expenditure variables with
the fraction of Catholics, the fraction of left cantonal parties, the population, population
squared, the fraction of area for farming, the fraction of area for forests, the fraction of
the population younger than 18 years and whether the community has a grammar school.
Columns (11) and (12) show the second stage. Again, taxes and public expenditures have the
expected sign. The interaction terms of taxes are negative but insignificant. The interaction
terms of aggregate expenditures are negative and insignificant. For disaggregate expenditures
we find that none of them is significant at the 10% level. Only income taxes capitalize
negatively. Neither the interaction terms for the tax rate nor any interaction term for the
different expenditure categories capitalize significantly. Consequently, instrumentation of
taxes and expenditures does not show any significant decrease in capitalization rates over the
analyzed period of seven years for municipalities in the Swiss canton of Zurich.
Time Trend Results
Contrary to the previous section, we now include in the estimated amenity model a variable
that interacts tax and public expenditures with a time trend. Generally, an opposite sign of
the interaction variable with respect to the base capitalization effect indicates a reduction
of the degree of capitalization over time and a reaction of housing supply. The results are
presented in Table 4.11.
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Table 4.11: Linear Interaction Model: Time Trends
Specification Specification
(1) (2)
Variable Coefficient Impact* in CHF Coefficient Impact* in CHF
Intercept 841493a 879605a
(59445) (62038)
TaxRate -1360.72a -1549.40 -1413.67a -1609.68
(280.828) (289.950)
Int.TaxRate.Trend 115.405c 131.41 158.357b 180.31
(66.613) (69.221)
FinExpAgg 32.773b 300.34
(13.751)
Int.FinExpAgg.Trend 6.677c 61.19
(3.474)
ExpCulture 198.978a 185.38
(57.557)
Int.ExpCulture.Trend -10.148
(16.036)
ExpSocial 70.638a 208.76
(22.876)
Int.ExpSocial.Trend 5.407
(4.943)
ExpAdmin -18.866
(19.787)
Int.ExpAdmin.Trend 1.196
(5.288)
ExpHealth 93.479c 142.52
(49.582)
Int.ExpHealth.Trend 28.625b 43.64
(13.677)
DistSchool -20.963a -181.27 -17.991a -155.58
(6.393) (5.991)
ClassSize 746.435 -87.248
(963.218) (922.693)
NoSchoolComm 1150.18 3942.96
(3992.05) (3887.46)
MedianIncome 7.328a 3464.30 6.679a 3157.51
(0.593) (0.608)
Density 21.190a 126.64 10.486b 62.67
(4.660) (5.052)
Elderly 6054.94a 761.61 4785.99a 602.00
(677.502) (695.121)
Commuters -107387a -739.94 -61539b -424.03
(28298) (27980)
Unemployment -5248.87b -117.12 -4042.22c -90.19
(2454.35) (2225.76)
Foreigners 1789.40a 236.86 872.436b 115.48
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.11: Linear Interaction Model: Time Trends (continued)
Specification Specification
(1) (2)
Variable Coefficient Impact* in CHF Coefficient Impact* in CHF
(378.029) (354.429)
Lakeview 35.585a 128.84 34.845a 126.16
(1.810) (1.877)
SWExposition 73142a 313.27 69105a 295.98
(5653.87) (5411.12)
DistCenter -6098.09a -1634.64 -6054.95a -1623.07
(318.409) (335.633)
DistShop -12.069a -147.22 -12.276a -149.74
(2.796) (2.649)
NO2Pollution -6554.43a -1164.49 -6658.62a -1183.00
(578.233) (584.214)
Year fixed effects YES YES
Adj R2 0.885 0.893
N 1183 1183
*Impact in CHF denotes the impact of a one percent increase of the mean of the respective
independent variable on property prices. The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the
average price of a comparable single family house for the respective years 1998 to 2004 across
169 municipalities. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a indicates a significance level of
below 1%; b indicates a significance level between 1% and 5%; c indicates significance level
between 5% and 10%.
The specification (1) displays the results using aggregate expenditures only. In contrast to
the previous results, we observe that the interaction term for the tax variable is positive and
significant, which indicate a decrease of the tax capitalization rate, as expected by the no-
capitalization faction. Note however that the degree of significance is only 10%. Reagarding
aggregate expenditures results, we find a weakly significant positive coefficient that is not
consistent with a reaction of housing supply over time, as it indicates an increase of the
capitalization of municipal spendings into house prices.
Column (2) confirms the results found with aggregate expenditures. The interaction term
for income tax rate exhibits a positive coefficient with a higher significance of 5%. The
interaction terms for the different categories of public expenditures are inconsitently positive
but are not significant (except for the case of health expenditures).
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In contrast to the year dummies results, specifications that include time trends in the in-
teraction variables seem to indicate some reaction of housing supply and a decrease of the
capitalization, at least on the income tax side. However, this reaction is weakly significant
in the aggregate expenditures specification and is inconsistent for the case of public expen-
diture, as the coefficients indicates a increase of the capitalization over time.
Bootstrap Results
We now turn to the last possibility to identify changes in capitalization rates. Table 4.12
presents seven regressions with the same independent variables for the years 1998 to 2004
including aggregate expenditures. Table 4.13 presents seven regressions using disaggregate
expenditures for the same years.
Looking at the coefficients for the income tax rate in Table 4.12, we find that they are always
negative. They are significant for the years 1998 and 1999 and marginally for the rest of
the years. Aggregate expenditures always capitalize positively and significantly for the years
1999 to 2004. All other variables have the expected signs and were discussed previously.
In Table 4.13, we find the same pattern for income tax rates as in Table 4.12. Furthermore,
cultural expenditures capitalize positively and significantly for the 1999-2004 period. Expen-
ditures for social well-being capitalize positively too and significantly for the same period
as cultural expenditures. Coefficient values for administrative expenditures are insignificant.
Apart from the year 1999 and 2000, health expenditures are always positive and significant.
We use these coefficients and their standard errors of the different years and compute spear-
man correlations for each variable over the seven years. Finally we bootstrap the computed
values 10,000 times. The results are given in Table 4.14 and Table 4.15.
Column (1) of these tables gives simple Spearman correlation coefficients and column (2)
provides the respective p-values for the sign of each of these coefficients. At a first glance,
it seems that the tax rate shows a positive linear trend indicating lower capitalization over
time. The p-value for the coefficient in Table 4.14 is below 0.1. When Spearman correlations
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Table 4.12: Regressions for Different Years and Aggregate Expenditures (1998 to
2004)
Variable Year 1998 Year 1999 Year 2000 Year 2001 Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(Intercept) 546697a 652872a 595753a 597446a 595873a 544829a 653146a
(132277) (134432) (145399) (131218) (143947) (142054) (143591)
TaxRate -867.830c -958.060c -834.358 -718.441 -669.748 -542.401 -794.207
(503.889) (521.750) (525.392) (473.711) (494.798) (478.008) (497.433)
ExpAgg 34.140 43.908c 56.564b 73.867a 93.729a 85.024a 84.229a
(22.223) (23.698) (23.894) (21.369) (21.761) (23.298) (21.106)
ClassSize -6302.32a -194.139b -4676.53b -5100.75b -1429.75 -5308.85b -3978.53
(2118.69) (80.843) (2025.01) (1991.19) (2401.090) (2490.26) (2630.30)
NoSchool -3116.77 -2794.03 -1486.72 -2281.25 147.978 700.39 881.28
Community (11097) (11526) (11320) (10661) (9757.43) (10039) (9325.49)
Elderly 8139.60a 6743.96a 6026.31a 4282.44a 4165.29b 5868.98a 4717.85b
(1683.68) (1707.12) (1690.34) (1628.32) (1871.46) (1883.66) (1829.41)
Density 20.463c 23.808c 24.274c 24.844b 20.258c 19.970c 25.140b
(12.104) (12.078) (12.451) (11.938) (10.961) (11.358) (10.991)
MedianIncome 9.183a 8.570a 7.967a 7.114a 8.120a 7.426a 6.482a
(1.601) (1.611) (1.640) (1.593) (1.482) (1.296) (1.183)
Lakeview 36.703a 36.030a 33.431a 33.781a 33.986a 34.802a 34.085a
(5.033) (5.154) (5.158) (4.517) (4.557) (4.498) (4.274)
DistCenter -6436.33a -6057.81a -5893.21a -5564.39a -5168.13a -5546.90a -5979.39a
(830.305) (794.759) (791.427) (852.482) (928.537) (855.426) (769.703)
NO2Pollution -7660.55a -6772.49a -6176.55a -5901.90a -5465.83a -5529.66a -5745.51a
(1419.72) (1537.45) (1581.21) (1434.02) (1405.44) (1449.65) (1438.26)
SWExposition 68906a 68627a 65005a 60690a 62207a 60394a 72605a
(13736) (14223) (13782) (13950) (14323) (15008) (15141)
DebtRepay -1799.07 -1773.80 -4936.29 -6636.17 -10327b -9858.46c -6130.54
(3817.46) (3436.55) (4505.42) (5346.12) (4959) (5024.70) (4566.75)
Unemployment -220.861 358.347 -2826.70 -22728c -12217b -7828.49 -18241a
(5560.52) (6553.84) (11019) (11561) (5888) (7592.69) (6620)
Foreigners 1585.33c 1718.29c 1155.66 2231.29b 2706.04a 2216.85c 3433.59a
(919.75) (917.761) (943.177) (1060.94) (1028.31) (1216.76) (1287.15)
Commuters -95997 -101137 -135059c -106587 -96626 -121629 -90721
(64701) (75899) (77095) (80010) (78778) (75702) (76874)
Adj R2 0.875 0.863 0.867 0.879 0.886 0.882 0.882
N 169 169 169 169 169 169 169
* The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the average price of a single family house for the respective years
1998 to 2004 across 169 municipalities. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a indicates a significance level of below 1%; b indicates a significance level between 1% and 5%; c indicates sig-
nificance level between 5% and 10%.
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Table 4.13: Regressions for Different Years and Disaggregate Expenditures (1998 to
2004)
Variable Year 1998 Year 1999 Year 2000 Year 2001 Year 2002 Year 2003 Year 2004
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(Intercept) 609682a 628762a 597916a 626483a 654796a 625559a 666531a
(135136) (136826) (152936) (135091) (143132) (140956) (141332)
TaxRate -895.978c -865.768c -732.279 -690.221 -683.692 -600.087 -840.539c
(486.117) (500.878) (536.928) (456.360) (492.628) (455.684) (460.353)
ExpCulture 140.394 194.530b 180.534c 184.370b 143.560c 180.766c 156.841c
(89.814) (91.719) (96.788) (90.838) (84.600) (95.690) (88.713)
ExpSocial 62.639 95.307b 73.553 112.376a 130.220a 113.973a 100.731a
(43.448) (44.562) (53.861) (40.289) (41.112) (39.797) (34.900)
ExpAdmin -50.867 -14.027 22.605 12.703 5.100 -10.298 14.031
(38.668) (32.786) (29.142) (18.434) (25.716) (24.511) (31.232)
ExpHealth 142.022b -3.144 85.168 228.298a 282.178a 304.708a 311.491a
(70.005) (97.131) (74.053) (53.277) (63.021) (77.717) (87.022)
ClassSize -5612.69a -170.626b -3912.53c -3435.90c -259.527 -4376.17b -4517.95c
(2038.50) (74.630) (1994.88) (1878.02) (2227.22) (2023.69) (2483.20)
NoSchool -1497.79 -1660.13 -684.722 3866.16 5372.86 6881.70 444.056
Community (10884) (11414) (11700) (10163) (9413.98) (9243.55) (9359.41)
Elderly 7771.93a 6647.89a 5522.16a 2666.80 2590.89 2700.61 2841.33
(1742.97) (1779.43) (1762.88) (1640.87) (1788.09) (1812.75) (1825.67)
Density 11.401 16.005 18.735 10.387 5.365 7.768 15.069
(13.333) (13.393) (14.958) (12.846) (12.368) (12.538) (11.465)
MedianIncome 8.208a 8.167a 7.516a 6.537a 7.564a 6.393a 5.817a
(1.652) (1.652) (1.684) (1.608) (1.406) (1.309) (1.231)
Lakeview 36.857a 35.967a 34.055a 33.242a 31.170a 32.813a 31.176a
(5.225) (5.308) (5.325) (4.577) (4.994) (4.420) (4.214)
DistCenter -6799.38a -5914.73a -5974.23a -5123.73a -5147.88a -5652.70a -5826.65a
(907.231) (857.834) (833.923) (912.023) (935.476) (932.555) (867.753)
NO2Pollution -8331.27a -7098.80a -6437.12a -6148.63a -5613.27a -5297.07a -5046.19a
(1390.87) (1518.36) (1631.50) (1355.69) (1311.00) (1447.60) (1582.75)
SWExposition 73197a 66510.992a 64709.89a 44423.34a 56386.00a 57009.92a 72673.34a
(13636) (13999) (13795) (13781) (13679) (13894) (13933)
DebtRepay -780.863 -1457.96 -5111.61 -6637.08 -7143.66c -5244.69 -3462.02
(3201.48) (3214.93) (4143.41) (4616.29) (3868.77) (4104.02) (4093.06)
Unemployment -2729.72 -418.256 -1844.56 -15261.32 -9697.75c -5145.05 -14357b
(5368.31) (6796.20) (10493) (10190) (5237.97) (6670.39) (6140.465)
Foreigners 1097.61 965.910 741.493 1179.82 1664.97c 791.162 2050.03c
(870.398) (863.065) (939.160) (924.843) (952.993) (1101.34) (1227.03)
Commuters -37325 -29276 -82869 -53077 -63935 -90160 -87273
(69049) (79737) (86214) (87733) (79285) (76149) (76402)
Adj R2 0.880 0.867 0.867 0.889 0.897 0.895 0.890
N 169 169 169 169 169 169 169
* The left-hand-side variable in all regressions is the average price of a single family house for the respective years
1998 to 2004 across 169 municipalities. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
a indicates a significance level of below 1%; b indicates a significance level between 1% and 5%; c indicates signifi-
cance level between 5% and 10%.
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Table 4.14: Bootstrap Results for Aggregate Expenditures
Variable Spearman Correlation p-Value Bootstrap Correlation Bootstrap Bias Bootstrap Standard Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TaxRate 0.750 0.066 0.643 -0.464 0.395
FinExpAgg 0.857 0.024 0.821 -0.177 0.226
Column (1) gives simple Spearman Correlations for the respective coefficients of the variables as calculated in Table 3. Col-
umn (2) is t p-Value of the Spearman Correlation. Columns (3) to (5) bootstrap the seven observations 10,000 times using
the coefficient and its standard error from Table 4.12.
Table 4.15: Bootstrap Results for Disaggregate Expenditures
Variable Spearman Correlation p-Value Bootstrap Correlation Bootstrap Bias Bootstrap Standard Error
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TaxRate 0.643 0.139 0.179 -0.071 0.394
ExpCulture 0.000 1.000 0.571 -0.580 0.394
ExpSocial 0.714 0.088 0.429 -0.119 0.343
ExpAdmin 0.500 0.267 0.571 -0.260 0.326
ExpHealth 0.893 0.012 0.679 0.057 0.176
Column (1) gives simple Spearman Correlations for the respective coefficients of the variables as calculated in Table 3. Col-
umn (2) is t p-Value of the Spearman Correlation. Columns (3) to (5) bootstrap the seven observations 10,000 times using
the coefficient and its standard error from Table 4.13 .
are derived using disaggregate expenditures in Table 4.15, the correlation is not significant
any more. Aggregate expenditures have a positive correlation indicating higher capitaliza-
tion over time. The value of 0.857 is significant and close to the 1% level. When analyzing
expenditures in more detail, we can see where the aggregate positive correlation comes from.
For cultural expenditures, no clear trend can be established. Indeed, the regression coeffi-
cients of Table 4.15 for this variable show no clear trend as they starts from 140.394, go
to 184.370 in the year 2001 and fall back to 156.841. Expenditures for social well-being
have a clearer trend. The Spearman correlation for this variable over time is 0.714 which
is significant at the 10% level. Administrative expenditures show a positive trend too, in-
dicating lower capitalization over time as the variable itself capitalizes usually negatively.
However, the correlation coefficient is not significant. Finally, expenditures for health have a
clear and significant positive trend. The Spearman correlation indicates that for the observed
time frame health expenditures tend to capitalize more in the canton of Zurich. The cultural
expenditures have a negative and significant correlation indicating falling capitalization rates
too. Social welfare expenditures as well as administrative expenditures show no clear pattern
whereas health expenditures seem to capitalize more.
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Analyzing linear trends in the coefficients is not enough as we do not take account of un-
certainty in these point estimates for the seven observations of each coefficient over time.
Consequently, we bootstrap the coefficient estimates 10,000 times for tax rate, aggregate ex-
penditures and disaggregate expenditures, as explained above. This allows us to calculate a
bootstrapped Spearman correlation for all fiscal variables in column (3). Bootstrap methods
also allow to compute a possible bias of the point estimates which is particularly interesting
when the number of observations is limited and when high uncertainty is associated with the
estimates. Column (4) gives the estimation. Finally, column (5) gives the bootstrap standard
errors.
Looking at the bootstrapped correlations and their biases in Table 4.14, we can see that the
bias is very high with respect to the coefficient in column (3). This indicates that the values in
column (1) cannot be directly interpreted as a linear trend. The uncertainty and the bias in the
trend estimation are high. Even if the capitalization of taxes seems to decrease over time, the
bootstrapping results do not show a clear trend. This remains true for expenditures categories
(Table 4.15). They seem to capitalize more but bootstrapping results show again that the bias
is high and unbiased estimates, in column (3) and (4), of the correlation coefficients are closer
to zero than the simple Spearman correlation of column (1). Dividing the unbiased estimates
by the standard error of column (5) shows that only for health expenditures and aggregate
expenditures a positive trend can be observed. For taxes and other expenditure categories no
significant changes in capitalization rates can be identified. Aggregate expenditures and the
category of health expenditures seem to capitalize more over time indicating that at least for
the observed time period and the data used, the ideas of Edel and Sclar (1974) concerning a
supply side reaction cannot be supported.
Conclusion
Even though we find significant capitalization of taxes and public expenditures in the munici-
palities of the canton of Zurich, some authors argue that this is only a temporary phenomenon
that should disappear as soon as land developers build new housing in response to price dif-
ferentials (Hamilton, 1976a; Henderson, 1985). This chapter has presented the controversy
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on the existence of capitalization and its implications for the test of the Tiebout hypothe-
sis. We also show with a simple theoretical model that the degree of fiscal capitalization
depends on housing supply elasticity. Thus, the persistence of capitalization is essentially an
empirical question.
Using our panel data set from the canton of Zurich, we estimate the change of capitalization
over the metropolitan area by including in a standard amenity model interaction variables
between fiscal variables and available land, a proxy for housing supply elasticity. We also
try to detect change of capitalization over time by interacting fiscal variables with year dum-
mies and a time trend. Overall, our estimation seems to indicate a persistence of tax and
public expenditures capitalization both across space and over time, as most of interaction
variables as well as the bootstrapped coefficients are not significant. These results gives sup-
port to the pro-capitalization faction that argues that housing supply is restricted at the local
level by zoning regulations land scarcity and that capitalization is persistent features of local
governments (Yinger, 1981; Fischel, 2001; Oates, 2006).
General Conclusion

SInce the Tiebout (1956) model, many empirical capitalization studies have confirmedthat taxes have a negative and public services have a positive impact on housing prices.
The first chapter of this thesis has presented the theoretical roots of capitalization. While it is
generally invoked to rationalize capitalization, the Tiebout model does not directly deal with
capitalization. Subsequent literature has solved some of the problems that are not raised in
the original Tiebout model, like the question of the form of taxation (Hoyt, 1991; Henderson,
1994) and its impact on the efficiency of public services provision (Hamilton, 1975, 1976b).
The original Tiebout model is also silent on the form and the objectives of governments that
provide local public goods and choose the level of taxes. Three approaches address this issue.
The profit maximizing developers approach (Sonstelie and Portney, 1978; Henderson, 1985)
is in line with the original Tiebout view of local governments, as it describes entrepreneurs
that provide local public goods in order to maximize profits. The second approach considers
that the governments objective is to maximize property value (Brueckner, 1983; Scotchmer,
1986). This objective is sometimes associated with a form of political pressure (Wildasin,
1979; Yinger, 1981; Fischel, 2001). The last approach is the club theory that shares com-
mon features with the Tiebout model (Cornes and Sandler, 1986; Oates, 2006). In all these
models, the efficiency of local public services provision does not emerge automatically as in
the Tiebout model but depends on the particular set of assumptions on the type of taxes and
governments objective.
Chapter 2 has provided a non-exhaustive review of the empirical literature on capitalization.
As argued by Fischel (2001), there have been so many capitalization studies that it is “now
an undergraduate exercise”. Thus we have focused our attention on studies that significantly
improved the techniques and data sets or estimate capitalization with original methods.
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In chapter 3, we have estimated the capitalization of income taxes and public expenditures in
171 municipalities from the Canton of Zurich. Our estimations are based on a unique data set
that allows to control for a variety of fiscal, environmental, neighborhood and demographic
variables. Our endogenous variables is the price of a standardized and comparable single
family house in each community. In contrast to the usual aggregate or micro data studies,
this approach allows us to ignore the structural variables that may induce various biases on
the tax and public services capitalization estimates. Our capitalization estimates are standard
and consistent to the literature; Most of the control variables have significant and expected
sign. The baseline results show that a a one percent increase in the mean income tax rate
reduces house values by around 1000 Swiss francs. Regarding local public expenditures,
the capitalization effect depends on the item considered. Social expenditures have larger im-
pact on house prices than health and cultural expenditures. Environment and administrative
expenditures have no significant influence on property values.
In line with Oates (1969), the estimation of fiscal capitalization has often been used in the
literature as a test for the Tiebout hypothesis. Oates (1969) shows that his capitalization
estimates imply equivalent impact of taxes and public school expenditures on house prices;
Thus the property tax is equivalent to a benefit tax, as the negative effect on property value
of a tax increase is roughly offset by the public spending allowed by the additional tax rev-
enues. This would indicate that communities have reached a Tiebout equilibrium and an
efficient pattern of local public services. In contrast, some authors (Hamilton, 1976a; Hen-
derson, 1985) criticize this view and argue that capitalization of local fiscal variables does
not describe a full Tiebout equilibrium. Chapter 4 has presented the debate on the existence
and the meaning of capitalization and provided a simple model that sums up the two sides
of the debate. We find that for a perfect elastic supply of housing, capitalization of taxes
and public expenditures should disappear. However, for inelastic supply of housing, cap-
italization tends to persist. Thus, the implication of this model is that the question of the
persistence of fiscal capitalization is essentially an empirical one. Chapter 4 has estimated
the change of the capitalization rate in response to housing supply differences across space
and over time. We introduce a land available variable as a proxy for housing supply elasticity
and which is interacted with fiscal variables. Then fiscal variables are interacted with time
dummies and a time trend in order to detect changes of capitalization over time. In all cases,
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a decreasing pattern of capitalization is supported if the interaction variables have opposite
sign to the base effects of taxes and public expenditures on housing prices. The signs of in-
teraction variables are consistent with a reaction of housing supply but coefficient estimates
are generally not significant. The only specification that exhibits some (weak) reaction of
housing supply over time is the one that includes the interaction term between tax rate and
a time trend. These results seem to indicate that capitalization of income taxes and public
expenditures into housing prices is persistent both across space and over time in the Canton
of Zurich.
What are the implications of our results for the evaluation of the municipal public policies
of the Canton of Zurich? The no-capitalization faction argues that a full Tiebout equilibrium
and an efficient pattern of local public services is actually associated with no correlation be-
tween local fiscal variables and housing prices. Thus, according to this approach, our main
results seem to indicate that municipalities provide local public services inefficiently. In con-
trast, Fischel (2001) argues that capitalization is an important ingredient of local efficiency
and is consistent with the intensive use of zoning regulations at the local level. Houses are
the major asset of communities’ residents and capitalization helps to keep the link between
them and local officials. In particular, Fischel (2001) argues that capitalization of local fiscal
variables constraints politicians to adopt efficient policies. For instance, if a jurisdiction de-
cides to settle a waste collection center without the agreement of residents, house prices will
decrease as the probability of reelection of the mayor. Thus, it is in the interest of the local
government to set the policy that increase property values.
The reader may wonder why we do not find any reaction of housing supply across space and
over time in the Canton of Zurich. Regarding the time dimension, the persistence of cap-
italization may simply be explained by the relatively small number of observations; while
housing supply is likely to take long time to react, we only have seven years of observations.
Regarding the space dimension, the no-capitalization argument implies that capitalization
should be larger near the CBD than in the fringe of the metropolitan area. In contrast, we
find that capitalization persists in any place of the metropolitan area, that is, whatever the
conditions prevailing on the housing supply. This result may be explained by several fac-
tors. The theoretical model presented in chapter 4 shows that the reaction of capitalization to
housing supply differentials occurs only if local jurisdictions have a significant market power
172 General Conclusion
over the metropolitan area. Our results may thus reflect that the relative small size of munic-
ipalities of the Canton of Zurich. The argument of the no-capitalization faction requires that
land developers have the possibility to reallocate land use appropriately in order to eliminate
capitalization. Let us Consider, for example, a municipality with a relatively high quality
of public services and a low level of taxes. Without any constraint, land developers would
convert agricultural land into residential land until housing price differentials vanish. As
mentioned above, Fischel (2001) argues in contrast that municipalities have an elastic supply
of housing and that zoning is an important municipal function. The change of capitalization
rate is related to the assumption of flexible jurisdiction’s boundaries. In the long run, flexi-
ble boundaries allow communities with desirable fiscal bundles to expand over communities
with less desirable fiscal bundles until house prices differentials disappear. In contrast to
this theoretical requirement, the municipal level in Switzerland exhibits a huge institutional
stability. For example, the number of municipalities in Switzerland has changed from 3205
to 2896. In the Canton of Zurich, the number of communities is stable (171 municipalities)
since 1941 (Federal census of the population 2000).
The last factor that may explain our results is related to the nature of the house price variable
used in these estimations. In contrast to the literature, we do not use sales transactions or
median property value but the price of a standardized and comparable single family house.
However, if the housing is segmented in several sub-markets, it is possible that housing
supply reactions concern other sub-markets than the particular one we analyze. In such
a case, we are not able to detect these reactions and their impact on the tax and public
expenditures capitalization without any additional data on other types of houses. This implies
that our study should be reproduced with different data sets including sales transactions for
example.
In conclusion, this thesis offers a new sight on capitalization of local fiscal variables. Con-
trary to the arguments of the no-capitalization faction and the recent empirical findings of
Brasington (2002) and Hilber and Mayer (2009), we have shown that not only capitalization
is a natural feature of local jurisdictions, but it is also likely to be a persistent phenomenon.
Subsequent research has to be conduced to confirm these findings.
Appendix

Detailed Steps for Capitalization Equations (4.4),
(4.5), (4.12) and (4.13)
Capitalization Equations for Perfectly Competitive Jurisdictions
Differentiating (4.3) with respect to gi yields:
∂V
∂ pi
∂ pi
∂gi
+
∂V
∂gi
= 0. (A1)
Applying Roy’s identity and MRSi = (∂V/∂gi)/(∂V/∂y) on (A1) and solving for ∂ pi/∂gi,
we obtain (4.4).
Differentiating (4.3) with respect to ti gives:
−∂V
∂yi
y+
∂V
∂ pi
∂ pi
∂ ti
= 0. (A2)
Applying Roy’s identity and solving (A2) for ∂ pi/∂ ti yields (4.5).
Capitalization Equations for Jurisdictions with Market Power
Differentiating (4.6) with respect to gi yields:
∂V
∂ pi
∂ pi
∂gi
+
∂V
∂gi
− ∂V
∂ p j
∂ p j
∂gi
= 0.
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Applying Roy’s identity and MRSi = (∂V/∂gi)/(∂V/∂y), we obtain:
−hi∂ pi∂gi +h j
∂ p j
∂gi
=−MRSi. (A3)
Then differentiating equation (4.9) with respect to gi gives:
∂Hi
∂ pi
∂ pi
∂gi
1
hi
− ∂hi
∂ pi
∂ pi
∂gi
Hi
h2i
+∑
j 6=i
(
∂H j
∂ p j
∂ p j
∂gi
1
h j
− ∂h j
∂ p j
∂ p j
∂gi
H j
h2j
)
= 0. (A4)
Using equation (A4), making appear the demand and housing supply elasticity, and combin-
ing with equation (A3), we get:
ni
pi
(ηi− εi)∂ pi∂gi +∑j 6=i
(
−n j
p j
(η j− ε j)
(
MRSi
h j
− hi
h j
∂ pi
∂gi
))
= 0. (A5)
Solving (A5) for ∂ pi/∂gi yields equation (4.12).
We proceed analogously for deriving the tax capitalization equation. Differentiating (4.6)
with respect to ti, applying Roy’s identity and the definition of the MRS gives:
−hi∂ pi∂ ti +h j
∂ p j
∂ ti
= y¯. (A6)
Differentiating equation (4.9) with respect to ti and making appear the demand and housing
supply elasticity gives:
ni
pi
(ηi− εi)∂ pi∂ ti +∑j 6=i
(
n j
p j
(η j− ε j)∂ p j∂ ti
)
= 0. (A7)
Combining equation (A6) and equation (A7), we obtain:
ni
pi
(ηi− εi)∂ pi∂ ti +∑j 6=i
(
n j
p j
(η j− ε j)
(
y¯
h j
+
hi
h j
∂ pi
∂ ti
))
= 0. (A8)
Solving (A8) for ∂ pi/∂ ti yields equation (4.13).
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RÉSUMÉ
Cette thèse analyse la dynamique spatiale et temporelle de la capitalisation des variables fiscales
locales (impôts et dépenses publiques) dans les valeurs immobilières des communes du Canton de
Zurich. Bien que la littérature ait maintes fois mis en évidence le phénomène de capitalisation,
la question de l’ampleur de la capitalisation ainsi que son interprétation reste ouverte. Bon nom-
bre d’analyses interprètent la capitalisation comme un test de l’hypothèse de Tiebout et associe sa
présence à une fourniture Pareto-optimale des biens publics. Cependant, une partie de la littérature
considère que la présence de capitalisation signifie au contraire que les collectivités locales n’ont pas
atteint un équilibre de Tiebout. Bien que cette question ait été soulevée pendant les années 70, elle
n’a toujours pas trouvé de réponse définitive.
Le premier chapitre de cette thèse offre un panorama de la littérature théorique associée au modèle
de Tiebout, en se concentrant sur les articles qui abordent le phénomène de capitalisation. Le second
chapitre remet en perspective différentes innovations économétriques réalisées dans le domaine de
l’estimation de la capitalisation fiscale. Le troisième chapitre présente des estimations de base de la
capitalisation dans le Canton de Zurich. Pour estimer l’impact des variables fiscales des communes
Zurichoises sur les valeurs immobilières, nous utilisons une variable endogène originale : le prix
d’une maison standardisée et comparable pour l’ensemble des communes. Cette approche permet
d’ignorer les variables structurelles (nombre de pièces, taille, âge, style) qui entrent dans les facteurs
explicatifs de la valeur d’un logement. En revanche, la variable de prix immobilier est régressée sur
un grand nombre de variables explicatives, allant des variables de voisinage aux variables fiscales,
démographiques ou environnementales. Le chapitre 4 contribue au débat sur la persistance de la cap-
italisation en estimant le changement du taux de capitalisation des variables fiscales en réaction à des
différences d’offre immobilière selon la situation de la commune dans l’agglomération Zurichoise et
à travers le temps. Ainsi, le taux de capitalisation devrait être plus faible dans les collectivités dis-
posant d’une plus grande quantité de terre disponible et devrait décroître à travers le temps, à mesure
que l’offre immobilière s’ajuste par le biais de nouvelles constructions dans les communes attrac-
tives. Les résultats indiquent cependant à l’inverse de la théorie une persitence de la capitalisation
fiscale à la fois sur l’ensemble de l’agglomération Zurichoise et à travers le temps. Ces résultats
soulignent l’importance de l’utilisation du zonage par les autorités locales, qui rendent rigides l’offre
immobilière et favorise le phénomène de capitalisation.
Mots-clés : capitalisation fiscale, prix hedonique, réaction de l’offre, valeurs immobilières.
Codes JEL : R14, R31, R52.

ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the dynamic of fiscal capitalization across space and over time in the Canton of
Zurich. While the literature provides a profusion of evidence on capitalization, there is still a contro-
versy on the extent to which local fiscal variables capitalize into house values and on the appropriate
interpretation one must have with respect to the Tiebout hypothesis. The outcome of a significant
degree of tax and public expenditures capitalization is often interpreted as a test of the Tiebout hy-
pothesis and associated with a Pareto efficient provision of local public goods. Some authors criticize
this view and argue that capitalization of local fiscal variables does not describe a full Tiebout equi-
librium. Fiscal capitalization results from scarcity of land that prevents households from moving
toward communities with favorable tax-expenditure packages. While it has been raised in the 70’s,
the question of the persistence of capitalization has not received a definitive answer. This thesis aims
to contribute to this debate.
Chapter 1 provides a survey of the theoretical literature on the Tiebout model, which is the basis of
virtually every empirical capitalization study. Chapter 2 provides a review of the econometric inno-
vations and improvements made by the empirical literature on capitalization. Chapter 3 contributes to
the empirical literature on capitalization by providing estimation results of a unique data set from the
Canton of Zurich. For our purpose, we use the price of a standardized and comparable single family
house in each community. This allows to ignore the control of the structural characteristics in the
estimation. We regress this house price variable on a large set of fiscal, neighborhood, environmental
and demographic characteristics. Chapter 4 contributes to the debate on the persistence of capital-
ization and estimates the change of the capitalization rate in response to housing supply differences
across space and over time. We use data on land availability as a proxy for housing supply elasticity.
We estimate amenity models in which we interact the dummy variable for land availability with local
fiscal variables. We also test for a decrease of capitalization over time by interacting local fiscal vari-
ables with year and time trend dummies. In addition we compute Spearman correlation to check the
presence of a linear trend in the fiscal variables coefficients. Since the time horizon of our sample is
relatively small (7 years), we bootstrap the basic capitalization coefficients 10,000 times. Overall, our
estimation seems to indicate a persistence of tax and public expenditures capitalization both across
space and over time, as most of interaction variables as well as the bootstrapped coefficients are not
significant. These results are consistent with the intensive use of zoning regulations at the local level.
Keywords: Fiscal capitalization, hedonic house price, amenity models, housing supply, property
values, taxes.
JEL classification: R14, R31, R52.
